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In this work, I analyse the role of judiciary in the process of censorship in India. 
Focussing on the subject of “Religious offense and censorship of publications,” I 
examine the rationales and justifications given by courts to restrict freedom of speech 
and expression. I argue that the issues like public order, and the concern to protect 
religious sentimentalities of different communities from hurt in a secular democracy, 
form the bedrock on which the courts construct the legal justification for curtailment 
of right to freedom of expression. In the process, the courts define the “reasonability” 
of restrictions, as advocated under article 19(2) of the constitution, very expansively, 
thereby allowing wide latitude for state intervention in the free exercise of this 
fundamental right. In a way, the position of the courts reflect a sense of legal 
patronage for state action against misuse of freedom of speech and expression, and it 
also exhibits a form of legal paternalism where the courts educates the citizens 
regarding the permissible limits of “matter” and “manner” of speech acts.  
 
I further argue that this attitude of the courts, along with the ambiguity attached with 
the nature of statutory laws, and the structural and procedural limitations of the legal 
process creates a “web of censorship” that fails to provide the legal protection 
required for the free exercise of the right to freedom of speech and expression. 
However, despite these limitations, and increasing intervention of non-state actors in 
the process of censorship, the role of courts cannot be undermined. As the 
constitutional authority to interpret and define the scope of freedom of speech and 
expression, they continue to play a dominant role in the politics of censorship in 
Indian context.  
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1. Freedom of Speech and Expression in India: Issues and Problems  
“The writer Perumal Murugan is dead.” 
This announcement was made by Perumal Murugan, a Tamil writer, in his facebook 
post on January 12, 2015.
1
 It reflected the state of the writer’s mind after one of his very 
popular novels Madhorubagan (One Part Woman), first published in December 2010 
and, a recipient of several prizes and accolades, suddenly became the subject of 
controversy in 2015. Madhorubagan was set in a village near Tiruchengode (Namakkal 
district) during the colonial period, and it told of the social stigma faced by a childless 
couple.
2
 The controversy over Murugan’s novel erupted when, in December 2014, 
some pages of the novel were photocopied and distributed along with a handbill that 
accused the author of demeaning women belonging to the Kongu Vellala community 
(also called Gounders), and vilifying an old tradition attached to the village temple. The 
accusation took a dramatic turn after around 40 different caste-based outfits, mobilized 
by the local leaders of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)
3
 decided to launch an 
agitation against the author for presenting in a poor light the character of Gounder 
women and the old temple ritual, which they held, brought a bad name to 
Tiruchengode. The town was shut down in protest, and the author received threats to his 
                                                           
1
  “Tamil author Peral Mumurugan announces his death on facebook over lack of freedom of speech,” 
Indian Express, January 15, 2015. 
2
  The novel highlights the plight of Kali and Ponna, the protagonist couple, and while discussing their 
attempts to conceive it also referred to an age old local custom of the community which, according to 
temple laws, allowed consensual union among consenting adults outside of marriage during village 
festival to overcome the problem of childlessness. More than 5000 copies of the novel had been sold 
and on popular demand a translated version with the title One Part Woman was published by Penguin 
in 2013. Two sequels to the novel had also been published. 
3
  RSS is a right-wing cultural organization, argued to be very close to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 
a prominent political party in India. 
10 
life, from the local community. Though no formal ban was placed on the book, the 





January the District Revenue Officer, V. R. Subbulakshmi, who also served as 
Additional District Magistrate, convened a “peace committee meeting,” to which 
Murugan along with his lawyer were also invited. However, in the meeting, Murugan 
and his lawyer were not allowed to present his case, nor was he allowed to meet the 
protesting groups. Rather the authorities ordered him to sign a statement, as has been 
demanded by the protesting groups, which stated that the author wished to apologize 
unconditionally, agreed to recall all copies of the book, change controversial references 
and paragraphs, and never in the future to write anything connected with Tiruchengode. 
In order to buy peace, the district administration had, it would seem, sacrificed the 
freedom of speech and expression of P. Murugan. Murugan’s subsequent facebook post 
claiming his death as a writer was a reaction to these events, which he claimed had left 
him “insecure and disgusted.”
5
 
This episode is just one instance among many, which illuminate forms of censorship 
that are operational in the Indian society. The case of Murugan also exposed different 
layers involved in the process of censorship as it operates in the Indian context – and 
helps us to see the reasons for its remarkably high success rate. Let me highlight some 
of the important issues involved in this case. First, when the book was originally 
published in the local language (Tamil) more than four years before the incident, there 
was no protest against the content of the book. In fact, it became a bestseller with the 
publisher selling more than 5000 copies, before the controversy began.
6
 The gap 
between the time of publication and the claims about hurt sentiments suggest other 
                                                           
4
  This is reflected in the affidavit submitted by Perumal Murugan in the High Court in connection with 
the court case over his book. 
5
  Murugan expressed his anguish in an affidavit that was submitted to Madras High Court on his 
behalf, where a plea to dismiss the undertaking had come up (W.P. No. 2668 of 2015). Ilangovan 
Rajasekaran, “Writer Speaks Out,” Frontline, March 20, 2015, http://www.frontline.in/the-
nation/writer-speaks-out/article6955375 .ece. 
6
  This is a part of the information provided by S. R. Sundaram as the publisher of Murugan’s book in a 
counter affidavit filed in the case, S. Tamilselvan and other v. The Government of Tamil Nadu and 
others, (2015) W.P. No. 1215 of 2015. 
11 
intervening factors at play. Second, the attitude of the government authorities of 
Tamil Nadu was open to question. The district administration claimed that its action 
was the best to control a potentially disruptive law and order situation in the town. In 
the “peace-meeting”, the administration brokered a one-sided deal which both 
provided legitimacy to the claims of hurt by the protestors, and ensured that their 
demands were met. The administration did not investigate as to who was responsible 
for the circulation of photocopies of selective portions from the book, which had 
incited the harassment of Murugan by local groups. Nor was the police interested in 
finding the people who had threatened Murugan, and his family members. The 
message was clear: the district administration wanted to avoid public order problems, 
and it was convinced that the freedom of expression of the author was a small price to 
be paid to secure that.  
The third important aspect related to the case, which has often been ignored by analysts 
and commentators, was the role of the court. After Murugan was forced to sign the 
compromise letter by the district authorities, several organizations including PUCL 
(People’s Union for Civil Liberties) filed writ petitions in the Madras High Court, 
highlighting two issues: first, the continuous harassment of Murugan by “caste and 
religion based groups”
7
; second, the role of state authorities, in particular in 
pressurizing Murugan to sign the agreement. Based on these issues, the request was 
made that the court declare the agreement as “illegal, unconstitutional, and not being 
enforceable.” The first petition in this regard was filed on 26
th
 January, 2015. The High 
Court later hinted that it wanted to hear directly from Murugan on the matter, and 
would club all the relevant petitions together. Petitions were also filed by Murugan’s 
opponents requesting the court to order the government to ban the book, and carry 
criminal proceedings against Murugan for disturbing communal harmony and vilifying 
religious practices. Within a month, Murugan submitted his reply in the form of an 
affidavit where he spoke out about his experiences, as well as his discomfort with the 
attitude of the state authorities. However, it took more than one and half years for the 
                                                           
7
  The petition was filed by S. Balamurugan, General Secretary of PUCL in Tamil Nadu and appeared 
as S. Balamurugan vs. The Government of Tamil Nadu and others, (2015) W.P. No. 2668 of 2015. 
12 
court to pronounce its final judgment on the subject.
8
 Such delays in judgment, by 
creating uncertainty as far as the issue of legality is concerned, have proved a block 
against the defenders of the right to freedom of expression. In the academic and 
philosophical debates about free speech, scholars have argued that incidents such as the 
Murugan case have a tendency to produce a “chilling effect,” which serves as an 
informal mode of censoring freedom of expression.
9
 Murugan’s case is a representative 
instance of a looming complexity exhibited in the functioning of the Indian state and 
society, when claims of religious offence are directed against the fundamental freedom 
of speech and expression.    
But such phenomena are not new for Indian society, and a historical survey of case laws 
and the archives of newspaper and periodicals suggest that the fundamental right to 
freedom of speech and expression has, since its inception as a constitutional provision, 
routinely faced challenges in the Indian context. In this thesis, I seek to analyze the role 
that law and legal process have played in the debates surrounding issues related to 
freedom of speech and expression in India. When the constitution of independent India 
was being drafted and the fundamental rights provisions were being discussed – of 
which the right to freedom of speech and expression was a significant part – the 
constitution makers gave a special role to the judiciary: that of safeguarding citizens’ 
fundamental rights from encroachment either by individuals, groups or the executive. It 
was assumed that in case of contradictions and controversies, the judiciary would act to 
protect the rights of citizens. I therefore make a primary focus of my thesis the issue of 
understanding how the courts have interpreted the Constitutional provisions that 
guarantee freedom of speech and expression and also the laws that allow for its 
restrictions.  
                                                           
8
  The Madras High Court finally pronounced its judgment in the case on July 5, 2016, almost one and 
half years after the petition had first appeared in the court. The judgment appeared as S. Tamilselvan, 
W.P. No. 1215 of 2015. 
9
  Chilling effect applies to cases where state might not directly censor free speech, but its role produces 
conditions which lead to self-censorship. It may either be due to uncertainity in legal sanctions or 
unfriendly attitude of administration or any such reasons. See, Gara LaMarche, “Some Thoughts on 
Chilling Effect,” Art Journal 50, no. 4 (1991): 56-58. 
13 
As the field of freedom of speech and expression is too broad, I limit the scope of my 
study to the specific subject of censorship of publications. In order to gain further focus, 
I will concentrate in this thesis on contentious writings which invoked religious issues, 
and which were claimed to be “offensive” to religious sensibilities by different socio-
religious groups. On such grounds, demands were raised for proscription, forfeiture or 
the banning of such publications. One reason for my choosing to focus on this topic is 
that the issue of censorship of publication has become a prominent issue in Indian 
politics. In recent years, several prominent cases, such as the pulping of Wendy 
Doniger’s book,
 10
 have become the subject of intense public controversy. One of the 
important questions raised by this case centered on the role of the courts – in particular, 
whether the courts could and should have played a more active role in the case. But 
Doniger’s was not the only book subject to the wrath of the claims of hurt sentiments of 
social groups. Scholars who have studied censorship in India have shown that since 
Independence there have been many publications that became embroiled in such 
controversies, and were either banned or censored by the authorities – who routinely 
cited reasons like a threat to public order or the hurt caused to the religious sentiments 
of different communities.
11
 In many such cases, the aggrieved party, either the author or 
the publishers approached the court for relief. The decision of the courts in these cases 
brought the controversy to an end within a finite period, and also contributed positively 
to the discourse of freedom of speech and expression in India.   
The topicality of the subject was not the only reason for choosing the field of censorship 
of publications, for research. The choice was also based on the representative nature of 
the subject. First, in India, where the average literacy rate is very low,
12
 it is striking to 
note how a publication can generate controversy over hurt caused by the publication’s 
content. Moreover, most of the books that attracted controversy were not aimed at 
                                                           
10
  I discuss the details of this case in chapter 5 of this thesis. 
11
  See, Girja Kumar, The Book on Trial: Fundamentalism and Censorship in India (Delhi: Har Anand, 
1997); Rajeev Dhavan, Publish and be Damned: Censorship and Intolerance in India (New Delhi: 
Tulika Books, 2008). 
12
  Literacy rate in India, according to census of 2011, is 74.04%. Data used from the official website of 
Census of India and is available at http://censusindia.gov.in/2011-prov-results/datafiles/india/Final_ 
PPT_2011_chapt er6.pdf. 
14 
public consumption. The price of the book, on the one hand, and the specificity of the 
subject (especially in cases of academic studies, such as Doniger’s), on the other hand, 
should have acted as hurdles to any broader public reception or awareness. It is easier, 
for example, in case of visual representation, like films and cartoons, to reach to a wider 
audience, and attract opposition, in case it is controversial. Therefore, the chances of 
publications being a cause of hurt sentiments, is much lesser than in case of other 
modes of expression. But it has been seen that publications have become equally 
controversial, and attracted censorship, similar to visual forms of expression. In the case 
of controversies regarding publications, rumours and hearsay play important roles in 
spreading the content and its interpretation.
13
 Also, in many cases in order to ignite 
controversy, the groups claiming offence often distributes photocopies of the 
controversial portions of the book or publication. For example, in Perumal Murugan’s 
case, this had a major role in creating public opinion against the book after 4 years of its 
initial publication. So, it can be argued that, the censorship of publications can act as a 
hard case to understand how the process of censorship operates in Indian society.     
Second, the censorship of publications also serves as a representative case to understand 
the legal boundaries of freedom of speech and expression. One of the reasons is that the 
statutory laws invoked in most cases of censorship are almost the same. For example, 
section 295(A) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), related with hurting religious 
sentiments, and section 153(A), related to promoting enmity between two classes of 
citizens, has been routinely used by government authorities as well as non-state actors 
in their efforts to censor different forms of expression. In 2001, the Government 
authorities in Delhi used the provisions of section 153(A) and 295(A) to disallow a 
public exhibition arranged by SAHMAT (Safdar Hashmi Memoria Trust) group.
14
 
Similarly, in the case of the artiste M. F. Hussain, the petitioners had filed criminal 
                                                           
13
  The mobilization of Muslims in several parts of India (as in Mumbai and Kashmir), after the 
‘Rushdie affair’ is a glaring example of this phenomenon. The book The Satanic Verses, was already 
banned, and could not be imported, so the chances that all who participated in such mobilizations and 
protests had actually read the book, is very low. 
14
  The case appeared in Delhi High Court as The Trustees of Safdar Hashmi Memorial Trust v. Govt. of 
NCT of Delhi, (2001) CriLJ3689. SAHMAT is a left-oriented cultural organization that includes 
academicians, artists and others, and it claims to promote the values of pluralism and secularism in 
Indian society. 
15 
charges against the painter under the same statutory laws. Equally, controversies related 
to censorship of publications highlights the interplay of power relations between 
important stakeholders – the government agencies, the courts and the non-state actors.
15
 
So, a study of the controversies surrounding censorship of publications, as in this thesis, 
even acts as a representative sample for understanding the role of law and legal process 
in the process of censorship, of different forms of expression.   
The claims regarding hurt caused to religious sensibilities have been one of the prominent 
reasons invoked for censoring and banning publications in India. Although government 
authorities have also exercised their legal powers against books that were adjudged to be 
against the national interest, defamatory of individuals, or deemed for obscene, the 
contentions based on religious subjects have been vital. One important reason for this has 
been the fact that claimants of hurt sentiments have often used the logic of another 
fundamental right i.e. right to freely profess, practice and propagate their religion, 
guaranteed by article 25 of the Constitution.
16
  Criticism of publications about religious 
subjects that have been found contentious are primarily based on the argument that it 
interferes with this fundamental right, and hence such publications are legally liable to 
censorship. So, focussing on publications that are considered contentious in religious 
terms also enables us to gain a broad understanding of how legal processes India deal 
with situations where two different fundamental rights are in contention – freedom of 
speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a), and freedom of religious 
practice guaranteed under article 25. The role of courts becomes central in such cases, and 
judges try to maintain the sanctity of both rights by creating a form of balance. How this 
balance is achieved is a matter of enquiry, and I have argued (in chapter 4) that a study of 
court proceedings suggest that courts in India prefer to restrict freedom of speech and 
expression if any way it is found to threaten the secular and plural values of India, of 
which article 25 has been held up as the most significant safeguard. The space for 
                                                           
15
  The case was dealt by the Delhi High Court as, Maqbool Fida Hussain v. Raj Kumar Pandey, (2008) 
Crl. Revision Petition No. 114/2007. 
16
  Article 25 provides for Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of 
religion. Clause 1 of the article is most important which reads “Subject to public order, morality and 
health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of 
conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion.” 
16 
protecting religion from vilification and insult to religious beliefs is also protected by 
statutory laws, especially section 295(A) of the IPC. The courts in India, in different 
cases, have also justified the constitutional validity of this law as well as its continuing 
relevance.
17
 It is for these reasons that a study of the subject of censorship of publications 
dealing with religious subject can, I shall argue, illuminate a range of different issues 
surrounding freedom of speech and expression as well as legal censorship.     
2. Research Questions 
The demand for censoring or banning a publication with a religious subject can be 
based on different grounds: feeling of offense, hate, vilification, discrimination, or 
threat experienced by individuals belonging to the target religious groups, or the feeling 
of any disruption or interruption in the enjoyment of the constitutionally guaranteed 
freedom of religion; it can also occur when government on its own decides to prohibit 
certain types of speech on the pretext that such speech may hurt sentiments and pose a 
threat to public order (tools like censorship of books, banning of books under Customs 
Act etc.). In such controversies it becomes the responsibility of the state to balance 
contradictory claims and at the same time to ensure that the fundamental rights of 
citizens are protected. Further, any such case is open to scrutiny by the judiciary, 
whereby a rational assessment of the executive’s action and its legality is undertaken. 
The response, both from government and the judiciary, is largely based on their 
interpretations of the provisions laid down under the Constitution, as well as other legal 
resources. As legal scholars have pointed out, the executive often takes the easy course 
by either banning the publication or arresting the accused writer/publisher, citing the 
threat of public disorder.
18
 As a result, it falls upon the judiciary to play the role of 
defender of the right to freedom of speech and expression.  
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19
 As the guardian of 
fundamental citizen rights, the courts enjoy considerable respect and legitimacy in the 
eyes of the people. For such reasons, advocates of free speech look towards the courts 
with high expectations.  However, the history of free speech jurisprudence in India 
reflects a complex dynamics, emerging from a balance based on respect for group 
identities and rights as well as individual rights.
20
 The balance is not fixed, and there is 
always a scope for its shift of prioritizing one over other. In the context of fundamental 
rights, the challenge of balancing was clearly reflected in the concerns of the 
constitution makers. Although the constitution guaranteed individual political rights and 
civil liberties, all these were severely circumscribed. The cultural community, on the 
one hand, and national interest, on the other, curtailed the free exercise of these rights.
21
  
The legal apparatus to control freedom of speech and expression was historically 
handed down by the British, who took it upon themselves to codify criminal and civil 
laws in India. They devised far reaching laws that were considered relevant according 
to the needs of the colonial context. Some of these laws were initiated to maintain 
their control over means of free expression, especially the press, in order to avoid its 
use in cultivating mass unrest by the nationalists, and other laws were devised in order 
to legitimize the authority of the British, as neutral arbiters of diverse cultural and 
religious interests that communities in India represented. However, even after 
independence, the government and law makers of the day, decided to incorporate the 
existing colonial legal codes, mostly without amendments, into the statutory laws of 
free India. This approach of the postcolonial state to appropriate laws devised by the 
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British has consistently faced criticism.
22
 It is equally true that a study of the 
legislative proceedings of the colonial period reveal that some Indian representatives 
raised pertinent issues with regard to British attempts to insert newer laws or amend 
older ones.
23
 But, as shown in chapter 2, there was a consensus that free speech 
needed to be curbed in order to protect other interests. These concerns, like those of 
public order and protecting religious sentimentalities of different communities from 
hurt, formed the bedrock on which the edifice for the legal regime to control free 
speech was constructed. After independence, though the nature of Indian state and its 
character changed significantly, the concerns regarding probable harm of free speech 
remained similar as during colonial period. Challenges like partition, and other events 
that marked the birth of India as a free nation, warranted a fresh consideration of the 
legal aspects in order to avoid crisis at the level of internal security and prevent public 
order issues. The new set of challenges forced amendments to the constitution, most 
significantly to those articles that dealt with freedom of speech and expression, in 
order to strengthen the executive’s control. The justification forwarded, as discussed 
in chapter 3, was that the citizens of a free nation should entrust confidence in its 
democratic government to protect and promote the interests of its citizens. This 
paternal attitude is explicitly reflected in the debates of the Parliament when 
amendments were introduced to the constitutional provisions as well as the statutory 
laws. 
At the same time, the pragmatic vision of the law makers inspired a regime of laws 
whereby the judiciary was granted the power to review executive decisions regarding 
important fundamental rights, and at the same time it could adjudicate the scope and 
relevance of the laws with changing times. Constitutionally, the first amendment to the 
constitution added the clause of “reasonability” in relation to restrictions placed on 
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freedom of speech and expression under article 19(2) of the constitution.
24
 This 
“reasonability” test provided the court with a tool to keep a check on the arbitrary 
actions of the government and thereby to protect individual right to free speech from 
regulation even in the name of public order or protecting socio-cultural rights. Other 
than this, the constitution under different articles has empowered the courts in India 
with the power of judicial review as the custodian of fundamental rights, whereby it can 
sit on any law created by the state that appears to be contravening any provisions of 
fundamental rights.
25
 The power to adjudicate on cases of freedom of expression also 
drew from the provisions of the statutory laws. For example, Section 96 of the CrPC 
(Code of Criminal Procedure) allows for any interested person to challenge the decision 
of forfeiture or ban of any publication by the government in the respective High Courts. 
Such provisions ensured that after independence the courtrooms became important 
arenas for struggle over the limits of freedom of speech and expression. 
Based on this broad understanding, my research focuses on two central questions: a) 
how has law and legal process contributed to our understanding of freedom of speech 
and expression in India?; and b) what role do courts in India play in the debates about 
free speech? In order to develop a more focussed reading of the issues I breakdown 
these two general questions into more specific ones – a) How did the idea of censorship 
evolve from the colonial period and what has been the role of socio-religious groups in 
that evolution? b) What has been the constitutional and legal framework devised by the 
Indian constitution makers vis-à-vis censorship and freedom of expression? c) How 
have amendments to the constitution and the statutory law shaped the legal discourse 
about freedom of expression in India? d) How do courts reason out restrictions on 
freedom of expression in the Indian context especially in case of contentious 
publications that are claimed to be offending religious sensibilities of certain sections? 
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e) How do structural and operative limitations of the Indian courts contribute in shaping 
the debate over free speech in India? f) How do we view the role of non-state actors in 
censorship, in the light of legal debates in India? 
3. Conceptual Terrain 
3.1. Freedom of Speech and Expression and Legal Intervention: A Comparative 
Perspective 
Freedom of speech and expression has always enjoyed a special value within liberalism. 
However, though on the one hand almost everyone seems to agree that freedom of 
speech and expression are important and that they ought to enjoy special legal 
protection which does not extend to any other class of acts in society, at the same time, 
there is no real agreement amongst philosophers, lawyers, legislators, and citizens as to 
why such freedom is important, and how much freedom might be too much freedom. 
Historically, the primary justifications put forward in favour of freedom of speech fall 
in one of these four categories – a) for the purpose of promotion of truth (or the 
marketplace of ideas theory)
26
; b) its benefits to democracy and self-government
27
; c) 
its role in promotion of other virtues that survives society
28
; and d) its contribution to 
individual’s self-realization and self determination (the autonomy based defence of free 
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. However, none of the advocates of these justifications completely dismiss the 
need for any kind of state intervention. For example, though Mill advocates that 
freedom of speech is important to produce a marketplace of ideas which could get us 
closer to truth, he also devises the “harm principle” and argues that government 
interventions could be valid if it was aimed to neutralize speech acts that had high 
potential to cause harm to others.
30
 At the least, what can be understood by the forms of 
justifications forwarded in favour of freedom of speech is that the advocates of these 
justifications support the idea of “neutrality” – both “content-neutrality” and “view-
point neutrality” – in state intervention. It means that state action should neither be 
based on the content of the speech act, nor on the viewpoint that the speech act 
represented. However, there have existed, broad disagreements about cases where the 
state should intervene, and also about the limitations of such interventions. For 
example, there is wide acceptance that “child pornography” should be banned, but there 
are existing debates about whether the state is justified in making laws to regulate 
“adult pornography”, “blasphemy” and, forms of speech which is widely referred to as 
“hate speech.” It has been observed that, regardless of the theoretical debates on the 
issue, most governments across the world have made provisions in law to restrict free 
speech in some form or other.  
Even international law, which vociferously defends the right to free speech, recognizes 
the need to allow some liberty to member states to legislate in order to balance free 
speech against its harms. For example, Article 19(2) of ICCPR (International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights) of the United Nations provides for the right to freedom of 
expression. However, it also allows the member states to restrict free speech by law 
under clause 3 of the same article, if such restrictions are meant to protect “rights” or 
“reputation” of others, or for national security or public order or of public health and 
morals. It is further specified under article 20(2) that “any advocacy of national, racial 
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or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence 
shall be prohibited.” Similarly, article 10 of the ECHR (European Convention on 
Human Rights) protects freedom of speech subject to certain restrictions that the 
member states could by law deem necessary “in the interests of national security, 
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for 
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the 
authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” So, it is evident that even international 
organizations like the UN and the EU observe the rights of its member states to restrict 
free speech on some important grounds.  
If we look at the legal provisions devised by individual countries to control the harms of 
free speech, we find a wide range of disparity. At one end of the spectrum stands the 
US legislation under the First Amendment, that allows strong protection to freedom of 
speech, and at the other end appear laws devised under the German system, where 
Article 130 of the Strafgesetzbuch (German Criminal Code), adopted in 1960, prohibits 
attack on human dignity, which include: 1) inciting hatred against a certain part of the 
population, 2) inciting to violent or arbitrary acts against such part of the population, or 
3) insulting, maliciously ridiculing or defaming such part. Parekh has rightly pointed to 
the diversity of issues that have prompted legal restrictions in different countries:  
Britain bans abusive, insulting, and threatening speech. Denmark and 
Canada prohibit speech that is insulting and degrading; and India and 
Israel ban speech that incites racial and religious hatred and is likely to 
stir up hostility between groups. In the Netherlands, it is a criminal 
offence to express publicly views insulting to groups of persons. 
Australia prohibits speech that offends, insults, humiliates, or 
intimidates individuals or groups, and some of its states have laws 
banning racial vilification. Germany goes further, banning speech 
defining and diminishing hate speech that violates the dignity of an 
individual, implies that he or she is an inferior being, or maliciously 
degrades or defames a group.
31
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Similarly the case laws in different countries have responded to the scope for 
government regulation, based on the challenges and potential threats that extreme 
defence of free speech could pose in that society. For example, in the American case, 
Samuel Walker has argued that the Supreme Court has shown a significant shift in its 
position from the early 20
th
 century to the 1940s, and then from 1950s to the 1980s. 
Walker has argued that that this shift could occur because the civil rights movement in 
the US recognized, that free speech was the only resource available for the powerless 
and the excluded, and so always stood in its favour, as it served broad social and 
political needs in the struggle for racial equality.
32
 One can definitely locate a shift in 
the courts position from the early 20
th
 century, when hate crimes of the white 
supremacist group Ku Klux Klan were widely reported, to the post-Second World War 
period of ideological opposition to communist and fascist ideologies. A shift in the 





where it upheld laws against group libel and argued that not all speech is protected by 




 and more prominently in the 
Skokie
37
 and R. A. V
38
. The debate seems to have taken a further turn with the challenge 
of “campus hate speech,” which became prominent from the 1980s onward. This phase 
is also marked by the rapid expansion of feminist theory, critical race theory and other 
alternative discourses, all of which attacked mainstream and official speech as 
inherently oppressive, white-male-dominated discourse and argued for pluralisation and 
fragmentation of discourse.
39
 As the judgements in different cases show, the court has 
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set very high standards for free speech, and its regulation is possible only in exceptional 
circumstances, even in cases concerned with hate speech. However, at the same time if 
we look at the cases that appear in the European courts, especially, in the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), it appears that the court has upheld the right of the 
member states to use legal sanction against the claims of free speech in a wide range of 
cases. For example, in Otto-Preminger-Institut
40
 the court held the forfeiture and 
seizure of anti-religious film “Das Liebenskonsil” (Council in Heaven) did not 
contravene article 10 of ECtHR since it was aimed at protection of religious right of the 
majority, in that case the Christians of Austria. Similarly in I.A.
41
, the court held that the 
case of blasphemous libel of a publisher for printing a fictional work by Abdullah Riza 
Erguven entitled “Forbidden Verses” in which a character makes disparaging comments 
about Islam was justified, as the conviction was intended to protect Muslims against 
offensive attacks on matters regarded as sacred by the community.
 
 
These readings of the legal provisions and case laws show that there is no uniformity in 
the way questions around the scope and limitations to free speech are handled around 
the world. In this respect, the case of India is similar. In India, though freedom of 
speech and expression is a guaranteed constitutional right, it in no way has any primacy 
or prior preference over other rights. The Constituent Assembly Debates (CAD)
42
 (as I 
shall discuss in my third chapter) clearly show the tension between different aspects of 
rights and the way the constitution-makers tried to balance them along with the possible 
threats emanating from freedom of speech and expression, by providing certain 
restrictions under article 19(2). This article, as it stands today, imposes reasonable 
restrictions “in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the 
State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in 
relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence.” However, 
India’s difference from the western democracies is also clearly visible if we examine 
major legislations designed to regulate free speech, and try to identify the reasons for 
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prosecution specified in these laws. For example, even if we argue that “incitement to 
an offence” and concern for “public order,” as present in article 19(2), may reflect the 
debates in west, how do we account for restrictions based on “decency”, “morality”, or 
“defamation”? The broad latitude of restrictions to free speech that India allows can 
further be gauged, from the language used to define the statutory laws. For example, 
section 153(A) of the IPC, criminalises the promotion of “enmity between different 
groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language etc,” or by 
engaging in “acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony.” The broad scope of section 
153(A) is further buttressed by section 153(B), which prohibits “imputations and 
assertions prejudicial to national-integration.” The section criminalises the use of 
“words either spoken or written,” signs, “or by visible representations or otherwise.” 
Similarly, there are other provisions like: 
• Section 295, which prohibits “injuring or defiling [any] place of worship with intent 
to insult the religion of any class”; 
• Section 295(A), which prohibits “deliberate and malicious acts, intended to outrage 
religious feelings or any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs”; 
• Section 298, which prohibits “uttering words, etc, with deliberate intent to wound 
religious feelings”;  
• Section 505(1), which prohibits “statements conducive to public mischief”; and, 
• Section 505(2), which prohibits “statements creating or promoting enmity, hatred or 
ill-will between classes.”  
These legal provisions, unlike most European provisions, use terms like “injury”, 
“insult”, “malicious act”, “outrage feelings”, “wound”, “promoting enmity”, and “ill-
will”, which have much wider, normative and practical connotation. What these legal 
provisions, and the historical background from which they emerged, reflect is that the 
fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression is treated differently in India. 
Charles Taylor rightly criticizes those scholars who assume there can be any right way 
to establish free speech through abstract principles, which could then be applied 
26 
anywhere, regardless of local conditions. Taylor adduces two reasons in support of his 
argument: a) any regime of freedom of expression requires some broad consensus. It 
cannot just be imposed by law, because, if its principles are too distant from mass 
sensibilities, it will be rendered nugatory by all sorts of extralegal pressures; and b) any 
regime of free expression has limits which are justified by the possibility of harm 
inflicted on others…. This is an issue which is sensitive to cultural differences.
43
 
Though one may disagree with the kind of regulative and restrictive mechanism 
allowed to be placed in the hands of government in India, one cannot deny that the 
regulations were included in a particular social and historical context. The complexities 
of inter-communal relationships, marred by the memory of partition, and the challenges 
facing the postcolonial Indian state, particularly that of national integration and nation-
building, became reasons for such extensive provisions for restricting free speech in 
India. So as the European nations argued for regulation of hate speech in the context of 
the Holocaust and later, under the pressure exerted by the “multi-cultural” nature of the 
European society, and in US in the context of racism and anti-communism, India had its 
own complex reality to deal with. The impact of context on legal regulation of free 
speech is very well reflected by Parekh, in his discussion about hate speech. As he puts 
it: 
Western societies have several mechanisms to cope with hate speech 
and its consequences, such as an open and competitive economy, a 
vibrant civil society, a reasonably cohesive and integrated society, a 
varied media representing a wide spectrum of views, and a plural and 
self-limiting public culture. They can therefore afford to assign law a 
relatively limited role…… So far as the developing countries are 
concerned, the situation could not be more different. Most of them are 
composed of ethnic, religious, and racial groups with little experience of 
working together and a long legacy of mistrust, ignorance, 
misunderstanding, and hostility. Rumours, jokes, inflammatory or ill-
conceived remarks by politicians seeking short-term gains, and even 
reasoned criticisms made in the course of an uninhabited exercise of free 
speech can arouse deep-seated fear, trigger unrest, and undo years of 
good work in nation building.
44
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Many scholars and legal practitioners have made critical assessments of the nature and 
scope of the law in India that governs free speech. One line of criticism pertains to the 
continuance of laws that had colonial roots. It is argued that such laws have lost their 
relevance in the present era and should therefore be scrapped.
45
 This idea echoes the 
concern that many lawmakers had also raised on the floor of the Constituent Assembly, 
when the restrictions enshrined under article 19(2) of the constitution was being 
debated.
46
 Another set of scholars highlight how these laws may not prove productive 
in achieving the goal they were meant to achieve – prevent hate speech, or protect hurt 
to religious sentiments of the people. There are two primary apprehensions raised by 
scholars in this regard – the first is with respect to the way in which these laws, rather 
than preventing hate speech which could hurt sentiments, allow for mobilisation in the 
name of hurt sentiments
47
; the second apprehension is about the “slippery slope” effect 
of laws, concerning the misuse of laws by state agencies in promoting or enforcing a 
legal sanction that might create hurdles for free exercise of right to freedom of speech 
and expression.
48
 These scholars argue about the inefficacy of the Indian statutory laws 
in dealing with the subject of hate speech, and therefore they question the presence of 
such laws in India.   
 Contrary to these views are the arguments of those who believe that given the nature of 
Indian society, where political power structures favour religious majorities, and where 
caste and gender inequalities render large numbers of citizens vulnerable and exposed 
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to the threat of hate speeches based on their caste, religious or gender identity, the state 







, and Rajeev Bhargava
52
, represent this view and they constantly highlight 
the importance of “reasonable restrictions” as enshrined in the constitution. However, 
they are cautious to suggest that the state machinery should understand that, it is the 
fundamental right of speech and expression that is “sacred” and not the restrictions 
itself. Reports on riots in India show that most of the instances of communal violence 
were preceded by altercations often incited by pamphlets, booklets, or other 
publications or even hate speech targeting the vulnerable religious group of the region, 
which included threats or vilification of their religious beliefs or practices. Studies such 
as those by Paul Brass
53
 and Steven Wilkinson
54
 support such explanations. These facts 
are used by human rights activists, such as Teesta Setalvad, to argue that hate speech 
laws are integral to the protection of the plural and secular nature of multi-religious 
Indian society. In the absence of hate speech laws, Setalvad holds that the instances of 
hate crimes against minorities could rise.
55
 
In this thesis, I do not intend to judge whether the presence of legal provisions against 
free speech is a good thing or not. I limit my study to understand what the presence of 
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these laws means to the discourse of freedom of speech and expression in India. 
Therefore I focus on the genesis of these laws – the context in which the laws were 
devised and the major actors who were involved in their formulation. This shall include 
a study of the circumstances that led to the formation of the provisions under 
constitution and the statutory laws, as well as the amendments introduced at later stages. 
This helps us to shed light on the attitude of the lawmakers towards freedom of speech 
and expression, both under colonial rule as well as after independence. At the same 
time, such study also enables us to understand the relationship between law and 
freedom of speech and expression in the Indian context as imagined by the law makers. 
I analyse the nature and scope of these laws, but my analysis is guided by the language 
used to define the laws and the possible interpretations that the courts have provided at 
different instances, which as I show in my thesis, is significant to the process by which 
state censorship works in India. It is therefore equally important to analyse the role of 
the judiciary for this purpose. 
As in the case of American and European political systems, the judiciary in India too, 
plays a prominent role in defining the scope and limits of free speech. Some 
commentators question the prominence given to the judiciary, based on their analysis of 
what they claim to be controversial judgments. It is said that “the judiciary is itself not 
outside the politics of communal hatred.”
56
 Even if one might agree with this 
assessment, it is beyond doubt that the judiciary plays an extraordinary role in defining 
the scope of freedom of speech and expression in the Indian context. Unlike the US 
judiciary which has largely dealt with the question of “hate speech” by means of 
“fighting words”
57
 and “clear and present danger”
58
 doctrines, the Supreme Court in 
India takes a wider cognizance of the test for “reasonableness” of restrictions imposed 
by the state machinery, by treating each case differently from the substantive as well as 
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 A reference to the case laws in other European countries as 
well as America becomes important as it has played a significant role in providing a 
frame of reference for Indian judges – a fact reflected in the judgments, where one can 
find constant reference to similar cases in America and other democracies. But at the 
same time, the judges in India have often maintained that the context and nature of their 
society being different, the principles and positions that the courts in other countries 
take may not be reproduced in India. For example, free speech scholar Daniel Hantman 
invokes a comparison between Indian and American Supreme Courts’ approach to 
freedom of expression, and argues that Indian courts shows a higher degree of tolerance 
for restricting socially offensive and emotionally harmful speech. He concludes that this 
has been made possible due to the persisting tension present between India’s western 
governing system and indigenous communal social structure.
60
  
In India, the judiciary interprets “reasonability” of restrictions to free speech in very 
broad terms by taking into consideration “intention”
61





 of the speech, and in some cases the “threat to public order,” where it is 
expected of the government to prove that, there was some definite threat to the law and 
order situation
64
, and that there was no other lesser alternative available
65
. As I argue in 
my thesis, the role of the judiciary in free speech cases in India lacks any basis for 
settled understanding. The rulings are ambiguous and any set precedence is absent. 
This, I show, proves to be counter effective to the cause of free speech in India as it 
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encourages non-state actors to use law and legal process to harass writers and 
publishers, since there is a constant uncertainty about the position the courts would take 
in a particular case. 
The role of the Indian judiciary in free speech discourse has (until recently) largely 
been an understudied area. It is in this field that I intend my thesis to make the most 
important contribution. Most of the literature available on the subject is 
predominantly about press freedom.
66
 Other than this, the subjects of censorship of 
books, art, films or obscenity find space in journalistic writings and are primarily in 
context of specific acts of censorship. Works on censorship such as Bhowmik’s on 
film censorship
67
, Girja Kumar’s on book censorship
68
, Brinda Bose’s gender and 
censorship
69
, Kaur and Mazzarella’s edited volume on censorship in South Asia
70
, 
have all avoided critical engagement with case laws. Though they use judicial 
pronouncements in their work, one can find only selective use of case laws aimed to 
buttress their arguments. Recently some serious engagement with the topic can be 
seen in the works of legal scholars like Rajeev Dhavan, Gautam Bhatia, Siddharth 
Narrain, and political scientist Pratap Bhanu Mehta. Dhavan’s work shows that courts 
in India, especially higher courts, have tried to provide a strong defence to freedom of 
speech. However, the legal process is so exhaustive and painful that the process itself 
becomes a form of punishment.
71
 This point has been reiterated by Narrain in his 
study of hate speech laws in India.
72
 However, with reference to case laws, Narrain 
                                                           
66
  See, S. Sorabjee, Law of Press Censorship in India (Bombay: N. M. Tripathi, 1976); S. Bhatia, 
Freedom of Press: Politico-Legal Aspects of Press Legislation in India (New Delhi: Rawat 
Publications). 
67
  Someswar Bhowmik, Cinema and Censorship: The Politics of Control in India (New Delhi: Orient 
Blackswan, 2009). 
68
  Kumar, Censorship in India; Kumar, The Book on Trial. 
69
  Brinda Bose (ed.), Gender and Censorship (New Delhi: Kali for Women, 2006). 
70
  Kaur and Mazzarella, Censorship in South Asia. 
71
  Dhavan, Publish and be Damned, 1. 
72
  Siddharth Narrain, “The Harm in Hate Speech Laws: Examining the origins of Hate Speech Legislation 
in India,” in Ramdev, Nambiar, and Bhattacharya, Sentiment, Politics, Censorship, 39-54. 
32 
has highlighted the ambiguities that exist even at the level of Supreme Court 
judgments, and hence he shows that the judgments even from courts at the highest 
level are not immune to contradictions, which make the fundamental right to speech 
and expression more vulnerable in the Indian context.
73
 The issue of ambiguity in free 
speech related judgments is also pointed to by Mehta, who believes that one of the 
reasons for such ambiguity is the concern for and the tilt of the courts towards 
communitarian values, especially when a fundamental right such as that of speech is 
posed in contention with freedom to religion. An approach based on values of 
individualism, according to Mehta, could help the courts overcome their bias against 
the right to freedom of speech and expression.
74
 Bhatia, in his work, presents a set of 
contradictory streams that appear as foundational to the judiciary’s position on free 
speech. He argues that the judges have either favoured a “moral-paternalistic vision” 
or a “liberal-autonomous vision”. The “moral-paternalistic vision” holds that since 
human beings are corruptible, they may not be entrusted with extreme freedoms and it 
is therefore the duty of the public institutions to prevent any harm to the citizens. The 
“liberal-autonomous vision”, according to Bhatia, is based on the immanent faith on 
human judgment and choices and any form of interference with that is seen as 
unwarranted.
75
 Where on the one hand, the “moral-paternalistic” attitude limits the 
scope of free speech, therefore allowing wider interference of the state, on the other 
hand, the “liberal-autonomous” attitude favours the claims of free speech. Bhatia 
argues that, based on these approaches, the courts decide the fate of free speech cases. 
These recent works on the subject have contributed significantly in my project. Such 
scholarship has helped me to grasp the multiple ways in which the role of judiciary 
could be viewed. Taking my cue from each of the above mentioned scholarships, I 
present a detailed study of courts role vis-a-vis the claims of religious offence against 
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publications. I have shown that a detailed study of the courts’ approach towards free 
speech, as well as the law and legal process that defines the boundaries of free speech, 
reveal that there are many variables that impact the fate of the case laws. For example, 
the courts’ generous consideration of the public order situation and the emphasis on 
protecting the secular and plural credentials of Indian society, has prompted moves to 
limit free speech. Similarly, the ambiguity in the court’s decisions, as well as the 
operative constraints like delay in judgments, has increased the vulnerability of 
freedom of speech and expression in the Indian context. At such a juncture, the 
philosophical considerations that scholars like Bhatia impose on the judiciary, might 
not represent the actual complexity. Mehta’s opinion about an individualism based 
approach might be fruitful, but the judiciary does not actually enjoy that liberty as it is 
guided by the constitution where freedom of expression is not the only value that 
needs protection. The courts are under, a lot of pressure to balance this fundamental 
right with others like freedom of religion and in the process, even if the courts fail the 
expectations of libertarians who argue for extreme freedom of expression, it is ready 
to do that. For its justification of curbing free speech, the courts easily invoke article 
19(2) of the constitution, which defines the limits to freedom of speech and 
expression. In my work I have tried to critically engage with all these scholars 
through the prism of case laws. However, I do not limit this study only to an analysis 
of case laws. I have also looked at the structural and operative aspects of courts’ 
functioning, which have been overlooked by both Bhatia and Mehta. This helps me to 
develop a broader understanding about the role of courts in the debates over freedom 
to expression. For example, my study about the duration of the time taken by the 
courts in India to pronounce judgments in cases related to publications claimed to be 
offensive, shows that it usually takes very long for the courts to adjudicate in the 
matter. This, as I explain in Chapter 5, creates conditions, whereby authors/publishers 
try to evade legal process, and agree for out-of-court settlement with the 
complainants, even if it hampers their free exercise of freedom of expression. Further, 
I have also tried to look at cases, where the government, the non-state actors, and the 
judiciary interact. This helps me examine the consequences of such interactions, and 
also understand how courts view the role of non-state actors in censorship, an issue 
largely overlooked in earlier studies. 
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3.2. Interventions by Non-state Actors in  Censorship and the Role of Courts  
Censorship is a form of suppression, whereby speech considered harmful, 
objectionable, sensitive or inconvenient is controlled. There can be several forms of this 
control and several agents that might perform this act. Traditionally it was understood 
to be under the power of some legitimate authority, mostly the state, to decide about 
censorship but the nature and forms of censorship has changed drastically in recent 
decades. More recently, censorship has come to be understood as a power relation 
operating at different nodal points in social relationship. While histories of censorship 
used to chronicle official legal suppression of speech, Foucault’s work invited us to 
“escape from the limited field of juridical sovereignty and state institutions, and instead 
base our analysis of power on the study of techniques and tactics of domination.”
76
 A 
set of scholars have used the Foucauldian method to develop a framework to view this 
power relationship which is popularly called “new censorship”.
77
 These scholars point 
at the change in the practice of censorship with the growth of new power centres, 
sometimes visible, at other times imperceptible. So, a range of new vocabularies have 
entered the discourse like “self-censorship”, “market censorship”, “social censorship,” 
and others. All these present different notions of censorship based on the difference in 
the location of power. The assumption is that threats to free speech come from all 
directions, not just from government. To this extent, censorship has been privatized, 
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taken out of the hands of the state and located in other sources of power.  Simon Lee 
calls it “the privatization of censorship.”
78
   
Commentators on censorship in India have primarily focussed on the role of state in the 
process. Concepts like “market censorship” and “self-censorship” are fairly new entrants 
into this scholarship. It is not to say that other forms of censorship did not exist in the 
Indian context, it is just that the field is heavily under-researched. Moreover, the state in 
India still plays a dominant role as censor. The only other form of censorship that appears 
prominently in the literature on censorship in India is “social censorship”, or what Noorani 
calls “informal censorship.”
79
 Some scholars believe that the issue of social censorship has 
still not acquired centrality in the discourse of free speech, even though it has greater 
ramifications than the traditional form of censorship practised by the state institutions.
80
 It 
is further argued, that such shift in the character of censorship can be attributed to the 
growth of Hindu Nationalism in 1980s, which developed a constructed form of cultural 
explanation and tried to impose it through vandalism and physical censorship.
81
 These 
scholars believe that, in this phase non-state groups began to not only define “harm”, and 
what was “objectionable”, but in themselves took the responsibility to censor the speech 
act by different means. The violence sometimes used by these vigilante groups – like the 
vandalism of art galleries, burning of books, attacks on artistes and theatre players, and 
protest demonstrations against authors – can be seen as evidences of this phenomenon. 
Though the argument about the changing nature of censorship may be true, its direct 
relationship to the rise of Hindu fundamentalism in 1980s is, at the very least, 
questionable. Indeed my own research shows that the forms of mobilization or protest 
that these commentators highlight, has in fact been a regular phenomenon in India, and 
has remained a successful strategy, used either to exert pressure on government to 
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censor the controversial speech act, or impose a direct form of censorship through 
threats or violence. The controversy surrounding the books Living Biographies of 
Religious Leaders in 1956 (as discussed in chapter 3), and Agnipariksha in 1970 (as 
discussed in chapter 6), reveal that explicit, or even violent forms of intervention by 
non-state groups, existed even before 1980s. It further shows that, these form of 
intervention are used by socio-religious groups across different communities (by 
Muslims in case of Living Biographies), and are not restricted to Hindu nationalists. 
Therefore, I argue that, the inter-relationship drawn between the role of non-state actors 
in censorship and the rise of Hindu Nationalism in 1980s is questionable.  
Even if one argues that social censorship is not a new phenomenon in India, the 
important question remains about the traditionally defined role of the state as the 
legitimate authority to take decisions regarding censorship. Constitutionally, it also 
raises doubts about who defines restrictions and what constitutes “reasonability” of 
such restrictions in this context. The situation becomes more complex when we see that 
the government not only fails to remove such constraints but in many occasions 
becomes a party to it.
82
 The role of the judiciary becomes even more important in this 
context. First, it acts as a check onto the arbitrary use of power to censor by the 
government authorities. Second, the courtroom becomes the site where contrasting and 
competing interpretations of the constitution are advanced by different parties, and 
judges are expected to decide cases according to law. The position that the courts take 
has ramifications not only for the way the scope of freedom of speech and expression is 
legally defined, but also for how free speech is perceived in the popular discourse. One 
of the important ways in which non-state actors assert their views is through legal 
channels. We have examples of writs being filed in judiciary requesting the court to 
direct the government to ban books (as in the case against Doniger’s The Hindus: An 
Alternative History). So the position that the courts take vis-a-vis the interpretation of 
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different statutory laws, determines the fate of such cases, and at the same time sets a 
precedent for future instances when non-state actors use the legal process for the 
purpose of censorship.
83
 For example, soon after Dinanath Batra was able to force the 
publishers to pulp Doniger’s book The Hindus, he threatened to file a law suit against 
Aleph Book Company, publisher of another of Doniger’s book, On Hinduism, which 
Batra claimed, offended the religious sensibilities of Hindus.
84
 By examining some of 
these representative cases, my thesis aims to explore some of the complexities that have 
become central to discussions about freedom of speech and expression in India. 
Many scholars on censorship in India have maintained that all forms of intervention by 
non-state actors – both legal and extra-legal – are unwarranted in a democracy like 
India as it limits the scope for freedom of expression.
85
 These scholars argue that there 
are examples which show that, even the legal route is used to harass authors/publishers/ 
artistes, as the legal process itself, is exhausting and costly.
86
 Contrary to this opinion, I 
argue that, we need to differentiate between the legal and extra-legal modes of 
participation in censorship by the non-state actors. The legal mode of participation – 
which includes the practise of demonstrating or protesting against a publication, 
claimed to be religiously offensive, or demanding the state to act against such 
publications, or filing petitions in the court against such publications – has been 
considered democratic and legitimate right of the citizens, by the Indian state. Further, 
the legality and validity of any demand for censorship, through the legal mode of 
participation, can be scrutinised by the government and the courts. Also, the 
inconvenience caused by the legal process cannot be attributed to the role of non-state 
actors. It is the procedural and operative aspects of the legal process, as I have discussed 
in Chapter 5, which is primarily responsible for the harassment of 
authors/publishers/artistes, when the non-state actors take a legal route. Contrary to this, 
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the extra-legal methods used by non-state actors, which includes use of threats and even 
violence, is legally prohibited in India.
87
 Even in this case, the role of the state is 
significant, and if it is vigilant and responsive to the claims of freedom of expression, it 
can protect the right to its free exercise. 
4. Methodology and Sources 
This dissertation is not intended as a work in political philosophy of freedom of speech 
and expression. Rather it offers a contribution to the legal history of freedom of speech 
and expression in Indian context, and also to the field of legal and historical analysis of 
case laws related to freedom of expression. That is not to say, however, that legal 
analysis or legal history is devoid of normative concerns. In fact, normative principles 
provide a significant frame of reference to assess the applicability and validity of law to 
find solutions to deeper moral concerns. This normative dimension is often reflected in 
the case laws themselves, where judges repeatedly cite quotations from Milton, Mill, 
Voltaire, and others, to establish the importance of freedom of speech and expression in 
a democracy. At the same time, judges have constantly sought to educate citizens about 
the contextual challenges that laws face in different societies. For example, though 
constitutional courts all over the world adjudicate freedom of speech cases (and often 
the courts in India refer extensively to them), the judges in India often reject the 
applicability of tests or tools used in other countries, by citing differences in the Indian 
context.
88
 Similarly, the “Hicklin test” that the courts applied for obscenity related cases 
in India earlier was considered to be outdated in 2014 and hence was replaced by 
another test which was argued to be more suitable to the changing times.
89
 Legal history 
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and legal analysis can register greater sensitivity to such contextual issues, without 
undermining the importance of normative principles or moral questions.    
I draw upon two different methodological approaches in my thesis. First, I have 
employed methods of historical analysis by historicizing the question of freedom of 
speech and expression in the Indian context. This historicization is an attempt at 
sketching a kind of conceptual history of freedom of speech and expression in India. 
Using the method of historicization helped me, on the one hand, to unpack the genesis 
of the debates about freedom of expression and its limits in Indian history particularly 
during the colonial period, and on the other hand, it also provided me with a vantage 
point to locate the transformations that the idea of free speech underwent after India 
became independent. I use this approach primarily in Chapter 2 and 3, which focus on 
the creation and amendment of laws that governed freedom of speech and expression, 
both during the colonial period, and after Independence. For this, I analyze 
chronologically, some important moments and incidents in Indian history, which 





century. For example, I examine the Rangila Rasul case and the debates that 
accompanied it, in order to understand the context in which section 295(A) was added 
to the IPC. This includes a discussion about how the publication of the text Rangila 
Rasul, led to a public controversy about the inefficacy of the available laws, and 
therefore pressure was exerted on the British authorities by the Indians, to insert new 
law that could protect the revered religious personalities of different communities, from 
insults.    
I primarily focus on two aspects: a) the context in which the laws governing free speech 
were created, or amended; and, b) the debates in the Legislative Assembly (for laws 
formulated during colonial times), and in the Constituent Assembly (during the making 
of the constitution, as well as in the Parliament (where significant amendments were 
made to the laws after Independence). Tracing the legal history helped me to be 
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sensitive to any shift, in the approach of important players (like Indian leaders) towards 
freedom of speech and expression and its boundaries, at different moments in history. 
For example, it helped me to contemplate, how the change in context, especially from a 
colonial to an independent nation, introduced Indian leaders to new forms of challenges, 
which had direct influence on the way, the scope of freedom of speech and expression 
was re-defined after Independence. Locating the historical trajectory through which, 
debates around free speech developed in India, also helps us to understand, the 
importance of context in shaping the debates around important concepts, like freedom 
of expression. For example, the historical trajectory reveals that, the challenges facing 
Indian society were completely different in nature, than the western democracies. The 
history of colonialism and the challenges of managing disputes in a multi-religious 
country, among others, had a significant impact on how the scope and the boundaries of 
free speech was imagined by the Indian leaders. This is explicitly reflected in the way 
laws governing free speech are defined in the Indian context, which is also significantly 
different than other western democracies.  
For this research I have used both primary and secondary sources. For the second 
chapter, as it delves with the colonial context, I have primarily used archival sources 
including official government files and personal files of Indian leaders as available in 
the National Archives at Delhi and the India Office Records at the British Library. In 
the third chapter, which deals with the Constituent Assembly Debates and the post 
Independence legislative amendments to the statutory and constitutional laws governing 
Freedom of speech and expression, I draw extensively on the debates as recorded 
during the Constituent Assembly Meetings and during legislative business in both 
houses of Indian Parliament. These are available in print form in the Indian Parliament 
Library and in the NMML (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Delhi). Along with 
this, the newspaper archive of the period available both, in digital archives, and in 
physical form in the National Archives, enabled me to reconstruct the background for 
the debates and hence to locate the debates in the political context of the time.  
Second, I have used interpretive methodology to study the case laws as well as debates 
in the Constituent Assembly and the Indian Parliament on the subject of freedom of 
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speech and expression. Here I take cue from the method of “recovering intentions” as 
suggested by Skinner.
90
 Skinner distinguishes between the question of what the text 
means and the other about what its author may have meant. He maintains that both 
these questions though separable, are not separate. Agreeing with Paul Ricoeur, he 
maintains that the meaning of a text is far more complex than the intention of the 
author, but recovering what the author may have meant is equally important to 
understanding the meaning of the text. So he suggests that even if the complete 
meaning of a text cannot be recovered, the author’s intentions which can give us some 
sense about the meaning of the text can definitely be understood.
91
 Further, Skinner 
maintains that though it might not be entirely fruitful to look for the perlocutionary 
intentions of an author, the recovery of illocutionary intentions is not only possible but 
also very important, if we aim to understand the meaning of what the author wrote.
92
 
For this he suggests: “we should start by elucidating the meaning, and hence the subject 
matter, of the utterances in which we are interested and then turn to the argumentative 
context of their occurrence to determine how exactly they connect with, or relate to, 
other utterances concerned with the same subject matter.”
93
 In my thesis, Skinner’s 
methodology proves extremely useful in interpreting the intentions of the constitution 
makers and the lawmakers in Independent India through a reading of the CAD, and the 
debates later in the Parliament. The recorded debates of the CAD and the Parliament are 
a rich repository of discussions on various aspects of the Constitution, its scope and 
limitations.  
During the course of these debates, each participant referred to both normative and 
empirical concerns related to the subjects they discussed, and in the process cited 
examples and evidences from the experiences of law in other countries, primarily from 
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the US and the UK. At the same time, the legislators also engaged with the views of 
philosophers and judges of different countries in order to argue for their viewpoint. For 
example, in case of freedom of expression, many members of the Constituent Assembly 
like Nehru, Ambedkar, K. T. Shah, K. M. Munshi quote from philosophers like Milton 
and Mill, and also engage with views of jurists like Justice Blackstone and Justice 
Holmes. A close reading of these debates, therefore, helps us to understand how these 
leaders imagined the nature and scope of freedom of expression in India, while being 
conscious, and at times critical, about the way it was constructed in the debates of 
western democracies. For example, the makers of Indian constitution were situated in 
such a position in history where they could neither completely endorse a individualism-
based liberal model of free speech regime as in the western democracies like US or UK, 
nor could they completely reject such views. While considering the form that freedom 
of expression adopted in different contexts, they settled for generating an India-specific 
idea of freedom of speech and expression which reflected a selective understanding of 
liberalism, one that was qualified by deep concerns of maintaining social cohesion and 
realizing the goal of integrated and sovereign Indian nation.  
More importantly, I use Skinner’s suggestions to interpret case laws. This method has 
been used primarily in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. Skinner suggests a very rigorous analysis of 
texts to derive authorial intentions. However, in case laws, the primary texts available 
for analysis are the recorded judgments of the courts. The judgments delivered by the 
court, contribute in the discourse on that subject, where the judges not only make a 
comparative analysis of case laws in different societies and its implications in those 
contexts, but also take extensive care regarding precedents including earlier judgments 
delivered on similar subject, either by the same court or other courts. A close study of 
these judgments can enlighten us about the perspective of the courts, in relation to their 
agreements and disagreements on the available understanding of free speech and its 
boundaries. The arguments made by judges, give a sense about what they were trying to 
achieve, by accepting or rejecting an earlier interpretation of law. So for example, in the 
case of Lalai Singh Yadav
94
, while dealing with the scope of section 95 of the CrPC, 
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Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer approached the question from various dimensions. He held 
that it was the legitimate right of the state authorities to ban or forfeiture publications 
that could create disturbances in law and order, and at the same time, he claimed that 
the American doctrine of “clear and present danger” would not be very helpful in the 
Indian context considering the volatility of communal relations in Indian society, 
particularly on issues related to religious offense. Though, the court adjudged that the 
forfeiture of the publication in question was not legal, as there were technical 
limitations in the notification, issued in support of the forfeiture by state officials, had 
technical flaws, the observations of Justice Iyer were significant. The debates and 
doctrines with which Justice Iyer engaged while writing the judgment, provides a sense 
about how he was defining the Indian context, and also the place of freedom of 
expression in it. The observations of Justice Iyer, primarily, his negation of the efficacy 
of “clear and present danger” doctrine in Indian context, became a guiding reference 
point for future debates on freedom of expression, and therefore an important 
intervention was laid by Justice Iyer in the discourse of freedom of speech and 
expression in India.      
Skinner’s methodology, therefore I argue, is equally helpful in legal analysis. However, 
in order to use the methodology more effectively, I concentrated on some analytical 
questions while interpreting the matter of the case laws. These included questions like: 
Why do courts in India allow restrictions to freedom of speech and expression and how 
do they define “reasonability” in this context? What are the factors that judges consider 
while adjudging a case where a claim of offense to religious sentiments is raised against 
a publication? What kind of philosophical and legal references do the judges use in 
order to reach to a conclusion in such cases? How do judges engage with the practise of 
similar laws in other countries? Similarly, in the case of interpreting the CAD and the 
Parliament I concentrated on following questions: How did the constitution makers 
view the idea of freedom of speech and expression especially in relation to the 
restrictions invoked under article 19(2) of the constitution? What were the events that 
guided the debates on freedom of speech and expression in the Constituent Assembly 
while the constitution was being written, and later, in the Parliament when the 
lawmakers initiated amendments to the statutory laws? How did the circumstantial 
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contingencies affect the idea of freedom of speech and expression in the Indian context? 
These questions helped me concentrate on the specific aspects of the debates and case 
laws that had relevance for my research and further helped me to situate the debates in a 
proper context whereby it became easier to understand the intentions of the judges and 
the lawmakers.  
The fourth, fifth and sixth chapters deal extensively with the role of courts and for these 
chapters I have largely depended on case laws both in the Supreme  Court as well as 
High Courts. The analysis in these chapters is driven by an extensive study of thirty two 
court cases related to contentious books claimed to be religiously offensive during the 
period 1947-2010. For this I conducted a search on Manupatra Database
95
 for the terms 
“19(1)(a)”; “19 (2)”; “295(A)”; “153(A)”; and “CrPC 95”. The reason was that these 
are the sections of the Constitutional and statutory laws which deal with freedom of 
speech and expression including the issue of book proscription, book bans and the 
controversies on the subject of freedom of speech and expression vis-à-vis the claims of 
religious offense. Following this, I tried to locate the original cases in the various 
official records, like AIR (All India Reporter); and journals published by Supreme 
Court and other agencies like Indian Law Institute, at Delhi, like CriJL (Criminal Law 
Journal), SCC (Supreme Court Case), and SCR (Supreme Court Reporter). The list of 
includes all the cases from the Supreme Court and High Courts on the subject, which 
appeared in these records.  
I have used case laws in two ways in my thesis: a) for analysing the interpretation of 
laws in these cases, and examining the reasons that the judges give in holding some 
form of expression as objectionable; and b) in order to study the procedural and 
operative dimensions of legal process, like, the time taken for courts to pronounce 
judgment in each case, the strength of the benches that heard the case, and ways in 
which the judgment uses different doctrines to test the subject under consideration. The 
analysis of all the aspects studied, as part of the procedural and operative dimensions of 
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legal process, has been presented in form of tables in Chapter 5. For analysing and 
presenting the interpretation of court judgments, I do not present a chronological order 
of discussion. This is primarily because I found that the courts do not follow any set 
precedents in terms of reference, nor do they necessarily respond to the debates of 
preceding judgment. Further, in defining what constitutes religious offense, and 
explaining the justifiable limits of freedom of expression, I did not find any major shift 
in the position of the courts over different periods. If such shifts were visible, it could be 
better represented through a chronological presentation of case laws. The approach of 
the judges is largely driven by the subject under consideration, and they choose to 
reflect and respond to the debates of selective case laws, as presented by the counsels 
during the course of the court proceedings. So, rather than presenting the study of case 
laws in a chronological way, I earmark some important questions for enquiry, and 
analyze the judgments in the light of those questions.  
For example, in Chapter 4, which primarily deals with the court’s position on the 
subject of religiously offensive publications, I focus on two primary questions: a) how 
courts in India define religious offence, in the light of available constitutional and 
statutory laws. This includes the discussion about what makes a publication “religiously 
offensive”, and therefore, eligible for legal action; b) what according to the courts, is the 
acceptable justifications for legal intervention by government officials, in the free 
exercise of the right to freedom of speech and expression? Focussing on these issues 
helped me, to analyze the court cases rigorously, while emphasizing on the subject 
which is one of the central concerns in this thesis, i.e. the role of courts in defining the 
limits of freedom of expression vis-a-vis the claims of religious offence.    
In order to support my arguments with evidence in Chapter 4, I have discussed selective 
court cases in great details. These cases were selected based on their importance, as 
well as their representative nature. For this, I have primarily focussed on the cases 
which recur in discussions in the courtrooms and in the written judgments as 
precedents. For example, in the Supreme Court case of Ramji Lal Modi
96
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tested the legal validity of section 295(A) of the IPC, based on its interpretation of 
article 19(2) of the Constitution. The judgment that the court delivered in the case 
became a landmark, and is consistently referred by different courts, whenever there is a 
discussion about section 295(A).
97
 In order to present a complete picture of the case and 
the background conditions, I have also used newspaper archives, to get a sense of the 
controversy. This includes the archives of primarily, national dailies, but where 
required, the archives of regional newspapers were also used, as per availability.       
I have also used some other case laws for discussions, which might not deal directly 
with the question of publications claimed to be religiously offensive, but the 
observations of the courts in those cases, are crucial to analyse the subject under 
consideration. For example, I refer to cases like Superintendent, Central Prison, 
Fatehgarh v. Ram Manohar Lohia, and Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar and 
others to understand how courts define the concept of “public order”. Though these 
cases are not about religiously offensive publications, they are cited widely as the issue 
of public order is equally relevant for cases that discuss the question of religious 
offence. 
Other than court cases, in Chapter 5 and 6, I also discuss a few other important 
instances of censorship in the Indian context. These include Wendy Doniger’s The 
Hindus, Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses, Tasleema Nareen’s Dwikhandito, and 
Acharya Tulsi’s Agniparksha. The selection of these examples is based on the subjects 
under discussion in these chapters. For example, Doniger’s case illustrates how the role 
of law and legal process in India produces “public self-censorship”, whereby the 
behaviour of the state institutions force a kind of self-censorship, so that the 
author/publisher are compelled to submit to the demands of the claimants of religious 
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 Similarly, banning of The Satanic Verses using Customs Law, reflected two 
important aspects about the practise of censorship in India: a) how non-state actors can 
assert pressure on the government, in order to impose their viewpoint; and b) how 
certain laws in Indian context, place executive decisions on censorship, beyond judicial 
scrutiny. Both these aspects are significant to understand the process of censorship in 
India. Further, though Customs Law was widely used by government to ban import of 
publications it considered objectionable, in the case of ban on The Satanic Verses, it 
was for the first time that the nature and scope of this law came into public discussion. 
In that way Rushdie’s case became an instant reference point. 
Acharya Tulsi’s Agnipariksha, Tasleema Nareen’s Dwikhandito, represent the 
phenomenon where the intervention of non-state actors in the process of censorship, 
undermine the role of courts in the process. Both these cases represent the extremity of 
this phenomenon. Even after the courts had held that the publications under controversy 
were harmless, and the state was not justified in acting against the publications, the non-
state actors forced the authors to withdraw controversial passages from the book, in 
case of Nasreen, and the entire book in case of Acharya Tulsi. Therefore, these cases 
become ideal representatives of the issue under discussion. Further, both these cases 
were widely reported in the media, and became subjects of intense controversy over the 
role of non-state actors in the process of censorship, and its meaning for the scope of 
freedom of expression. I argue that the cases discussed above are representative cases, 
because they initiated important public debate on different aspects related to censorship, 
but also because they most effectively highlight the issues that form important subjects 
under consideration in this thesis, like: how restrictions to freedom of expression is 
defined in the context of an interface between law, state agencies and the non-state 
actors. These four cases showcase different layers in the understanding, as well as 
practises of censorship. As the cases vary across a wide time frame (between Acharya 
Tulsi’s Agnipariksha in 1970s to Doniger’s The Hindus in 2014), I have used similar 
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sources in all the cases to map them consistently. I have primarily dealt with newspaper 
archives and secondary writings by legal and political experts, in order to make sense 
about the issues at stake, and narrate important moments from the cases under 
consideration.  
5. Structure of the Thesis and Chapterization 
The thesis is divided into following chapters: 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
In the introductory chapter I discuss the concept of freedom of speech and expression 
and the debates surrounding its limitations. Here I concentrate on the legal and 
constitutional provisions for free speech and its restrictions in International law as well 
as laws of democratic societies like US, UK, South Africa, among others. This would 
give a broad understanding about how Indian laws on the subject stand in relation to 
other democracies when seen in a comparative perspective. The chapter will also 
discuss the central questions on which the research was based and the methodology 
followed during the research.    
Chapter 2: Freedom of Speech and Expression in Colonial India: The Genesis of 
an Idea 
In this chapter the history of the debate in colonial times is traced in order to understand 
the making of some of the most important laws that continue to govern freedom of 
speech and expression. This historical context provides an account of how British and 
Indian leaders understood the issue of limiting freedom of speech and expression. My 
central argument in this chapter is that the British authorities employed “selective 
censorship” in cases of malicious writings on religious subjects and the Indians’ 
response on the subject was similarly ambiguous. A tacit consensus was developed that 
freedom of expression should be limited by law but there was no clarity about how 
these limitations should be defined or exercised. 
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Chapter 3: Freedom of Expression and Religious Vilifications: Decoding the 
Constitutional and Legal Definition of Limits 
This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part, I revisit the CAD to understand 
the position of the founding fathers vis-à-vis freedom of speech and expression: it was 
made a part of fundamental rights, but simultaneously important caveats, in the form of 
article 19(2) were also placed upon it. I argue that the caveats emerged from a particular 
context: the nationalists’ experience with the British Raj, as well as the threat to public 
order in the context of partition. In an attempt to rationalize the binary relationship 
between free speech and restrictions, the Assembly agreed to boundaries that remained 
vague in language and subjective in interpretation.  
In the second part I discuss the amendments introduced to the constitution and other 
statutory laws. Two constitutional amendments (first, sixteenth), and the amendments 
to section 295(A), and 153(A) (in 1961 and 1969) are discussed in detail, as they all 
directly affected the freedom of speech and expression. The central argument I 
advance in this section is that the constitutional as well as legal provisions for 
freedom of expression and its ‘limits’ in fact allowed significant space for the 
intervention of government. Also, the debates in the Constituent Assembly and the 
Parliament (during amendments) give us useful clues and indications about the 
attitude of the Indian lawmakers on the subject. We can see that the threat of religious 
violence and riots in each case dominated decisions regarding such legislations. While 
efforts were made to control elements within the news press that were responsible for 
inciting religious hatred among communities, how such changes might affect freedom 
of expression at a much broader level tended to be overlooked. For example, the 
legislations that were passed to control news press were also going to impact 
authors/publishers of books and other printed materials. But no effort was made to 
either reason out the broader impact of such laws or to include protections against 
misuse of such laws.   
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Chapter 4: Preventing Religious Offence: Law, Courts and “Reasonable” 
Restrictions to Freedom of Speech and Expression 
In this chapter I analyse how the courts in India have treated the claims of religious 
offence vis-à-vis freedom of speech and expression. I argue that, unlike the popular 
perception, the courts’ position in general has been to restrict freedom of speech and 
expression if it is found to be offending to the religious sensibilities of any section of 
the society. By examining various High Court and Supreme Court cases, I show that 
this position was reflected in the way the courts justified wider latitude for state action 
and intervention in cases related to contentious publications and its author. On the one 
hand, the expansive interpretation is adopted in the way courts have criminalized 
publications for the content or subject-matter as well as the form in which the ideas 
were expressed, on the other hand, it is also explicit in the court’s arguments for 
expansion of the scope of preventive action by the executive. I also argue that the 
court’s approach to the question of religious offense could be seen based on two 
important justifications adopted in different cases. Firstly, the courts have shown great 
sensitivity towards cases where the issue of public order is involved. Judges have 
maintained that issues of religious offense have a tendency to snowball into religious 
violence and hence have emphasized the need for being cautious with such 
publications. Secondly, courts have argued that since it is the duty of the state to 
protect the secular and plural nature of India society, the government should take 
immediate steps to prevent any feelings of exclusion or discrimination among 
different religious communities. Both these concerns have led the courts to uphold 
several occurrences of state intervention where freedom of speech and expression was 
stifled. I argue that the position of the court in such cases reflect, on the one hand, a 
form of legal paternalism, where it guides the citizens about how to speak and 
express, and on the other hand, a form of legal patronage to state action. The cases 
used to build this argument have been significant in defining the scope for freedom of 
speech and expression in India and find repeated citations in other cases regarding 
freedom of expression. 
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Chapter 5: Law and Legal Process as Hurdles to Freedom of Speech and Expression 
In this chapter I engage with the operative and evaluative aspects of the court. I argue 
that the courts have failed to provide a robust defence to freedom of speech and 
expression. In fact, the lacunas largely associated with the functioning of courts in India 
and the ambiguities reflected in judgments have proved counter-productive to the 
defenders of free speech. It has not only resulted in creating an atmosphere of 
uncertainty and fear among authors/publishers but also acted as an encouragement to 
people demanding censorship based on the pretext of religious offense. The case of 
Wendy Donigers’s The Hindus provides a striking example of this dichotomy. I show 
that the institution of judiciary, which the constitution makers had claimed served as the 
ultimate defender of civil and fundamental rights of the citizens and especially of 
freedom of speech and expression, has in fact allowed its curtailment. Though some of 
the judgments in the courts seem to favour freedom of speech and expression, its 
general attitude of defining the limits of freedom of expression vis-à-vis public order, or 
other values like secularism and pluralism, have produced signals which cannot be 
considered favourable for a free exercise of freedom of expression. 
Chapter 6: Role of Non-state Actors in Censorship and the Position of Courts 
In this chapter I examine cases related to censorship where the government, the 
judiciary, and the non-state actors interact. The process through which social forces 
collide with state power, has often subordinated the role of the courts as defenders of 
free speech. To highlight this I discuss two types of cases: a) cases where the use of 
statutory laws like the Customs Act, give an immunity to the decision of the 
government (For example, I discuss the banning of Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses); 
and b) cases where the prevailing atmosphere forced the author to censor controversial 
writing regardless of the fact that the court had found nothing objectionable in the text 
and hence revoked the official ban on the book (I discuss the fate of Tasleema 
Nasreen’s Dwikhandito and Acharya Tulsi’s Agnipariksha). In each of these cases one 
can see an active role played by non-state actors, which include socio-religious groups 
as well as political parties. The main arena of the contestation between the claims of 
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religious offence and freedom of expression in these cases remained outside the 
courtroom, I argue. However, the language of law was predominantly used as a way to 
legitimize for demands of censorship.  
Unlike the position taken by many scholars on censorship, who argue that all forms of 
intervention by non-state actors was problematic, I argue that we need to look into the 
interventions of non-state actors, by distinguishing their participation through the legal 
process, and their use of violence and threats, to impose censorship. This distinction 
helps us to understand that on many occasions, the grievances may be genuine, and that 
the expression of such grievances, even the protests to attract attention of government 
officials towards their grievances, may fall well within the democratic rights of citizens. 
By highlighting the role of non-state actors in censorship, I argue that, it increases the 
role of courts as protector of freedom of speech and expression in India.  
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
This chapter shall summarize the entire thesis focusing on major arguments, and 
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The ideas and institutions of colonial modernity were brought to India from outside: 
that is, by the agents of European, especially British imperialism. This was in sharp 
contrast to the primarily or largely internal or indigenous processes through which 
Europe itself had launched its project of enlightenment and modernity.
99
 The claim of 
monopoly and expertise over modernity was used as justification by the colonial powers 
to fulfil its imperial ambitions. The colonial rule reflected dichotomies at two different 
levels. Firstly, liberty that was held to be the most sacred and universal value of the 
enlightenment project was in fact being curtailed through the processes of colonialism 
and the creation of subject peoples- another product of the same enlightenment project. 
Further, the same argument of modernity which was being used to enlarge civil liberties 
in west was being used to deny basic rights to the colonial masses. This contradiction 
was sharply reflected in the case of freedom of expression. The people who celebrated 
and claimed freedom of expression and press as sacred in their own societies, became 
under the garb of imperial rulers ardent opponents in the colonies, restricting both free 
expression and freedom of press for their own benefits. For many, British India was a 
contradictory political formation. In Henry Maine’s words, it was a “most extraordinary 
experiment” involving “the virtually despotic government of a dependency by a free 
people.”
100
 These dichotomies produced a new context through the interaction of “east” 
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and “west” which is clearly reflected in the translation and understanding of freedom of 
speech and expression in India. 
The power relationship operating in colonial India can be deduced, as Guha argues, by 
deriving a relation between dominance and subordination.
101
 The British tried to 
establish their hegemony by inducing changes in the institutional structures. The 
introduction of Western education was an important part of this strategy with an aim to 
produce a group of rationalist intelligentsia which could ensure a relay of ideological 
justification for their activities.
102
 Though the class of new intelligentsia largely 
remained loyal to this cause, the liberal ideas based on values of rights and liberty 
encouraged a section of the same intelligentsia to question the rationale of the colonial 
rule in India. The press became an effective tool to expose and criticize the British. 
Such interventions frustrated the attempt to generate legitimacy, which meant that the 
British rule had to extensively depend on coercion as the primary mode of dominance. 
They responded by enacting several laws to curb the freedom of press. This was just the 
beginning of a series of censorship laws initiated by the British which also witnessed a 
parallel struggle for the demand of freedom of speech and expression by the native 
Indians.  
In this chapter, the aim is to understand how the debates over censorship took shape 
during the colonial times. I focus on two aspects: a) the attitude of British authorities 
with regard to censorship and freedom of expression; and b) the reception and response 
to such attitude from the native population. The central concern is to examine how the 
debates around freedom of expression and communalism interacted to produce a regime 
of censorship defined by colonial laws. In the first section I discuss the early stages of 
debates regarding press freedom and censorship using Raja Rammohan Roy’s memorial 
submitted to the Supreme Court, and later to King George IV, as the most 
representative response from the liberals in India against press censorship. This is 
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followed by a discussion about the attitude of British law makers in India, especially 
Macaulay and James Fitzjames Stephen, with respect to restrictions on speech acts. I 
argue that the volatile communal context was used as reason to formulate newer laws 
governing freedom of speech and expression, and it reflected the politics to derive 
legitimacy by projecting itself as the neutral arbitrator of competing religious interests. 
This position is also reflected in the making of section 295(A) of the IPC discussed later 
in the chapter. However, though the British had devised several laws to regulate and 
restrict freedom of expression, in the communal atmosphere where tracts and pamphlets 
were being used to vilify and defame the religious beliefs and religiously sacred 
symbols they used it very selectively, in order to avoid the blame of favouring one 
community over the other. The next section highlights how the politics of ‘competitive 
communalism’ in the 1870s became so vicious that demands for censorship of offensive 
publications started emerging from among the Indians themselves. This is followed by a 
detailed discussion about the formation of section 295(A) of the IPC, which is also 
referred by many as the blasphemy law of India. The politics behind the making of this 
law reflected all the aspects discussed earlier – it reflected the attitude of the British 
authorities as well as the concerns of Indian leaders. The formation of this law also 
showed the emergence of a tacit consensus that freedom of speech and expression could 
not be left unbridled especially when the same freedom is misused to cause religious 
offense or incite religious hatred. So the leaders who were otherwise demanding 
freedom of press to criticize the authorities, in this case came together with the British 
lawmakers to define the limits of such freedom with respect to religious harm it could 
cause. This dichotomy is further reflected in the case of banning of Satyarth Prakash
103
 
by the Muslim League Government of Sind in 1944, as I have discussed in the last 
section of the chapter. This period, and the response of the leaders, were crucial in 
shaping the nationalist imagination vis-à-vis freedom of expression because these were 
the very same people who within 3 years were going to take up the job of writing the 
constitution of Independent India.  
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2. Press Censorship and its Opposition in Early Nineteenth Century 
The formal debate over freedom of speech and expression in India began to take shape 
from the early 19
th
 century, which according to C. A. Bayly was the period of advent of 
“constitutional liberalism” in India.
104
 This development, according to him, shared 
some connection with the great expansion of the press and the idea of association across 
the world, beginning in the 1780s.
105
 The first newspaper in India was also started 
during this period. However, James Augustus Hickey’s Bengal Gazette or The Calcutta 
General Advertiser, which took off in 1780, was stopped only two years after its 
inception as its exposure of the private lives of company servants did not go well with 
the British authorities.
106
 In 1799, the idea of press censorship became more explicit 
and official with the Censorship of Press Act introduced by Lord Wellesley. The Act 
brought all the newspapers under the government scrutiny before their publication. 
Later, in 1807, it was extended to cover all kinds of press publications- newspaper, 
magazine, books and pamphlets. The Act was revoked by Lord Hastings in 1818. 
However, the abolition was initiated on the terms that the editors would take 
responsibility to exclude matters likely to affect the authority of government or 
injurious to the public interest.
107
  
During this period, Raja Rammohan Roy arose as the undisputed representative of the 
Indians in the struggle for freedom of speech and expression. Roy’s aim was to build an 
Indian “public” from the ground up, so that within a generation Indians would begin to 
share in power and legislative authority.
108
 His concern for freedom of speech and 
expression is reflected in his opposition to arbitrary deportation of editors and formal 
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press censorship. Along with other Indian liberals of his time like D. N. Tagore, G. C. 
Bonnerjee, etc., Roy wrote a memorial to the Supreme Court against the ordinance 
initiated by the then acting Governor General John Adam in December 1823, popularly 
known as Licensing Regulation Act.
109
 When the Supreme Court did not pay heed to 
the request and went on to register the regulation, he pursued the case further and wrote 
another memorial, this time addressed to King George IV in London.
110
  
The memorial makes it explicit that he was not in support of unbridled freedom, nor 
was he against already existing laws of land that limited such freedom like laws against 
libel, and others. In fact he argued that if there were objectionable or seditious 
publications, the judicial system should render a “writer or publisher culpable and 
amenable to punishment.”
111
 Further, he also ensured that should the limitation of 
liberty of press become necessary, in cases such as – a) if it was for sake of “greater 
security and to preserve the union existing between England and this country,” or, b) 
against seditious attempt to excite hostility with neighbouring or friendly states – the 




One of the important aspects of the free press in the Indian context that Roy highlighted 
in the memorial was its role in the religious discourse of the period. The publishing of 
books and pamphlets helped the Christian missionaries to promote and spread their 
religious viewpoints. In this context, Roy was concerned by the ideological clash 
between different religions and by the way the free press was being used by the native 
religions to defend themselves from the onslaught of English missionaries, through 
debates and discussions. He wrote:  
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After a body of English missionaries have been labouring for about 
twenty five years by preaching and distributing publications in the native 
languages in all parts of Bengal, to bring the prevailing system of 
religion into disrepute, no alarm whatever prevails, because your 
Majesty’s faithful subjects possess the power of defending their religion 
by the same means that are employed against it, and many of them have 
exercised the freedom of the press to combat the writings of English 
missionaries, and think no other protection necessary to the maintenance 
of their faith. While the teachers of Christianity use only reason and 
persuasion to propagate their religion, your majesty’s faithful subjects 
are content to defend theirs by the same weapons.
113
     
This according to Roy was a significant contribution of the free press in India which 
allowed for debates over key tenets of belief and faith in a non-violent and discursive 
environment. It is evident that Roy and others did not contemplate that in future the 
press could be used to incite communal violence.
114
 Also, the importance of the free 
press, for them, did not include a deep concern for individual’s freedom of speech and 
expression, nor was it seen as a necessary to offer a philosophical defence of it. If 
anything, the argument for the free press was teleological and not concerned with the 
value of free speech as a good-in-itself. It prioritized the benefits a free press could have 
for society- both for the governors as well as the governed. But Roy’s memorial 
received no response and the Act remained in place till it was abolished by Charles 
Metcalfe in 1835. 
3. British Attitudes towards Free Expression in Colonial India 
From the beginnings of press culture in India, the British authorities wanted to ensure 
that press freedom could not be used to threaten their rule. So, though some freedom 
was allowed, it was always subjected to conditions that determined its scope. The 
legislations introduced during this period reflected this approach. In the process, the 
basic tenets of liberalism were modified to develop a creative logic in support of 
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 One of the important figures that contributed in this redefinition was 
Thomas Macaulay who spearheaded the formulation of the IPC.  
3.1. Regulating Free Speech through Law: Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Legal 
Provisions 
In 1833, Thomas Macaulay was appointed as India’s First Law Member and head of its 
first Law Commission. The legal system in India which he inherited was complex and 
pluralistic. Some British commentators believed that in many respects it was 
unmanageable as it suffered from what James Fitzjames Stephen would later call “vices 
of vagueness.”
116
 The law making process of this period was dominated by the 
Utilitarians, in particular the followers of Bentham.
117
 Macaulay tried to introduce an 




Macaulay believed that the language of the laws should be clear, unequivocal and 
concise. Certainty and clarity were two aspects of the Benthamite tradition that 
remained central. He maintained that laws should resonate “uniformity where you can 
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have it; diversity where you must have it; but in all cases certainty.”
119
 This was 
necessary in order to “limit the power which the courts of justice possess of putting 
their own sense on the laws,” rendering them uncertain and contradictory.
120
 The 
codification of Penal laws was an attempt in this direction.  
Chapter XXII of the IPC, entitled “Of Criminal Intimidation, Insult and Annoyance” is 
entirely devoted to forms of offensive language. Macaulay introduced various doctrinal 
innovations in this section to suit the need of the context. For example he expanded the 
term ‘defamation’ to cover libels and slander as well.
121
 Further, he rejected the notion 
that a strict division between speech and acts could be made. He argued that offensive 
and insulting language should be conceived as speech acts and ought to be a subject to 
criminal jurisprudence.
122
 In many ways this idea of “performative” speech was 





. He proposed that defamatory spoken words should be considered an 
offense irrespective of whether they actually caused a breach of peace, on the ground 
that the mental pain they inflict is a sufficient basis for action. The reason for this 
proposition was also based on his reading of Indian society. He maintained, “There is 
perhaps no country in which more cruel suffering is inflicted, and more deadly 
resentment called forth, by injuries which affect only the mental feelings.”
125
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He was particularly concerned about religious insults and devoted a whole chapter 
entitled “On Offence relating to Religion and Caste” (Chapter XV). In the Notes he 
mentions that in contexts such as India’s, where the relationship between different 
religions is very volatile, dangers “can only be averted by a firm adherence to the true 
principle of toleration.”
126
 He believed that one of the ways to inculcate such values in 
society was by including strict laws against violations. So, laws like section 298 were 
inserted into the IPC.
127
 Macaulay introduced some unprecedented interventions in the 
discourse of free speech in India. For example: a) The “volatile” context of India and 
the “intolerant” public culture were used as reasons to legally limit the scope of free 
speech; b) it made space for prosecution against “mental injury” or “feeling of offence”; 
and c) at least indirectly, it made religions immune to any criticism or questioning, 
thereby generating a sense of autonomy which had potentials to promote orthodoxy. He 
argued that even if the contents of a religion may be wrong, the pain which “insults give 
to the professors of that religion is real.”
128
 This, as I will show, completely changed the 
nature of debate about free speech in India, and the burden of legal limitations guided 
the discourse since then.   
The legal experts of the time like John Dawson Mayne and Sir Lawrence Peel were 
very critical of Macaulay’s approach. They believed that making wounded sentiments a 
cause for action was a recipe for disaster and it should only be subject to sanction when 
it led a public disorder.
129
 Another person who criticized such approach was James 
Fitzjames Stephen. Though Stephen lauded the nature of the codes and its success, he 
was particularly suspicious of the scope of provisions like section 298.
130
 Stephen 
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thought that such laws would end the possibility of convincing any person that his 
religious beliefs were untrue as it was impossible “to convince anyone that he is in error 
upon religious subject without causing him great pain if he really believes in his creed, 
and the act of addressing cogent and earnest arguments to him on the subject must of 
necessity involve a deliberate intention of wounding his feelings.”
131
 Though he had 
firm faith in the intentions of the law makers and he believed that in the hands of the 
English magistrates, the law would be interpreted to apply only to wanton insults, he 
remained suspicious that in future if the power came into the hands of Hindu or Muslim 




Stephen, however, was convinced about the need for strong laws and a proactive state 
to maintain peace and order against ever-present threats of inter-communal conflict, 
“threats that were integral to the nature of the communities the British governed in 
India.”
133
 His understanding of the Indian context became the basis of his criticism of 
John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty expressed by Stephen in his seminal Liberty, Equality, 
Fraternity.
134
 If one compares the attitudes of Stephen and Mill towards imperial policy 
in India, though there were great overlaps, it also exhibited a significant difference. 
Stephen’s advocacy for coercion was a universal and fundamental aspect of his political 
thought unlike Mill, who considered it apt only for societies who were still in early 
stages of civilization.
135
 As far as Stephen’s views about liberty as a value was 
concerned, he believed that whether liberty was good or bad would depend on the 
particular context, time, place and circumstances. In certain cases, he believed, the 
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curtailment of liberty was pertinent for the larger benefit of the society and he cited the 
example of British coercion in India.
136
 He held that coercion was essential to the 
British efforts to direct moral and religious changes in the Indian society in order to 
civilize it.
137
   
Stephen’s attitude towards the state’s role in freedom of speech and expression also 
becomes evident when he questioned Mill’s assumption that compulsion was justifiable 
till the time “when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal 
discussion.”
138
 He believed that in absence of the heavy hand of the state, no society 
can fruitfully value its liberties, and he therefore insisted that compulsion was a 
necessary component of any transformation and it could never be completely replaced 
by discussion in any society at any time.
139
 Stephen’s engagement with Mill had 
particular relevance for India as he had been Law Member of the government of India 
and had introduced measures to control the press, which Indian liberals regarded as 
authoritarian.
140
 Most significant among his contributions was the Special Act No. 
XXVII of 1870, which inserted section 124(A) in the IPC, and which was at par with 
the sedition law in England.  
The period between Macaulay as Law Commissioner and Stephen as law member of 
the council of the Viceroy (1838-1869) witnessed important shifts in the approach of 
the British administration- both in terms of attitude and policy imperatives. The revolt 
of 1857 and the transfer of powers from the East India Company to the Crown in 
London marked an important moment in this shift. The earlier emphasis on the 
universalist project of civilization based on the assumption that non-western societies 
were politically dysfunctional was replaced by an aim to understand the logic of native 
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society. There seemed to have appeared a consensus in the post-mutiny context to 
“curtail the transformative ambition implied in the civilizing mission and reconstitute 
the imperial order on a more conservative basis, in line ith the “traditional” imperatives 
of native society.”
141
 According to Low, this initiated in India a more authoritarian 
insistence on efficiency and stability as the watchwords of imperial policy, and also 
reversal of liberal efforts at civilizing and creative reform in favour of protecting and 
conserving native society.
142
 This approach was manifest when the religious causes of 
the revolt became evident and Queen Victoria’s Proclamation made the principle of 
non-interference into native religious beliefs and customs the cornerstone of the post-
mutiny imperial policy. The proclamation said: 
We declare it to be our royal will and pleasure that none be in anywise 
favoured, none molested or disquieted, by reason of their religious faith 
or observances, but that all shall alike enjoy the equal and impartial 
protection of the law; and we do strictly charge to enjoin all those who 
may be in authority under us that they abstain from all interference with 




The most important representative of this shift was Henry Maine, who advocated the 
idea of “indirect rule”
144
 based on his own study of the Indian society. Significant 
change in the understanding about law- its utility, its goal, and more importantly its 
scope- can also be seen as a direct product of such shift. Though Warren Hastings had 
back in 1772, introduced the colonial distinction between private and public laws where 
“public” applied to property and commerce, and personal law pertained to the “private” 
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realm of women, family, religion and tradition but such classifications got a new 
definition and significance during this period. It made way for two different spheres of 
law based on the socio-cultural understanding of the Indian context. On the one hand, 
there was the British-administered universal law in the public sphere, and on the other 
hand, a separate sphere was left for the administration of Hindu and Muslim personal 
law. As Thomas Metcalf has noted, “The legal system of colonial India thus 
accommodated both, the assimilative ideals of liberalism, which found a home in the 
codes of procedure, and insistence upon Indian difference in a personal law defined by 
membership in a religious community.”
145
 It can be argued that, in the context, this was 
an effective strategy for a colonial power in order to manage its firm control over the 
administrative aspects of the society, and still maintain a certain level of legitimacy. But 
such bifurcation also had capacity to sanction a higher degree of autonomy to religious 
groups and making their internal system more closed. Non-interference in religious 
matters could also establish a freedom to profess and popularize ones religion, which 
could later be used to criticize and attack other faiths and belief systems. 
3.2. British Raj and “Selective Censorship”   
Just after the revolts of 1857, the English language press, largely owned by members of 
the European community, came down heavily upon the authorities for being too soft 
and indecisive in punishing the rebels. Lord Canning was at the centre of the wrath and 
he reacted by announcing gag orders against the press that remained in force for around 
a year. A decade later in 1867, an Act for the Regulation of Printing Presses and 
Newspapers was passed to replace the Metcalfe Act, 1835. This act later came to be 
known as “The Press and Registration of Books Act.” After several modifications and 
amendments in 1890, 1914, 1952 and 1953, this formed a part of the formal law in post-
independent India. However, the biggest and most strategic threat to the idea of free 
press came in 1878 in the form of Vernacular Press Act enacted to give better control 
over newspapers published in Indian languages. It appeared during the Second Anglo-
Afghan War (1878-1880) in order to prevent the vernacular press from expressing 
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criticism of British policies. It was only four years later in 1882 that Lord Ripon 
repealed the act. One significant feature of the Vernacular Press Act was that it made an 
explicit distinction between the English language press and the vernacular press.
146
 The 
distinction prescribed, was a product of two long term developments- on the one hand, 
public opinion in India was largely being defined by the state as the opinions of the 
“non-official” European community, which was mostly represented by the English 
speaking press; on the other hand, the vernacular press was held responsible not only 
for supporting developments that led up to 1857 but also for engaging in statements in 
the years after. For example, Ashley Eden, the Bengal governor defended English 
speaking press by “non-official Europeans” and argued that it be kept outside the 
impact of Vernacular Press Act. He said: 
On the whole the English press of India, whether conducted by 
Europeans or natives, bears evidence of being influenced by a proper 
sense of responsibility and by a general desire to discuss public events in 
a moderate and responsible spirit. There is no occasion to subject that 
press to restraint, and therefore, naturally enough, it is exempted. It 
would be a sign of great weakness on the part of government to bring it 




The nationalist movement after 1885 gave a new impetus to the development of the 
press in India; in fact the press played a very significant role in the movements that 
followed. By the 1890s, when the issues of sedition became even more prominent, the 
government geared for new laws. Most significant was the amendment of section 
124(A) of the IPC which was restructured in 1898 to include “hatred” and “contempt” 
along with “disaffection towards the government” as being worthy of prosecution, 
thereby still further limiting the space for criticism of the administration. These 
amendments were also warranted because several judicial arguments during sedition 
trials, including Tilak’s, had raised questions about the validity and the scope of the 
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 The period of the 1880s and 1890s was also marked by communal 
violence between Hindus and Muslims in several parts of the country. So, when the 
amendment was being discussed in the Legislative Assembly, it was proposed that 
promotion of religious enmity should also be included as an offence against the state 
under section 124(A).
149
 However, after more deliberations, the Select Committee 
recommended the inclusion of a separate section within the IPC to deal with such cases. 
This led to the formation of section 153(A) which punished anyone who with words, 
either spoken or written, promoted or attempted to promote feeling of enmity or ill-will 
between different classes of subjects, based on religion, race or other factors.
150
   
Each important event in local or international politics that had the potential to engage 
and mobilize public opinion against the British administration was greeted with heavy 
censorship of the press in India. Though even otherwise the press in India was never 
completely free, special tools were used during crisis period. So, the Press Act of 1910 
and the Defence of India Act 1939 were promulgated against the background of the two 
World Wars respectively. Similarly, the Press Emergency Act during the Salt 
Satyagraha, in 1931, and the gag orders during the 1942 Quit India Movement to 
suppress any news related to Congress activities were all product of reactions to 
particular events/challenges. The understanding of “crisis” was therefore very political 
and instrumental. For example, when the Cow Protection Movement peaked and took 
violent forms in 1893, the vernacular press in the hands of both communities – Hindus 
and Muslims – played an important role in sowing distrust and enmity – yet on this 
occasion, the government did not respond to the situation with a sense of urgency to 
prevent communal clashes. The communication between Lord Lansdowne and the Earl 
of Kimberley, in 1893, shows that the authorities were well aware how the communal 
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frenzy was spreading so fast all across the country. On a question about “why… 
disturbances are becoming more frequent than in past years”, Lansdowne responded:  
One of the causes to which this is due [is] in our opinion, beyond all 
doubt, the greater frequency of communication and the interchange of 
news by post and telegraph between different parts of the country.... 
This rapid dissemination of news and increasing activity of controversy, 
carried on through the Press, by public meetings, and by the addresses of 
itinerant preachers, is in some respects a new feature in Indian life, and 
is one which is likely to grow and add considerably to the difficulties of 
administration.
151
     
Further he also gives a detailed account of how it was happening: 
In addition to the inflammatory harangues delivered to meetings of 
Hindus, [wandering ascetics] have distributed throughout the country 
pictures of the cow, of a kind calculated to appeal strongly to the religious 
sentiment of the people. One of them, for instance, depicts a cow in the 
act of being slaughtered by three Muhammadan butchers, and is headed 
'the present state'. Another exhibits a cow, in every part of whose body 
groups of Hindu deities and holy persons are shown, being assailed by a 
monster with a drawn sword entitled the 'KaliYug' but which has been 
largely understood as typifying the Muhammadan community.
152
  
Though the administration had such precise details, very little was done to prevent such 
circulations in different parts of the country. Even when some kind of censorship was 
imposed to prevent communal tensions, it was always on the pretext of appeals from 
local officers, who in most cases were natives. This prevented the British authorities 
from taking direct responsibility of such acts, and in many cases it led to further uproar 
as it was assumed that the presiding officer was supporting the cause of his own 
religious brethren in an indirect way. The case of Munshi Inderman of Moradabad in 
1879 illustrates how the spread of print was sharpening existing cleavages and exposing 
new kinds of social tensions. Inderman, who was a follower/member of the Arya 
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Samaj, had been writing and publishing extensively against Islam and practices of the 
Muslim community. The Muslim groups, through their press had been continuously 
urging the district administration to take steps to prevent such offensive publications, 
but in vain.
153
 Later the magistrate imposed a fine on Inderman and ordered destruction 
of all the copies of the objectionable books he had published. It was found that the 
magistrate’s orders were based on evidences provided by the Deputy Collector, who 
happened to be a Muslim. This incident was given a communal colour and popularized 
to demonstrate that now Muslims in public offices were practising “oppression and 
tyranny upon the Hindus.”
154
 The Lahore Hindi weekly Mittra Vilas regretted that a 
“distinguished disciple” of Dayanada Saraswati should be treated so severely when 
many offensive Christian Missionary publications went unpunished.
155
 Attempt was 
made to mobilize public opinion against both enemies simultaneously- the colonial state 
as well as the Muslims. In the context of the Arya Samaj movement, this strategy 
helped further polarisation. 
N. G. Barrier has noted that the government barred any title strongly critical of western 
civilization or Christianity.
156
 Further, the British authorities were also very strict 
against any publication against the government and left no stone unturned to charge the 
offenders under the laws of sedition. The courtrooms, in case of writings against the 
administration, were only used as signifiers of government’s faith in legal system and 
its inherent respect for freedom of press, but in reality the government used all the 
possibilities at hand to punish such offenders. Robert Darnton notes that the 
government would freely construe “feelings of enmity as ‘disaffection’ and 
‘disaffection’ as ‘sedition,’ translating freely from one idiom to another as the need 
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arose” in order to ensure that the guilty could not escape the web of law.
157
 However, in 
the case of religious vilification and insult among Hindus and Muslims, even after being 




It is evident from the above discussions that on the one hand the British authorities were 
not averse to the idea of framing new laws to control, what they held to be, misuse of 
freedom of speech and expression. However, they were selective in the use of these 
laws, especially when it involved the subject of religion, as on the one hand they 
wanted to project their non-interference on religious matters of the colonial subjects, 
and on the other hand they feared that if they acted against members of one community, 
they would be blamed of favouring the other. So, unlike the political subjects, the 
government acted in the controversies over religion very selectively considering all the 
risks and benefits involved.     
In the post-mutiny period, there were also major socio-political changes within the 
internal structure of Indian society. In politics, a significant development was the 
formation of the Indian National Congress in 1885, which later led the nationalist 
response to British colonial rule. Similarly, in the field of religion, this phase saw a 
wide range of experimental explorations initiated by reformers and revivalists. There 
were reformers who were using liberal vocabularies to challenge the conservatives.
159
 
Contrarily, it also gave rise to sections of orthodox fundamentalists within each 
religion, who opposed any kind of attempts to revive or reform. Such conservatives 
sought to guard the inner citadel of their religions against any form of external 
                                                           
157
  Robert Darnton, “Literary Surveillance in the British Raj: The Contradictions of Liberal 
Imperialism,” Book History 4 (2001), 167-68; also see Robert Darnton, “Book Production in British 
India, 1850-1900,” Book History, 5 (2002), 239-62. 
158
  Darnton demonstrated that the British had developed very strict literary surveillance on the 
publications in India and if anything was found to be against their liking it was deterred and 
repressed, but such urgency was never visible in issues related to religious “insults” and “offence”. 
Darnton, Literary Surveillance. 
159
  For example, Bayly has shown the selective appropriation of Mill’s ideas of liberty and free 
expression by the liberals in India to counter the orthodox within the society. Bayly, Recovering 
Liberties, 11. 
71 
intervention or interrogations. The period also witnessed the rise of new forms of 
communal consciousness which by the 1880s and 1890s became an all-India 
phenomenon.
160
 For example as Christophe Jaffrelot notes, this was when “Hindu 
nationalism,” was constructed as an ideology and derived from the socio-religious 
movements initiated by high-caste Hindus, such as the Arya Samaj.
161
 The printing 
press became new site in the process of cultural self-definition, and the realm in which 
nineteenth-century communalism developed. The early nationalists like Rammohan 
Roy, who argued that freedom of press was important for a non-violent clash of 
religious ideologies, had not contemplated that the same freedom would be used in 
future to incite violence in the name of religion. It was obvious, therefore, that the 
attitude of Indians of this period towards freedom of speech and expression was 
different than that of Roy. 
4. The Indian Nationalists’ Position on the Question of Freedom of 
Expression 
In the previous section, I discussed the attitude of the British colonial authorities and 
law-makers on the subject of freedom of expression in India. In the following part, I 
examine the Indian nationalists’ position on the subject, particularly with reference to 
the publications claimed to be offensive to religious sensibilities of the people. 
4.1. Communal Consciousness during 1870s and the Role of Freedom of Speech 
and Expression 
It has been argued that in India, two ideologies – nationalism and communalism – had 
simultaneous and parallel growth trajectories.
162
 The British policy of non-interference 
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in the internal matters of religion further allowed a space for cultivation of communal 
ideologies. Sandra Freitag has convincingly shown how public arena activities like 
religious ceremonies among the Hindu and Muslim groups helped in consolidating 
communal consciousness and also became the breeding ground for violent clashes as 
witnessed during language controversies over Hindi-Urdu, or the Cow Protection 
Movement.
163
 The same movements also produced local leaders who carried the baton 
of the nationalist response to colonial rule. 
Partha Chatterjee has argued that, in the wake of colonial modernity, the “spiritual” or 
“inner” domain of culture, such as language, or religion, or the elements of personal and 
family life, was central to nationalists, and the “more nationalism engaged in its contest 
with the colonial power in the outer domain of politics the more it insisted in displaying 
the marks of ‘essential’ cultural difference so as to keep out the colonizer from that 
inner domain of national life and to proclaim its sovereignty over it.”
164
 So, on the one 
hand, the nationalists fought relentlessly to eradicate the “colonial difference” in the 
outer domain, on the other hand they struggled to protect their inner/spiritual domain 
thereby retaining its difference. In this way Chatterjee responds to the claims of 
Benedict Anderson and Edward Said, who suggested that the colonized confronted their 
domination, and, imagined their nationalism through the discourses made available by 
the west.
165
 In his work, Chatterjee explored one of the ways in which the active and 
creative process of self-fashioning happens. But as Ayesha Jalal and Neeladri 
Bhattacharya, among others, have demonstrated, Chatterjee’s assumptions seem to be 
based on his study of Bengal’s middle class “Hindu” society.
166
 In their respective 
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works, these scholars have shown us that there were alternative strategies which were 
utilized by different sections of population to counter the threat of cultural invasion.
167
  
Furthermore, the categories used by Chatterjee’s (of “inner” and “outer” sphere), does 
not seem to engage with the fact that though the “inner” domain of the colonized was 
different from the colonizer, it was not homogeneous. The insistence of essential 
difference between the “inner” spheres raised possibilities for multiplicity of 
subjectivities which consolidated in different forms of available spaces. Hence the 
forms of consciousness found in this “inner” domain took multiple forms, motivated by 
different interests variously – religion, caste, language among others. Even within 
religious consciousness, there were several strands/layers- some dominated by the 
orthodox sections and the other by the revivalists and reformists. The use of modern 
statistical tools like census and mapping by the British further added to this process of 
consolidation. So, even if it was a strategy by the nationalist elites to counter the impact 
of imperialism in their “inner” or “spiritual” domain, in fact it often made way for 
further disintegration and increasing differences among themselves. 
Also, the “private” and “public” spheres often intermingled in multiple ways. So, there 
were situations where components of public sphere interacted with the private and vice 
versa, and such interactions had capacity to reconstitute and redefine the other sphere. 
Consider for example the sphere of religion. According to Chatterjee, it would form a 
part of the “inner” or “spiritual” domain and this sphere was guarded by freedom of 
belief and faith. Similarly, freedom of speech and expression was something of “public” 
or “outer” domain as it was situated in the realm of law, and there was constant demand 
to grant such equal rights as enjoyed by the European inhabitants. If the “inner” and 
“outer” sphere existed as autonomous, how do we understand the phenomenon wherein 
such freedom was also used by different socio-religious groups to not only profess and 
popularize one’s own religion but in the process vilify other beliefs and encourage 
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conversion? The role of vernacular press, tracts and pamphlets published in the period 
are evidence of such strategy. In a way, it can be argued that the freedom in “external” 
domain was being used to impact belief and faith, which constituted the “inner” 
domain. This form of interaction between private and public sphere also became a 
problem for the British administrators as they were not sure whether to intrude in 
certain domains. So, though the realm of the communal press remained embedded in 




The communal consciousness that occurred under the effect of print during this period 
did not give rise to a “public sphere” as understood by Habermas in European context, 
but rather made the public space itself a site of multiple contestations and differences.
169
 
Debates implicitly and explicitly defined themselves against opponents, both internal 
and external. The “lay leaders”
170
 played a prominent role who utilized the new 
techniques of journalism, public preaching and debates, tracts and book writing to 
promote and profess their ideology. This process also included the invocation of 
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Initially the printing press was used to expose the role of Christian missionaries.
172
 But 
soon these same critical tools were directed by religious groups against each other 
exposing the fissures at various levels in the religious organization of Indian society. 
The opposition in this politics was constituted through an imagination of the “other,” 
which changed according to the context of the clashes. So for example, in Punjab when 
the activities of the Arya Samaj became prominent, it was challenged by the growth of 
two different streams- the Sanatanis from within the Hindus, and the Singh Sabhas from 
the Sikhs. However, when the Cow Protection Movement became popular, the natural 
“other” was found in the Muslims, and on many occasions, one could see tacit 
understanding among the Arya Samajists, the Sanatanis and the members of Sikh 
Sabhas to fight against the common enemy, in this case the Muslims.
173
  
Though the literate population was still very small, one did not need to be a literate to 
be aware of such struggles, which often were fuelled by rumours that were transmitted 
by the spoken word.
174
 The contents of newspapers and pamphlets were also 
disseminated through word of mouth at bazaars and local fairs to rouse communitarian 
emotions.
175
 Various newspapers and pamphlets of this period, from all sides, also 
voiced their resentment and questioned the colonial government’s proclaimed policy of 
impartiality in the domain of religion. Some of the newspapers urged the government to 
ban all publications intended to inflame religious passions, but in vain. They equally 
opposed the virus of conversion that was infecting social peace and urged the state to 
                                                           
172
  See, Lauh-i-Mahfuz, Moradabad, September 14, 1874, Selections, L/R/5/52, IOL, 484. Lauh-i-
Mehfuz, an Urdu journal, exposed that instead of using the mission funds for supporting the poor, the 
money was being wasted on the “publication of books written with no other object than to expose, to 
ridicule and contempt the Hindus and Mussalman religion.”  
173
  Metcalf, “Imagining Community”. Also see, N. G. Barrier, “Vernacular Publishing and Sikh Public 
Life in the Punjab, 1880-1910,” in Religious Controversy, ed. Jones, 200-228. The common enemy 
appeared in the form of Muslims because beef formed an important part of their diet and the same 
was prohibited in both Hindu as well as Sikh religious traditions which considered Cow to be sacred. 
174
  The role of ‘rumours’ has been widely discussed by various scholars. See, Ranajit Guha, 
“Tansmission,” and C. A. Bayly, “The Indian Ecumene: An Indigenous Public Sphere”, in The 
Indian Public Sphere: Readings in Media History, ed. Arvind Rajagopal (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 2009).  
175
  Jalal, Self and Sovereignty, 83. 
76 
take steps in this regard.
176
 The demand for censorship had started to emerge from 
among the Indians and it was mainly based on the logic to prevent the misuse of the 
freedom of press and publication to vilify and denigrate religious symbols and 
personage which led to the incitement of communal hatred among different religious 
communities. However, such demands were largely overlooked by the British 
authorities. 
By the beginning of twentieth century, clashing communitarian narratives, ostensibly 
emanating from the “private” domain, flowed in unrestrained form into a public arena 
of informal politics.
177
 Many of the nationalists during this period were also deeply 
religious and often the political use of religious categories blurred the line between 
nationalism and communalism.
178
 This process had two-way repercussions. On one side 
the creative energy generated by such consciousness was used in the service of 
nationalism. For example, Tilak used Ganesh Puja as a public event to facilitate 
community participation and build a new grassroot unity between Brahmins and non-
brahmins which contributed significantly in the nationalist project especially in western 
India.
179
 At the same time, such communal consciousness also inflamed fundamental 
differences and gave rise to new forms of inter-community conflicts that often took 
shape of violent riots. As Barbara Metcalf has noted, unlike European experience, 
where national loyalty dominated, in the colonial areas communal divisions were 
decisive. In India, according to her, this happened due to two significant developments. 
Firstly; “representation” and “communalism” were linked. The British had created a 
“form of government structured on representation, in which leaders to be effective had 
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to claim to speak for the interests of communities.”
180
 This meant that it was not 
individuals but communities defined by religious identities which engaged with the 
colonial state. This led to, as Freitag has also shown, politicization of religious 
identities.
181
 Secondly, Metcalf also points out that “the colonial appropriation of public 
and civic institutions encouraged a kind of retreat to domestic and religious space as 
sites where cultural values could be reworked and renewed.”
182
 In this process, religious 
vocabulary attained the role of legitimate expression against the colonial rule. Not only 
this, even when spaces within civic and public institutions were later created for 
representation of Indian interests, these were so limited in scope that the issues of 
religion dominated the debates within these spaces. As Jaffrelot has shown, party 
leaders appealing to the voters tended to resort to arguments drawn from the religious 
repertoire. For example, in Allahabad, the electoral rivalry between Motilal Nehru and 
Madan Mohan Malviya during 1920s revolved around the question of “who was a 
better Hindu,” and was dominated by the issues of beef eating, organizing Ram Lila 
procession, and so on.
183
 This suggests how electoral mobilization, even when it 
involved such avowedly secular leaders as Motilal Nehru, tended to be assimilated into 
debates defined by communal consciousness during this period.  
The practise of surveillance and control on different forms of expression by the British 
authorities also contributed to the process communal consciousness. It led to a new 
tendency among the nationalists to use religious idioms in order to articulate their 
political aspirations.
184
 As Freiteg has maintained, because the “British viewed 
‘political’ activities as discrete from ‘religious’ or cultural ones,” such attempts were 
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less susceptible to strict censorship.
185
 This gave an alternative way to convey the same 
idea in a covert way. However the use of religious aspects in national consciousness 
also opened the dangers of misinterpretations and communal polarization as most of 
these new experiments used references from Hindu mythologies and tried to portray the 
superiority of Hindu race.  
Take for example, the religious idioms used in plays written by Indians in late 
nineteenth century. In 1876, the government passed the Dramatic Performances Act to 
“prohibit dramatic performances” that were “seditious or obscene, or otherwise 
prejudicial to the public interests,” “likely to excite feelings of disaffection to the 
government established by law in British India,” or “likely to deprave and corrupt 
persons present at the performance.”
186
 The immediate reason for such legislation was 
the popularity and impact in Bengal of plays like Dinnabandhu Mitra’s Nil Darpan 
(Indigo Mirror, 1860), Dakshina Charan Chattopadhayay’s Chakar Darpan (Tea 
Planter’s Mirror, 1875), Upendra Nath Das’s Surendra-Binodini (1875), Ganjananda 
and the Prince (1876), and Police of Pig and Sheep (1876). Through these 
performances, the playwright not only explicitly showcased the atrocities of the 
government, but also appealed for unity to overthrow of the Raj. However under strict 
censorship initiated by the new law, the writers had to change the plots and characters. 
So the plays were now based on mythologies and the British characters, which were 
earlier at the centre of criticism, were replaced by the anglicized Indian character carved 
by imperial rule.
187
 This antagonized the new middle class intelligentsia, who along 
with some from the Brahmin sections had even earlier objected to the plays on grounds 
of obscenity, misrepresentation of women subjects and even to the stage performances 
by women. Further, being based on Hindu mythologies, these plays also lacked appeal 
to the Muslims: indeed, if anything, the call to Hindu pride put Muslims off. There is 
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evidence that some of these plays were being used with multiple purposes- on the one 
hand to expose the British and the other to counter the Muslims claims, especially 
during Cow Protection Movement and the Hindi-Urdu controversy.
188
 
The examples cited above indicate the way that religious symbols were used to speak 
simultaneously the language of communalism and nationalism. But such symbolism 
often contained communal overtones, and in the backdrop of multiple moments of 
religious violence and a culture of vilification of the other religion, the religious 
differences became more prominent. The situation worsened in the 1920s and with 
extreme political polarization of religious identities government had to come up with 
new regulations, in the form of 295(A) which followed the famous Rangila Rasul (The 
Merry Prophet) case in 1927. The most significant aspect of this legislation, however, 
was that the demand for a law to curtail freedom of expression had emanated from 
Indians themselves and was passed by the Central Legislature which contained a 
reasonable number of Indian representatives. Though such demands were not new, in 
the charged political climate, it took a completely new dimension. 
4.2. The Rangila Rasul Controversy and the Making of Section 295(A) 
The Rangila Rasul controversy was shaped and propelled in a particular context of 
1920s Punjab. The Non-cooperation-Khilafat phase of Indian politics (1919-1921)
189
 
represented an unprecedented scale of collaboration between the two largest religious 
communities of India– the Hindus and the Muslims. However by 1922, after a sudden 
call off of the movement by Gandhiji following the mass violence at Chauri Chaura, 
things began to change. The void created by the nationalistic politics was overtaken by 
competing religious sentiments. This was further fuelled by the Shudhi (purification) 
and Sangathan (organization) movement launched by the Arya Samajists in North 
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India. This propaganda was equally and strongly reciprocated by the Muslims in North 
India. The printing press again became a significant means for propaganda setting and 
very soon the reports of communal clashes replaced the news about nationalist 
movement as headlines of most major dailies. It turned into a bitter war of tracts and 
pamphlets which not only involved criticism of each other’s faith but went as far as to 
vilify prominent figures of the other religion.
190
 It was in this context that the pamphlet 
Rangila Rasul first appeared.  
The tract was published and distributed by Raj Pal
191
, an Arya Samaj polemicist, and 
it was aimed to denigrate the image of Prophet Mohammad by primarily mocking at 
his marriages and sex life. The publication appeared in response to another Urdu tract 
entitled Unisveen Sadi ka Maharishi (The Great Sage of the Nineteenth century), 
penned by a Muslim fanatic to counter the criticism and misrepresentation of the 
Prophet and Islam in Satyarth Prakash, the most reverend book of the Arya 
Samajists.
192
 When the demand for the banning of the tracts Unisveen Sadi ka 
Maharishi was raised, the government rejected it citing the absence of “any general 
public feeling,” “lack of any public motive” and no formal complaint unlike Rangila 
Rasul which “attracted immediate attention,” and received “wide publicity and was 
condemned by certain Hindu as well as Muhammadan papers.”
193
 Consequently, Raj 
Pal was arrested under section 153(A) of the IPC. Though Raj Pal was convicted and 
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4.2.1. The Case in the Lahore High Court 
The final appeal in the case was directed to the High Court at Lahore, where Justice 
Dalip Singh heard it, and handed down the judgment on May 4, 1927.
195
 After 
extensive examination of the evidences and contents of the pamphlet, he concluded that 
the pamphlet was “undoubtedly…… a scurrilous satire on the founder of the Muslim 
religion….” In very strong words, he maintained that it was a ridiculous piece of 
writing, liable to, “arouse the contempt of all decent persons of whatever community.” 
However, he insisted that he could not find anything that showed “it was meant to 
attack the Mohammedan religion as such or to hold up Mohammedans as objects 
worthy of enmity and hatred.” So, he very ‘reluctantly’ acquitted the petitioner as he 
believed that the subject in question – malicious satire on the personal life of a religious 
teacher was outside the purview of section 153(A). He further suggested that if such 
writings were to be convicted, there was a need for passage of a law to amend the code 
“by which the publication of pamphlets published with the intention of wounding the 
religious feelings of any person or of insulting the religion of any person might be made 
criminal.” But because he had to base his judgment in the case upon existing law, he 
ordered acquittal of the appellant.  
The judgement received polarized reactions. It was proclaimed as the victory of Hindu 
religion by the Arya Samjists. On the other hand protest meetings were held by 
Muslims all over India, the one in Lahore being attended by around ten thousand 
Muslims. It was held that the court had failed in protecting the honour of the Prophet. 
This caused a serious law and order crisis in Punjab. Discussing the situation, Punjab 
governor Hailey commented:  
There was really a very serious danger of disorder, for an attack on the 
Prophet was a concrete offence against Islam that stung them to the 
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On June 11, due to the rising fear for the law and order situation, Hailey moved beyond the 
set protocol and met a Muslim deputation.
197
 He admitted to them that the judgment had 
left the government “much concerned.” He said that he sympathized with those Muslims 
who felt “justifiably offended” by the pamphlet, and if required, the government would also 
seek amendment of the law in order to extend its application as suggested by Justice Dalip 
Singh. Though the liberal Muslims were convinced by Hailey’s promises, according to the 
popular press reports, these voices were silenced by the strong feeling of betrayal and sense 
of victimhood felt by the agitated popular Muslim response.
198
  
In Punjab, a demand for the resignation of Justice Dalip Singh and reversal of the 
judgment delivered by him was growing. A very radical opinion was expressed under 
the title “Resign” in Muslim Outlook of June 14, 1927, in which both – the judgment in 
Rangila Rasul case and Justice Dalip Singh – were abusively criticised. It included 
grave allegations against impartiality, justice and integrity of Justice Singh.
199
 The 
demand for his resignation was further echoed by other newspapers. Responding to the 
situation, government arrested D.S. Bukhari, the editor of the daily and its printer Nur-
ul-haq on the charges of contempt of court.
200
 
The situation worsened with these arrests. Though Bukhari and Nur-ul-haq were 
punished under the charges of contempt of court, it was widely perceived differently in 
connection with the Rangila Rasul case. The general feeling among the Muslims was 
that the government had been vigilant and interested in punishing for the offense of 
contempt of court but was very casual on the issue of the contempt of their Prophet. The 
sense of anger was rooted in what was seen as a case of bias towards Hindus and 
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victimization of the Muslims. The news and the interpretations of the cases spread 
rapidly all over the country and the press reported reactions in the form of protest 
meetings, hartals (strikes) and Hindu boycott from different regions.
201
 
The community antagonism was at its peak and the government was under pressure to 
restore the faith of protesting Muslims in the justice system. Within a few months, in 
another similar case, involving Devi Sharan Sharma, who published a similar tract 
entitled Sair-i-Dozakh (Passage to Hell) in Risala Vartman, the publisher was held 
guilty and punished. In this case the judges argued against the logic of Dalip Singh and 
held that any kind of “promotion of feeling of hatred” in any form was prohibited. 
Justice Broadway stated that “any criticism of a religious leader, whether dead or alive, 
falls within the ambit of section 153(A) of IPC.”
202
 The importance the government 
attached to this particular case can be gleaned from the fact that Justice Broadway, then 
on vacation, was especially asked to return to Punjab for the court hearing in the hope 
that he would reverse the earlier decision.
203
 
Broadway’s judgment delivered what the government was expecting. But it could do 
nothing to improve the law and order situation in the country. The harsh punishment 
pronounced in the case was enough to alienate the Hindus especially in United Province 
and elsewhere. It was argued that in each case of religious vilification it was Hindus 
who were prosecuted, and no action was initiated against Muslim authors who wrote 
similar tracts against Hindu deities. It was further held that the harsh punishment 
delivered in the Vartman case was only because of the hysteria created by Muslims 
after the Rangila Rasul case and the government had buckled under their pressure. Mass 
meetings were organized all over the United Provinces to condemn and protest against 
the attitude of Muslims and of government officials.
204
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4.2.2. The Bill in the Legislature 
Though the Vartman case went as desired by the government, it was thought that 
uncertainty should be avoided. There was a looming fear of a judgment like Rangila 
Rasul coming up in future, especially, with the kind of uncertainty it had generated 
vis-à-vis section 153(A). The doubt over such judicial issues needed to be clarified 
and the only way of doing it was by introducing a revision of the law. It was also 
believed to be helpful in winning back the lost confidence and good will among the 
Muslims.
205
 Unlike the popular Muslim demand for legislation particularly against 
such vilification of the Prophet, Hailey recommended drafting of a general section 
which could prohibit attack upon any sacred symbol of all religions. Hailey believed 
that a general law of this nature could find support both among the Muslims and the 
Hindus who had been equally vocal in their criticism when the matter came to 
discussion in the Punjab Legislative Council.
206
 The decision to legislate the 
“Religious Insult Bill” to amend the required sections of IPC was approved by the 
Viceroy and the bill was put on table for discussion in the August session of the 
Central Legislative Assembly. 
From the time of introduction of the Bill, to its way through the Select Committee and 
its final passage, there were several dissenting voices. There were several grounds on 
which the bill was criticized. Most of the dissenters felt that the legislation was being 
pushed through hurriedly. B. P. Naidu called it a “panicky legislation” and along with 
others reiterated the request for a wide circulation of the Bill and that response be 
sought from all sections whose interests were at stake.
207
 Some members also charged 
the government of appeasement by acting so hastily on the demands raised by a set of 
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Muslims in North India.
208
 Amar Nath Dutt termed it as the “favourite wife policy.”
209
 
A large section of the dissenters also believed that there already existed enough number 
of such laws and if the government truly wanted to maintain peace and order in society, 
it did not need an additional law.  
However, the most serious questions were raised about the scope of the Bill – about its 
aims, the fear of misuse and its failure to address the real issues. Though it was 
recognized that the bill that appeared after the Select Committee stage was much better 
than what was initially proposed, it did not end all worries. There was a general feeling 
among dissenters that the bill would not be able to achieve its aims as it did nothing to 
address the real problem – the causes of Hindu-Muslim tension – since the scurrilous 
writings were only a product of such tension.
210
  
Significantly, there was another issue that received shared concerns from most members 
across religious and other affiliations. Lajpat Rai, Jinnah, Kunzru, Madan Mohan 
Malviya were all in support of legitimate criticism of religion or religious reform, 
especially if made in works of historical importance.
211
 Largely it was a concern that 
the freedom of speech and expression should not be restrained to such an extent that it 
lost its meaning and true value. Though most of these members were worried about the 
fate of freedom of expression, the presence of contingent situations forced them to 
compromise. Freedom of speech and expression in the colonial context, after all, was 
just a desired claim and not a legal or fundamental right. The law makers considered it 
more important to counter the temporary threat that it was having on public order and 
tranquillity. There was also a suggestion in the form of amendment that the law be 
made applicable only for a limited duration and this was widely supported by the likes 
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of Lajpat Rai and S. Iyengar, but it lost by a close margin.
212
 Section 295(A) as finally 
adopted said: 
Whoever with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the 
religious feelings of any class of His Majesty’s subjects, by words, 
either spoken or written, or by visible representations, insults or attempts 
to insult the religion or the religious belief of that class, shall be 
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may 
extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
213
 
The case further reflected what I have earlier referred as an attitude to use law for 
“selective censorship.” The government did not ban the initial pamphlets like Unisveen 
Sadi ka Maharishi on the pretext that ‘no serious threat was visible,” whereas it was 
evident that Rangila Rasul was written in reaction of those tracts. If government would 
have acted earlier, it is possible that the incumbent situation could be avoided. Such 
inaction encouraged deviants like Raj Pal and raised several issues about the intentions 
of the government which was also reflected in the debates of the Assembly.
214
 At the 
same time, it can be seen as a conscious and calculated move to assert the capacity of 
the state to act as a neutral arbitrator of “supposedly endemic and inevitable religious 
conflicts.”
215
 In this regard, one should not overlook the fact that section 295(A) was 
structured in the form of a law for public order and aimed at preventing vilification of 
religious belief and personalities of all sections. At least in this sense it was projected as 
a “secular law,” thereby also upholding its promise of neutrality on religious matters.
216
 
So, without direct intervention on religious matters, the British could claim to have 
developed a law that protected the interests of all religious communities.  
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But how does one understand the role in such law-making of the native Indian 
representatives in the legislature? Neeti Nair has argued that in the context of 
“competitive communalism,” this moment should be seen as a case of “legislative 
pragmatism” where leaders from opposition parties came together to stop wanton 
attacks on religious figures and create an atmosphere for dialogue between the two 
communities.
217
 A close analysis of the Assembly Debate suggests us that this analysis 
is not entirely correct. Firstly, as discussed earlier, the primary reason cited by most of 
the members who were against the bill was the fear of political misuse and increase in 
the latitude of space for executive action. Secondly, the proceedings of the Assembly 
also reflected sharp divisions on religious lines. It would not be entirely correct to 
claim, as Neeti Nair does, that the leaders rose above their loyalties and affiliations.
218
  
In contrast, they seem to hold to strongly religious line of arguments.
219
 Most of the 
Muslim legislators were in favour of the bill and among those who voted against the 
bill, most were Hindus.
220
 The charges levelled by several Hindu members that the bill 
was an extension of Muslim appeasement policy of government, has already been 
discussed. In fact, many of those Hindu members who supported the bill did so only 
because they believed that a prohibition and check on scurrilous writings would be 
equally beneficial for all religious denominations. Thirdly, though the concern for 
freedom of expression was raised, it was not centrally addressed. The fear of the bill’s 
impact on freedom of expression largely remained confined in the arguments of 
professional pressmen who feared that such law would directly impact their lives. At all 
other times when the concern was raised, about its impact on historical research or 
religious reforms, it was never seriously dealt and no remedy was therefore suggested. 
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It was not surprising that the claim about the bill’s impact on freedom of speech and 
expression was easily overshadowed by the concern for emergent communal situation 
and thereby the need to empower the state to maintain public order and tranquillity. It is 
for this reason that a “consensus,” as claimed by Nair, could be reached. But 
considering the broader silence on the subject of freedom of speech and expression, 
which was going to be directly affected by the new law, and a strong insistence on the 
religious line of argument, reflected that the law makers were engaged in building a 
response to a situation of emergency, where law was seen as a means to protect the 
emotional subjects from hurt. I doubt that this approach can be called “legislative 
pragmatism,” as Nair has claimed. If anything, the role of the Indian representatives in 
the Assembly reflects a sense of urgency and short-sightedness as, in an attempt to 
provide instant protection to religious sensibilities from hurt, they failed to contemplate 
the long term repercussion that such a law could have on the basic rights of people.
221
 
The most significant aspect of the debates in the Assembly was that the native leaders 
engaged in a process of deliberation on a law that was going to govern their lives and 
impact their basic liberties in a fundamental way. However, a consensus was implicit in 
the process of deliberation that some rational limits had to be drawn in order to check 
religiously offensive speech acts. This aspect dominated the proceedings of the 
legislature and the importance rendered to such law in overcoming topical issues 
marred the possibility of an assessment about its probable implications.    
4.3. The Nationalist Discourse and the Dichotomy over Freedom of Expression 
Situations like the Rangila Rasul controversy exposed the lack of clarity, among the 
nationalists, on the question of freedom of speech and expression. So, on the one hand they 
were demanding greater freedom to criticize the government
222
, and on the other hand they 
were not very sure how to respond when such freedom was used for vilification of religious 
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symbols and personalities. This was further evident when Satyarth Prakash (The light of 
truth) the most important book of Arya Samaj, was banned in Sind in 1944. The demand 
for the ban had been made time and again by several Muslim groups since its publication in 
1875, as they insisted that it contained severe insulting references to the Prophet 
Mohammad and to Islam, which according to them was offensive to the Muslims all over 
country. But the British did not endorse their position. In December 1943, during a public 
meeting in Karachi, the Muslim League reiterated this demand and appealed for action. In 
1944, due to immense pressure from Muslim public opinion, the Sind government led by 
the Muslim League announced the ban. Gandhi was distressed with the ban. He maintained 
that, “Satyarth Prakash enjoys the same status for 40 lakhs of Arya Samajists as the Koran 
for the Muslims and the Bible for the Christians.”
223
 He argued in his article entitled Sind 
bans Satyarth Prakash: 
The virtue of toleration is never strained, especially in matters of 
religion. Differences of religious opinion will persist to the end of time. 
Toleration is the only thing that will enable persons belonging to 
different religions to live as good neighbours and friends. Religion never 
suffers by reason of the criticism- fair or foul of critics, it always suffers 
from the laxity or indifference of its followers.
224
  
Ironically, about the same book, writing in Young India in 1924 about Hindu- Muslim 
tension: Its cause and cure, Gandhi had said: 
I have read Satyarth Prakash, the Arya Samaj Bible…. I have not read a 
more disappointing book from a reformer so great…. He has 
unconsciously misrepresented Jainism, Islam, Christianity and Hinduism 
itself… One having even cursory acquaintance with these faiths could 
easily discover the errors into which the great reformer was betrayed. 
Although he was extremely critical about Satyarth Prakash, he believed the banning of 
the book was uncalled for.
225
 Gandhi’s position with regard to Satyarth Prakash 
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indicated his approach to the question of tolerance and his discomfort with the idea of 
banning any form of publication. Rather, the remedy he suggested to counter writings 
containing vilification or denigration of other religions was different. In his article 
Hindu- Muslim tension: Its cause and cure, Gandhi was particularly critical of writings- 
tracts and pamphlets -which according to him had played significant role in heightening 
Hindu-Muslim tensions. But he believed that the best mechanism to counter this 
competitive vilification of each other’s religion was the role that local community 
leaders should play, for instance by taking measures to find ways of “stopping these 
publications or, at least, discrediting them and distributing clean literature instead, 
showing tolerance for each other’s faith.”
226
 He also insisted on creating a public 
opinion that could reject such incitements. He believed that the regulatory and legal 
mechanisms fail “to serve the purpose intended, except temporarily, and in no case do 
they convert the writers ….. The real remedy is healthy public opinion that will refuse 
to patronize poisonous journals.”
227
 
Gandhi’s was a moral position on the subject and was also reflective of his general 
aversion to the role that law and government should play in an ideal society. Rather he 
insisted on building local networks to counter the threat posed by offensive 
publications. However, many other nationalists would not uphold this position. Though 
they were critical of the ban on Satyarth Prakash, they had their own reasons. For 
example, Nehru claimed it to be a larger issue of civil liberty and religious freedom. He 
was worried that “this may become a precedent for future invasions on all civil rights 
and liberties.”
 228
 Nehru asserted that “I shall always endeavour to have civil liberties in 
all forms maintained and practised in India and to resist any encroachment on them.”
229
 
For Nehru, to take a principled position when the ban was called by the Muslim 
League’s government in Sind was easy, but one can contrast this view from his position 
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in 1937 after Indian National Congress had emerged in power in most of the provinces. 
He wrote in Harijan on 23
rd
 October: 
Inspite of every desire to avoid it, coercive action may become necessary 
and in such cases ministries will inevitably have to undertake it. Such 
coercive action should only be undertaken where there has been 
violence or incitement to violence or communal strife.  
Nehru’s approach was more realist than Gandhi’s as he saw the inevitability of the state’s 
role in regulating free speech in certain circumstances especially when it increased 
communal tensions. He insisted that in such cases, governmental interferences was 
necessary, a position that he maintained even after India became independent.  
The opposition to the ban seemed to situate Nehru in the same side as S. P. 
Mookherjee
230
, who also criticized the ban, however, for completely different reasons. 
Mookherjee condemned the ban as an attack on Hinduism. He took the opportunity to 
appeal to the Arya Samajists to work in cooperation with other parties for the 
consolidation of the Hindu forces and freedom of Hindustan.
231
 The Arya Samajists 
organized a massive satyagraha in Sind but in vain.
232
 The book remained banned 
even after all such agitations.  
It was evident that though the ban was opposed by the nationalists, different sections 
had different reasons for their oppositions. It was particularly true in cases where the 
freedom of speech and expression was seen as being in collision with religious values 
and identities. So, Gandhi’s opposition was a matter of principle against use of 
government machinery for such cause, Nehru’s opposition on the other hand was based 
on his arguments for civil liberties, whereas Mookherjee saw it as a conscious ploy by 
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Muslim fundamentalists. The divergent arguments reveal no unanimity over the 
criticism of the ban, but rather at ambiguities in nationalist positions regarding 
censorship. These issues once again came out in the open when these personalities sat 
to write the Constitution for Independent India, I discuss in the next chapter. 
5. Conclusion 
What ramifications did the debates over censorship during colonial times have on the 
understanding about freedom of speech and expression? On the one hand, the legal 
provisions and limitations introduced by the British formed the guiding principles for 
the free speech discourse in India, and on the other hand, in the absence of any 
comprehensive civil liberties movement, the mediums of nationalist responses like 
vernacular press, tracts, books and iconographies became the rallying point around 
which the freedom of expression debate centred.
233
 Freedom of expression remained 
largely dependent on the interpretations of law offered by the colonial authorities. 
Neither the British nor the Indians treated freedom of expression as a fundamental 
individual right. It was invoked based on the utility it served for the community at large. 
The British attitude to freedom of expression in relation to “offence”, or “insult” to 
religious identities reflected a subtle dichotomy. On the one hand, in legal and 
legislative language, the limits to free expression was pronounced and kept on growing 
(in the form of section 153(A), or section 295(A) of the IPC and other similar 
regulations) on the other hand, post-1857 they claimed to maintain a policy of non-
interference in the religious activities of the natives. The use of the colonial laws was 
subject to the interests of the imperial design, which was believed to be best served by 
the colonial state maintaining an image of a neutral arbitrator of religious conflicts. So, 
at times due to the fear of being branded as biased towards a particular community, and 
at other times, in order to extract maximum benefit from such antagonisms, they 
exercised “selective censorship.”    
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On the part of the colonized Indians, the response was equally diverse. The early 
liberals like Rammohan Roy argued for some limits to freedom of speech and 
expression especially in conditions of “libel” and “sedition,” but thought it to be a 
potent weapon to respond to the challenges of Christian missionaries. But gradually the 
same freedom was used by Hindus and Muslims against each other. As these 
antagonisms escalated and began to take violent shape, there were demands from within 
the Indian communities that they had conferred religious hatred. The nationalists 
questioned the British claim that they had conferred religious liberty and toleration on 
Indian society through their policy of impartiality in the domain of religion, and argued 
that it only allowed men of various creeds to play fast and loose with religion.
234
 There 
was no clarity in the position of Indian nationalists on the subject. Though they were 
struggling for greater freedom of expression to criticize the authorities, they were not 
sure if similar freedom should be allowed in religious subjects. This contradiction was 
evident in their role in making of section 295(A) as well as when Satyarth Prakash was 
banned. It can be concluded that when India became independent, it carried with itself 
an ambiguity, vis-a-vis the position over freedom of expression, particularly in relation 
to religious offense. There was, however, a looming consensus that such freedom 
needed to be controlled and regulated through law. This history of contradictions and 
the role of vernacular press in communal violence had a significant impact on the future 
of freedom of speech and expression, when it was being debated in the Constituent 
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CHAPTER 3 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND RELIGIOUS 
VILIFICATIONS: DECODING THE CONSTITUTIONAL 




In the last chapter I discussed how the debates around freedom of speech and 
expression took shape during colonial period. It was argued that in the colonial context 
the idea of freedom of speech and expression acquired a position of uncertainty in the 
story of colonial dominance and the nationalist response to it. On the part of the Indians, 
the argument for freedom of expression developed in relation to the language of 
opposition to the colonial rule but there remained a marked ambiguity in their position 
over cases concerning religious propaganda. Although they favoured freedom of 
expression, they were not sure about how to respond when the same freedom became 
instrument for what could be seen as religious vilification, and hence a tacit consensus 
emerged that such freedom needed to be subjected to certain restrictions. 
Ironically, the ambiguity did not end even after India became independent in 1947. The 
celebrations of the birth of a new nation was accompanied with the general feeling of 
hope that everything associated with the colonial rule would be undone, and 
independence along with the formation of the new state under the leadership of the 
nationalists, would usher a new sense of freedom with an uncompromising respect for 
civil liberties.
235
 However, the challenge of nation making and the pressure of the 
context did not allow space for such ambitious intervention. This dichotomy was clearly 
evident in the CAD
236
 and the Constitution that took shape thereafter. Kaviraj has 
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significantly argued that “before independence as power was not in the hands of the 
nationalists, political and ideological position could be articulated only as ideas, which 
allowed the liberty to think beyond barriers, almost a utopian imagery of independent 
India.”
237
 The real challenge therefore was visible when the same nationalists occupied 
positions of power and responsibility to shape the future of the nation.  
In this chapter, I explore the constitutional and legal provisions that govern the issues of 
freedom of speech and expression in Independent India. For this, the chapter has been 
divided into two parts. The first part discusses how the divergent views about the space 
for state intervention vis-à-vis such rights and liberties were represented and confronted 
one another in India’s CAD, and reconstructs the negotiated settlement that emerged 
during the course of CAD. The aim is to examine how the issue of rights in general and 
freedom of speech and expression in particular was discussed and debated, which will 
also highlight the concerns and motivations among the constitution makers with regard 
to such rights. In the second part I discuss the amendments carried out to the 
constitution and other statutory laws. Two constitutional amendments (first, and 
sixteenth), and the amendments to section 295(A), and 153(A) (in 1961 and 1969) are 
discussed in details. These amendments re-defined the scope of freedom of speech and 
expression and the debates in the Parliament was also representative of the attitude of 
the lawmakers in independent India. The central argument in this chapter is that the 
constitutional as well as legal provisions for freedom of expression, and its limits, 
allowed significant space for the intervention by government. Most of the terms used to 
delimit the scope of freedom of speech and expression under the constitution – libel, 
slander, defamation, contempt of court, decency, morality– are vague and leave space 
for multiple interpretations. This does not only invite extensive forms of state 
intervention, but also increases the possibility of its misuse. At the same time, the 
paternalistic approach of the lawmakers, and the context of “urgency” in which they 
amended significant laws (both constitutional and statutory), further allowed the 
widening of the net for government intervention in individual’s right to freedom of 
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speech and expression. A new language of liberty, loaded with the concern for social 
cohesion and communal harmony was introduced, which made the right to freedom of 
speech and expression in India conditional to significant limitations, and presented a 
skewed conception of individual rights – dependent on the state at every step to 
authorize its legitimacy and appropriateness.  
2. Constituent Assembly and the Idea of Freedom of Speech and 
Expression in the Constitution 
The Constituent Assembly became the site where divergent visions about India’s future 
interacted to produce a document which could become the “statement of Indian 
identity.”
238
 The discussions in the Assembly over freedom of speech and expression 
lacked any political or philosophical argumentation about the importance or need for 
such right in a democracy. Its inclusion in the constitution was considered sine qua non, 
partly because of the historical background of the national struggle and more because of 
the fact that most part of India’s constitution was largely borrowed from the 
declarations or constitutions of the then successful democracies. The Bill of Rights, the 
debates over First amendment in the US, and others, were clear in the minds of the 
constitution makers. But it was not an exclusive case with freedom of speech and 
expression. Many political concepts that were used and included in the constitution 
were little debated or reflected upon by the constitution makers.
239
 Sunil Khilnani has 
rightly argued that such evasion “retracted attention from how these elements might 
interact with one another over time, producing mutations in the forms of democracy, 
while also changing the internal character of the nature of representation, rights and 
equality.”
240
 However, it did not mean that the ideas were not discussed at all. For 
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example, in relation to freedom of speech and expression, the members debated 
extensively about the appropriate limits to such freedom.  
The issue about the restrictions and its rationale came up at an early stage when the 
Draft Report submitted by the sub-committee to Advisory committee for consideration 
subjected freedom of speech and expression to “public order” and “morality.” It also 
included provisions for action against “publication or utterance of seditious, obscene, 
slanderous, libellous or defamatory matter.”
241
 Pointing out the lacunae, members like 
K. T. Shah
242
 argued that the limitations should be minimal and terms like “morality” 
should be avoided as they were vague and could be misused.
243
 On the opposite of the 
spectrum were members like A. K. Ayyar
244
, who argued that exceptions were too 
narrow and should be broadened in order to be used by the state for security and other 
emergencies. These discussions forced early amendments and the Interim Report on 
Fundamental Rights that was presented to the Constituent Assembly by the Advisory 
committee read: 
8. There shall be liberty for the exercise of the following rights subject 
to public order and morality or to the existence of grave emergency 
declared to be such by the government of the union or the unit 
concerned whereby the security of the union or the unit, as the case may 
be, is threatened: 
a) The right of every citizen to freedom of speech and expression: 
provision may be made by law to make the publication or utterance of 
seditious, obscene, blasphemous, slanderous, libellous or defamatory 
matter actionable and punishable.
245
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This draft attracted severe criticism from different ends. For example, Somnath 
Lahiri
246
 argued that the provisions seemed to have been framed “from the point of 
view of a police constable.” He also warned that the phrase “grave emergency” was one 
open to interpretation, and hence its misuse by the executive was possible.
247
 Looking 
at the kind of hostility it had generated, Patel moved clause 8 the next day omitting the 
provisos contained in clause 8(a). Based on the Committee reports and their discussion 
in the Constituent Assembly, B. N. Rau
248
 prepared the Draft Constitution which was 
cleared by the Drafting Committee before being placed in the Assembly. Interestingly, 
the Draft Constitution included a set of new provisos and read as follows: 
13. (1) Subject to other provisions of this article, all citizens shall have 
the right- (a) To freedom of speech and expression;  
(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of this article shall affect the 
operation of any existing law, or prevent the state from making any law, 
related to libel, slander, defamation, sedition or any other matter which 
offends against decency or morality or undermines the authority or 
foundation of the state. 
These new inclusions received polarized reactions, some opposing the provisos and the 
other in its support. Those opposing included K. T. Shah
249





, Sardar Hukam Singh
252
, Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava
253
, among 
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others. They invoked the Bill of Rights of American Constitution and argued that the 
fundamental rights should be absolute and not subject to exceptions. It was feared that 
the presence of provisos made the liberty insignificant. Damodar Swaroop Seth said: 
“Rights guaranteed in article 13 are cancelled by that very section and placed at the 
mercy of the high handedness of the legislature.”
254
 There was a general feeling that 
the presence of provisos in the article seemed as if the right was “given by right hand 
and taken away by left.”
255
 They were concerned about the executives in future acting 
like British in the past and using laws to curb political dissent. Most of the advocates 
of such unconditional institutional protection for civil rights belonged to political 
minorities: Muslims, Communists, and Hindu Right. Based on their distrust of 
government’s role, they argued that the decisions about regulation of freedom of 
speech and expression should be left exclusively for the judiciary which could decide 
on a case to case basis.  
Contrary to this view were those who believed that some form of censorship was 
important for government to enable it to handle the turbulent times that the country was 
undergoing. For example, Shri K. Hanumanthaiya
256
 said: 
We went through a course of suffering and sacrifice which were 
imposed upon us by the repressive laws of British imperialism; this 
naturally made us votaries of unadulterated fundamental rights and that 
was our hope. But, ultimately when we emerged out of those 
innumerable difficulties, we are faced, within our own society, with 
elements who want to take advantage of those rights in order to do 
violence to men, society and laws.... No man who believes in violence 
and who wants to upset the State and society by violent methods should 
be allowed to have his way under the colour of these rights. It is for that 
purpose that the Drafting Committee has thought it fit to limit the 
operation of these fundamental rights.
257
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Those in favour of restrictions insisted on the need to show faith in the executive’s 
commitment not to misuse power since it was under democratic oversight.
258
 Defending 
the presence of provisos, T. T. Krishnamachari
259
 argued that it just reflected the middle 
path adopted by the government to balance freedom with responsibility.
260
 There were 
others like Amiyo Kumar Ghosh
261
, who were not against the idea of including 
provisos, but believed that the vagueness of the terms used to limit such freedom should 
be avoided as it could lead to ambiguity and misinterpretations. However there seems to 
have been no serious response to such arguments. 
At the end only K. M. Munshi’s
262
 amendment to delete the word “sedition” from 
article 13(2) was accepted and the re-numbered provision, finally adopted, read as 
follows: 
19. (1) all citizens shall have the right- (a) to freedom of speech and 
expression; 
(2) nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of 
any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the state from 
making any law relating to, libel, slander, defamation, contempt of court 
or any matter which offends against decency or morality or which 
undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the state. 
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3. The CAD and the Central Concerns regarding Freedom of 
Expression 
The debates in the Constituent Assembly reflected three broad concerns related to 
Freedom of speech and expression in particular: a) there was concern about any 
continuity to the British form of rule and colonial laws, and at least symbolically there 
was a unanimous negation of it; b) there was concern about whether the government 
could always be trusted on questions relating to freedom of speech and expression and 
there was agreement on the need for a “two-tiered” response system as it was agreed 
that the judiciary should play an important role as the protector of fundamental rights.; 
and c) set against the back drop of Partition, the Constitution makers were also taking 
into account and reacting to the new set of challenges connected with communal 
antagonisms. 
3.1. The Fear of Continuing Aspects of British Rule 
The concern that the restrictions on freedom of speech and expression by the 
government represented a continuing aspect of colonial policies of control was reflected 
in the way the reference of British rule was invoked to either criticize the government or 
question its intentionality. For example, Mr. Mohammed Ismail Sahib
263
 raised his 
concern about the scope of the provisos and said:  
It was different when the Britisher, the foreigner was in the country and 
that now it’s our own rule. True, but that does not mean that we can deal 
with liberty of the citizens as we please……. Therefore, Sir, the citizen 
must be protected against the vagaries of the executive in a very careful 
manner as other self-governing countries have done.
264
 
Similar attitude was reflected when other members compared the expectations from the 
constitution of a new state, with the history of denial of such rights by an autocratic 
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government. For example, Somnath Lahiri in the course of debate accused Sardar Patel 
(then Home Minister and the Chairman of the Advisory committee on fundamental rights) 
of trying to arm the future legislature and executives with more powers than the British 
government itself, which according to him, was “not the basis of democracy.”
265
 It is 
ironic, however, that though there was a firm determination to be different from the British 
in forms of administration and rule in general- or to say at least in the visible forms of 
governmental manifestations- the fact that more than one third of the constitution was 
taken from 1935 Act and further, article 372 allowed all the then existing laws to continue 
(subject to review power of the judiciary) did not seem to be in consonance. The fear of 
existing laws affecting the sanctity of these rights was raised at several instances. Mahboob 
Ali Baig pointed out that the laws like the Press Acts, Criminal Law Amendment Acts and 
Security Acts were promulgated by British for repressive purposes and the continuation of 
such laws was both unwarranted and useless in a democracy.
266
 Similar fear is reflected in 
Sardar Bhupinder Singh Mann’s claim that “to apply the existing law in spite of changed 
conditions really amounts to trifling the freedom of speech and expression. From the very 
beginning we have stood against the existing laws, but now you are imposing them on 
us.”
267
 One could also see a fierce opposition launched to the inclusion of word “sedition” 
within the provisions restricting freedom of speech and expression. The history of bitter 
experiences faced by the leaders of nationalist movement in the hands of the British, and 
the scope for its misuse in future, were cited as primary reasons for such opposition.
268
 
Eventually the word sedition was dropped.  
A special clarification had to be offered by Nehru and Ambedkar claiming that no such 
intrusion was intended. It was forcefully argued that article 8 (article 19 in the present 
constitution) would be a safeguard against any such attempt by future authorities in 
power. It was further assured that any law which was in force in any part of the land 
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shall be held as void, if the judiciary found it to be inconsistent with the provisions 
guaranteed under fundamental rights. 
3.2. Uncompromising Faith in the Judiciary 
It was almost unanimously held that the judiciary should be the sentinel of the rights 
promised by the constitution. This confidence in the judiciary was encouraged by the 
concern that the executives in future could misuse their capacities if these rights were 
not granted such protections. Sardar Hukam Singh and Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava 
argued that if the fate was left in the hands of the authorities in power, the fundamental 
rights would become “illusory” and hence the Supreme Court should have the “final say 
with regard to the destinies of our nationals.”
269
 There was a strong set of voices in the 
Assembly arguing that “unconditional” rights be granted by the constitution, and in 
cases of disputes, the judiciary can judge its validity, as in the American case. 
The faith in the judiciary was also shaped by two other factors: a) the positive role that 
judiciary had played in preservation of civil liberties against executive excesses in other 
successful democracies. The American case was an instant reference point. Mahboob 
Ali Baig cited the Fourteenth Amendment of the US constitution and the British 
experience to highlight the primacy of the judiciary contrary to the German experience 
where power was misused by legislature and executive under Hitler’s rule;
270
 b) The 
enthusiasm also flowed from the experiences of the working of the Supreme Court at 
home, especially in its last phase before independence. As legal historians like Rohit De 
have demonstrated, there were instances of severe confrontation between colonial state 
and federal judiciary when the later struck down a number of emergency war time 
legislations. This not only took both the colonial officials and Indian public by surprise, 
but also encouraged a degree of faith in the judiciary among Indians themselves.
271
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All these factors invoked a deep reverence for the judiciary as the protector of such 
rights. However, there was a small section, mostly amongst Congress loyalists, who 
were not enthusiastic about giving extensive powers to the courts. For example, K. 
Hanumanthiya doubted the court’s capacity of coming to grips with rapid changes 
within the country. He also argued that the function of courts was only to interpret and 
the legislature should therefore frame laws that could adjust according to the demands 
of changing times and not depend on the judiciary for its innovations.
272
 Similarly, G.B. 
Pant
273
 was afraid that the future of the country will be determined “not by the 
collective wisdom of the representatives of the people but by the fiats of those elevated 
to the judiciary.”
274
 “We cannot be subject to varying court judgements, to the whims 
and vagaries of judges…… If we can’t put mischief makers in jail, there is no end to 
communal disorders,” he said.
275
 It seems that in order to maintain a balance although 
the judiciary was assigned a central role via article 13 and article 32 of the constitution, 
the space for such judicial intervention was in some ways limited by pronouncing 
provisos to freedom of speech and expression under article 19(2).  
3.3. Responding to the Complicated Context 
The making of the constitution took two years eleven months and eighteen days. This 
period was full of turmoil and disturbances in the country. Though the period was 
marked by the transition from a subjugated colony to a free nation, it was accompanied 
by partition and the widespread communal violence. Such transformation posed serious 
challenges to the project of nation building facing the framers of the constitution. A 
central question they had to confront concerned the fate of the religious minorities who 
had chosen to stay back. There was on the one hand the fear among minorities of being 
suppressed by the Hindu majority, something about which the Muslim League had long 
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been warning, while on the other hand there was expectations of some “reward” in 
return of their decision to stay back- rewards in the form of institutional protection of 
their political and cultural rights as promised by the nationalists during the course of 
freedom struggle and as they had enjoyed during the last phase of British rule.
276
 It was 
also a test for the new Indian leadership, since they were required to refute the historical 
claim made by the British that the British had special obligations to protect the 
minorities as they could not find justice if left in the hands of other Indians.
277
 So, Patel 
made it explicit in the first meeting of the Advisory committee on minority rights that:  
It is for us to prove that it is a bogus claim, a false claim, and that 
nobody can be more interested than us in India, in the protection of our 
minorities. Our mission is to satisfy everyone of them…. at least let us 
prove we can rule ourselves and we have no ambition to rule others.
278
 
There was mounting pressure on the Assembly to handle in tandem the issues of rights 
and liberties and the concerns of minority protection and national integration. Though 
these were not mutually exclusive goals, the real challenge was to derive an acceptable 
and workable balance among them all. In the process, the Assembly arrived at remedies 
that had lasting impact on, and consequences for the future of Indian democracy. This 
was so in atleast three respects, affecting the discourse of free speech: a) the location of 
the value of liberty in relation to equality and fraternity in the democratic discourse; b) 
Individual vs. group in the Constitutional vocabulary; and c) freedom of speech and 
expression vis-à-vis “communal hatred.”  
3.3.1. The Location of the Value of Liberty in relation to Equality and Fraternity 
In the Indian context, it seems that the values of equality and fraternity were placed at a 
higher pedestal than that of liberty. The constitution makers of a nation which had 
experienced police repression, arbitrary governmental action and brutality under colonial 
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regime showed little respect for civil liberties and individual freedom. The enunciation of 
fundamental individual rights was conjoined with a set of conditions under which the 
state could exercise its power and limit such liberties to realize a broader national and 
political vision. So, a broad understanding was achieved that individual liberties would 
attain a subsidiary position within the constitution and more emphasis was rendered on 
the values of equality and fraternity. Ambedkar’s statement in the Assembly on 
November 4, 1948 is significant in this regard. While distinguishing between non-
fundamental rights and fundamental rights he argued that while the non fundamental 
rights are created by agreement between parties: “Fundamental rights are gifts of the law. 
Because fundamental rights are the gift of the state it does not follow that the state cannot 
qualify them.”
279
 So, if the need be, the state had every legitimate right to compromise 
such individual rights and liberties for the larger goals. In a context marred by riots and 
political violence, it was considered imperative that the state should assert its 
prerogatives, and with extensive powers under its command should guide the process of 
nation building by inculcating a sense of trust and faith among communities which in turn 
required projecting the values of fraternity and promises of equality where necessary.
280
 
Broadly speaking there were two positions amongst those who supported such 
limitations of individual liberties: a) the first was expressed by CAD members who 
argued that extensive powers in the hands of the state was required in order to control 
the conflictual situation that had arisen post independence. The state was expected to 
maintain peace and order in society by not only enforcing law and order but also 
enabling solidarities and trust to emerge among various communities especially 
between Hindus and Muslims. This idea was articulated by members like 
Hanumanthaiya and T. T. Krishnamachari. b) The other position was held by those 
CAD members who believed that by its very nature liberty was different from license 
and the role of state was important also to ensure that clashes of different perceptions of 
liberty did not occur. No rights therefore could be absolute. This position was held by 
members like Ambedkar, Patel and others. As the proceedings of the CAD turned out, 
these voices were very dominant in the house and led to the fact that the provisions in 
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the constitution favouring individual rights were made conditional to the authority of 
the state to manage liberties to ensure equality and fraternity in society. 
3.3.2. Individual v. Group in the Constitutional Vocabulary 
The prevailing context and the history of national movement also had a deep impact on 
the way individual rights were perceived in relation to group rights in the constitution. 
Within the Constituent Assembly, there was a significant section who wanted 
individuals and not groups to be the bearers of rights. For example, G. B. Pant 
condemned the practice of invoking the category of “community” thereby undermining 
the value of “individual,” who was the citizen and therefore should be centre of 
concern.
281
 This attitude, as Jaffrelot has argued, represented a classical “Jacobin 
rejection of communities.”
282
 It was also reflected in the ideas of Nehru, Patel, and 
Radhakrishnan among others. This rejection of communities was based on two central 
arguments: a) The project of nation building required a strong unity of the nation, which 
could be hampered by due allegiance to intermediary forms of identity such as religion 
or caste; and b) the fear that recognition of minority identities would inevitably lead to 
the isolation and neglect of these communities by the majorities in the future.
283
  
There was yet another section among the CAD members who invoked individual rights 
and national unity considerations virtually interchangeably. This position was represented 




 and Minoo Masani
286
. Their opposition to 
community recognition was not only based on the importance of equal rights for all 
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citizens in nation building, but also from a fear that if the cultural communities were 
thus recognized, without drastic internal reform among these communities, it would 
mean the continuation of the subjugatory illiberal practices within each such 
community which would be contrary to the interests of large sections within these 
communities that were vulnerable, like women.
287
 So, they preferred the individual 
based concept of rights, equal for all. This was reflected in their consistent support for 
Uniform Civil Code, and opposition to the addition of “practice” and “propagate” 
religion as a fundamental right.
288
      
Contrary to all these positions, were the view of other members like K. T. Shah, K. M. 
Munshi, and representatives of different minority community who argued for 
recognition of the rights of communities based on the significance of religious identity 
to the self.
289
 Eventually, as it happened, this latter position was in part accepted and 
space was made for recognition of groups and the claims of community rights. 
However, with independence the context had changed and partition in the name of 
religion had convinced the members that though minorities’ right to culture should be 
protected, they should have no claim to benefits in political rights either in form of 
reservations or separate electorates.
290
 Many of the minority leaders including several 
Muslim leaders welcomed the decision.
291
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In the case of religious and cultural rights, on the one hand the leaders of religious 
minorities wanted no interference of the state on issues of institutional and cultural 
practices internal to religion, but at the same time they expected protection and support in 
the form of social welfare programmes that included education and propagation of 
cultural values. About the abrogation of political benefits and protection of socio-cultural 
rights, Gurpreet Mahajan is of the opinion that in the post-partition phase, the minority 
leaders were more interested in preserving their cultural rights of their communities than 
in upholding the political rights that they previously enjoyed during the British rule.
292
 
Rochana Bajpai adds to this understanding by demonstrating that unlike political 
safeguards, the language of cultural rights of minorities found support in key nationalist 
ideals. Preservation of such rights was seen as a part of the secularism that the new state 
was expected to follow, whereas the political safeguards in the form of either separate 
electorates or reservations was considered a threat to the cause of national unity. It is not 
surprising therefore that unlike the standard liberal position, groups as well as individuals 
were recognized in nationalist opinion as the subjects of rights and entitlements.
293
 The 
Constituent Assembly took a balanced position on this issue: on the one hand the right to 
religion – to profess, practise and propagate – was conferred to all persons, on the other 
hand the freedom was not left unfettered – state intervention was authorised in the interest 
of protecting “public order, morality and health.”
294
 It is equally true that cultural 
pluralism, rather than liberal individualism became the operative principle of democracy, 
and though, the Constitution had guaranteed a set of individual political rights like 
freedom of speech and expression, almost all of these were severely circumscribed. The 
cultural community, on the one hand, and national interest, on the other, curtailed the free 
expression of these rights.
295
 This position was indicative of the approach of the 
government in cases where individual rights came in collision with group rights. For 
example, when the claim of religious “offense” is presented as a claim for protection 
                                                           
292
  Gurpreet Mahajan, “Religion and the Indian Constitution.” 
293
  Rochana Bajpai, “Cultural Rights,” 291. The idea is further elaborated in Bajpai, Debating 
Difference. 
294
  Rochana Bajpai, “Cultural Rights,” 293.  
295
  Mahajan, Identities and Rights, 38. 
110 
promised under right to freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and 
propagation of religion under article 25, and is shown to be threatened by someone’s 
freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under article 19(1)(a), it presents a 
complicated situation because though each of these rights are legally treated as individual 
rights, the practical implications of the former is for a wider public.    
3.3.3. Freedom of Speech and Expression and the Issue of “Communal Hatred”  
The context in which the constitution was being drawn also brought in to question the 
relation of freedom of speech and expression to communal harmony. The role of press 
and publications as means for propaganda to incite communal hatred had been 
significant. Several members were convinced that such incitement to religious and 
communal hatred should be prevented by the state. So during the meeting of the 
Advisory Committee on Fundamental Rights, A.K. Ayyar insisted on the inclusion of 
the words “calculated to promote class hatred” as condition to limit freedom of speech 
and expression.
296
 This idea was supported by K.M. Pannikar
297
 who wanted the 
addition of “class or religious hatred” as one of the provisos under article 19(2).
298
 On 
this, Rajagopalachari noted that some of the provisions for such action were already 
present in existing laws within IPC especially under section 153(A), therefore he argued 
that the best way to deal with it was by redrafting the whole clause and saying – “The 
right of every citizen to freedom of speech and expression, subject to criminal law.” 
Rajagopalachari opined that “the fundamental peace and orderly progress” of the 
country depended upon “communal peace and harmony” and if the “speeches and 
utterances likely to foster communal hatred” were not prevented “we cannot have 
progress.”
299
 What Rajagopalachari was suggesting was extremely dangerous, as it 
                                                           
296
  See Ayyar’s Comment on the Draft report, April 10, 14 and 15, 1947, in Rao, Framing of India’s 
Constitution, 157. 
297
  A well known journalist and historian who represented Punjab.  
298
  Rao, Framing of India’s Constitution, 157. Also see “Proceedings of the meetings of the Advisory 
Committee on 21-22 April, 1947” in the same volume at page 231.  
299
  Ibid., 232. 
111 
would have meant that the fundamental rights would become subordinate to criminal 
laws of the land, which incidentally, were devised by the British, and were not at all 
amended as of then. It would have definitely made the limits placed upon such rights 
more central and seminal, than the idea of liberty itself. It was to be expected that such 
attempts to curtail liberties faced severe criticism from among the members. S. P. 
Mookherjee
300
 thought that such expression could cut both ways. It was possible that 
simply expressing opinions against the party in power might be construed as class or 
communal hatred and punished.
301
 Bakshi Tek Chand
302
 and H. C. Mookherjee
303
 
pointed out that their worries about abuse were rooted in their experience under the 
British rule and feared that such powers in the hands of future executives could be 
extremely dangerous.
304
 K. M. Munshi took the debate forward and argued that “class 
or communal hatred” was omitted as it was feared that the state units would make 
drastic laws under such provisions in order to curtail even the basic forms of free 
expressions. For him “breach of peace or public order” should be important for 
restrictions. He said: “The right of free expression is now recognized all over the world, 
and it has been felt that speeches or writings tending towards communal or class hatred, 
if they do not go to the extent of causing violence or crime, may be permitted.”
305
 As 
none of the side was ready to relent, the amendment was put to vote whereby the 
amendment proposed by Rajagopalachari was defeated. Even though the amendment 
failed, it seems that the framers saw some merit in the argument related to communal 
hatred and in the “Interim Report of the Advisory Committee on Fundamental Rights” 
one could find the mention of “blasphemy” as one of the provisos. However, in the 
Drafting stage, when the provisos reappeared (after it was dropped by Sardar Patel 
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during debates in the Assembly), the word “blasphemy” was found missing. 
Interestingly, there is no evidence of any opposition or protest against such move, 
neither within the drafting committee, nor during the debates of the assembly.
306
  
A similar issue appeared when during the course of debate on the Draft Constitution, 
Mohd. Tahir
307
 argued that invoking “communal passion” should be made an offence 
against which the state should have right to make laws to limit freedom of speech and 
expression. “Communal passion”, according to him, included “agitating or exciting the 
minds of one community against the other.” He pointed to the great “loss and disservice” 
that such offences had done to the country and to the neglect of such laws by the British 
as it served their interest. But after independence, he believed, such stringent laws were 
very important.
308
 This initiative also found support among others like Syed 
Karimuddin
309
 who argued that “whether Muslims are responsible or the Hindus are 
responsible for communal passions it has eaten away everything that is good in 
society.”
310
 Hence, he maintained that inciting communal passion in any form should be 
made an offence. This concern was reflected in the amendment suggesting the inclusion 
of “inciting communal passion” as a proviso to restrict free.
311
 This amendment was 
vociferously opposed by members like M.A. Ayyangar
312
 who argued that there were 
already laws under IPC to deal with such issues and hence such inclusions were not 
required.
313
 The amendment was put to vote and was eventually defeated.  
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The demand for making “promotion of communal hatred” or incitement of “communal 
passion” as a proviso to limit freedom of expression was based on the premise that 
Indian citizens could easily be misguided by communal elements, and therefore the 
state needed to step in more prominently to protect them from such propaganda. 
Though incitement of communal passion or promotion of communal hatred did not 
form a part of the caveats introduced under article 19(2), it was primarily because the 
law makers showered extensive faith on statutory laws like section 153(A) and 295(A), 
as credible tools in the hands of the officials to deal with situations, where communal 
hatred was being promoted. It not only hinted at their support to the statutory laws 
(which had colonial origins), but also gave a sense that they wanted the officials to use 
it extensively, in order to suppress fissiparous tendencies among some Indians to incite 
communal hatred. 
Looking at the final draft one can say that the opponents of the provisos failed in their 
efforts because not only were the provisos entered, the final clause were vague in its 
content and intent, which made it open to misuse and misinterpretations by different 
parties. It was also clear that the lawmakers thought that though freedom of speech and 
expression was important, its misuse for communal polarisation that led to violence was 
detrimental to social harmony and hence it was necessary to curb it. A broad consensus 
was reached that in the interest of national integration freedom of speech and expression 
should carry important provisos which significantly limited its scope in practice. It now 
remained upon the courts, to protect the fundamental rights of citizens from any form of 
intrusions by either the state or the society.  
4. The Constitutional Amendments and other Legal Apparatuses 
Within a few months of its introduction, the judiciary and the parliament were at 
loggerheads over the interpretation of the constitution. Both these institutions seemed to 
have diverse views regarding some key constitutional aspects. It was felt that political 
stability and national integrity was in conflict with the democratic rights to freedom of 
expression and personal liberty. Responding to the situation, Nehru’s government 
introduced the First Amendment Bill in 1951. The situation arose primarily because of 
114 
decisions of courts in the Crossroads case
314
, Shailabala Devi case
315
, and Brij Bhushan 
case
316
. In each of these cases the state governments took action under some version of 
“Public Safety Act”, and each defendant turned for protection to the first clause of 
article 19. In Crossroads case, dangers of the “communist threat” were used by the 
government to justify press censorship and laws of Preventive Detention against 
Romesh Thapar, the editor of the communist mouthpiece. The Patna High Court in 
Shailabala Devi case rejected the contention that the pamphlet incited violence and 
Supreme Court unanimously upheld this judgement. In East Punjab, Public Safety Act, 
1950, was struck down by Supreme Court on the grounds that pre-censorship restricted 
liberty of press. The laws were all struck down on grounds of “over-breadth” – the 
courts claimed that their ambit was much greater than the exceptions provided within 
article 19(2). 
This led to wide ranging political reactions, some of which were particularly significant. 
Sardar Patel thought that the Crossroads decision knocked “the bottom out of most of 
our penal laws for the control and regulation of the press.”
317
 Ambedkar, the erstwhile 
Chairman of the Drafting Committee, and Law Minister at the time of the First 
Amendment Bill, commented that the Supreme Court had decided the issue 
incorrectly.
318
 Central to Nehru’s arguments regarding amendment to article 19 was his 
unease with some of the press which according to him seemed irresponsible “some two 
page news-sheet… full of vulgarity, indecency and falsehood.”
319
 New provisos in the 
form of “public order” and “incitement to an offence” were added as Nehru maintained 
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that a constitution should not limit the “power of the Parliament to face a situation.”
320
 
The “concept of individual freedom has to be balanced with social freedom and the 
relations of the individual with the social groups”, Nehru argued.
321
  
The opposition to the amendments came from different directions. There were 
criticisms about the high handedness of the government thereby undermining the 
importance of freedom of speech and expression.
322
 Questions were also raised about 
the timing of such introduction (just before general elections) and the technical subject 




However it was H.V. Kamath’s
324
 suggestion about the need to include “reasonable” as 
qualifying any restrictions on speech that attracted most attention.
325
 Amidst a lot of 
pressure, both from the opposition and from within the cabinet (especially from the Law 
Ministry), Nehru agreed to include this proposal, but he was not very happy as he feared 
that such inclusion could invite each such case to go to the courts and hence more 
intervention of court in executive decisions.
326
 Finally, the Assembly passed the bill by a 
vote of 228 to 20. It retroactively and prospectively empowered government to impose 
“reasonable restrictions” on the freedom of expression “in the interests of the security of 
the State (replacing the words ‘tends to overthrow the state’), friendly relations with 
foreign states, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, 
defamation, or incitement to an offence.”
327
 Other than broadening the scope for 
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government intervention, there were three important aspects in the debates: a) The First 
Amendment received, as expected, comparisons with the First Amendment in the US. It 
was pointed that while the First Amendment had extended individual rights, “our First 
Amendment did the opposite by curtailing individual freedom”
328
; b) there was pointed 
discussion and criticisms about the courts. Nehru charged the courts of practicing 
conservatism
329
 and N. G. Ranga
330
 extended the charge to the judges of the courts
331
. All 
the top leaders including Ambedkar, Patel and Rajagopalachari questioned the wisdom of 
the courts in interpreting the Constitution and argued that the amendment was necessary 
as such interpretations had been made possible because of the error in the founding of the 
Constitution itself; and c) the addition of “reasonable” to qualify the restrictions on 
freedom of expression was a significant move. It provided the judiciary with the test of 
“reasonableness” in order to assess whether the action of the executive in cases dealing 
with freedom of speech and expression were justifiable.  
Significant transformation again occurred in 1963 when both external and internal 
situations forced another amendment of the Constitution. The threats emanating from 
Chinese invasion in North-East and concerns over the demands of regional autonomy 
reflected in Tara Singh’s fast for Sikh state, and Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) call 
for “Dravidanad” led to the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution which added that 
government might place restrictions on expression in the interest of “the sovereignty and 
integrity of India,” the qualifier ‘reasonable’ remaining in place.
332
 After all these changes, 
the Constitutional provision for Freedom of expression as it stands today reads as follows: 
19(1) The citizens shall have the right- 
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(a) to freedom of speech and expression; and the proviso under 19 (2) 
reads:  
Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any 
existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such 
law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred 
by the said sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of 
India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, 
public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, 
defamation or incitement to an offence.
333
 
5. The Amendment of the Statutory Laws and its Implication on 
Freedom of Speech and Expression 
The challenges facing Indian society in its post independence phase forced the 
government of the day to relook into the existing statutory laws. The incidents of 
communal violence and the role of print media, especially vernacular press allowed 
interventions which ensured that the scope of sections 153(A) and 295(A) of IPC was 
significantly altered. The government wanted to curb the misuse of the capacity of the 
press to spread communal hatred, but the changes initiated were also going to affect 
pamphlets, tracts and books as the laws governing all these forms of publications 
remained the same. A strong will to introduce new changes to these laws was reflected 
as early as in 1956, when the controversy surrounding the publication of the book 
Living Biographies of Religious Leaders and the subsequent role of some sections of 
Urdu press in Uttar Pradesh led to communal riots in Aligarh and surrounding areas.
334
   
The book Living Biographies of Religious Leaders was written by Henry Thomas and 
Dana Lee Thomas, and was originally published in the US. It was already in circulation 
when Bharatiya Vidya Bhawan, Delhi decided to reprint it.
335
 The protests against the 
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book began in Aligarh with students of Aligarh Muslim University playing a pivotal 
role in organizing strikes and demonstrations.
336
 It was argued that the book contained a 
chapter on Prophet Mohammed and it presented the Prophet in wrong light. The 
protests also targeted K. M. Munshi, who was then the Governor of UP and very 
closely associated with Bharatiya Vidya Bhawan as a founding member and one of the 
editors. Fearing scaling up of the controversy, the book was quickly withdrawn and 
Munshi also published an unconditional apology along with requests to the protestors to 
allow the matter to rest.
 337
 However, the controversy did not die down.
338
 The 
offending passages from the book were reproduced in Urdu newspapers and these were 
distributed to mobilize Muslims against the attitude of Indian government in general 
and Munshi in particular. There were significant communal clashes in different parts of 
Uttar Pradesh.
339
 The controversy further took an international dimension. The Hindu 
groups argued that the protesting Muslims were getting support from Pakistan as the 
Muslims organizations in Pakistan had voiced their support against the book and 
thereby the protestors were also referred as “anti-national elements.”
340
 The crisis was 
later resolved by the involvement and interventions by Zakir Hussain, the retiring Vice 
Chancellor of the Aligarh Muslim University, Maulana Azad, Education Minister and 
Nehru, the Prime Minister.
341
  
The episode highlighted some deep concerns about the freedom of speech and 
expression and the question of religious offence. Most leaders criticized the manner in 
which Muslim demonstrations turned violent and a counter movement was launched by 
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Hindus in north India.
342
 Also an important issue of concern was the role of print media 
in promoting communalism with the objectionable portions of the book being reprinted 
by the vernacular press that further escalated the feeling of offence among the Muslims 
in those areas. Nehru in particular saw it as a major challenge to be strongly dealt with 
in future and was eager to come up with a legislation to prohibit such acts. He wrote to 
the Chief Ministers that if they were “convinced that a newspaper editor or any other 
individual has spread communal hatred or incited people to communal violence, we 
should arrest him and either proceed against him in a court of law or keep him under 
preventive detention.”
343
 In an attempt to devise a zero tolerance attitude for incitement 
of communal violence, Nehru also encouraged the executive to take direct action 
against such violators which could be seen as a dangerous step as there was every 
possibility that some official could misuse this power for political ends. In another letter 
addressed to the CMs Nehru wrote, “I have personally come to the conclusion that we 
must have fresh legislation to deal with the spread of communal hatred by newspapers, 
etc. I would confine this to offensive communal writings, and not extend it at all in the 
political or other fields.”
344
 The urgency expressed by Nehru reflects the impact the 
protests and the violence that followed had on national politics. Further, this attitude 
was also reflective of the understanding that amendment to the existing laws was 
warranted and if need be the political class was prepared to intervene in order to counter 
the threat of communal violence. Strong and wider laws was seen as an important tool 
in the hands of the state to maintain public tranquillity. The episode also had 
connotations for publications that were considered to be religiously offensive. It was 
clear that the book was already available in India much before the publishers decided to 
reprint the book, and the timing of the furore could therefore be questioned. But 
contrary to this, the government seemed to consider the removal of the book from 
public sphere as an easy and instant remedy to the hurt sentiments of the protesting 
Muslims. This approach of the state laid the foundation of a trend in future where the 
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claims of religious offence obtained a sense of legitimacy and the tendency to take to 
the streets against publications considered offensive became a legitimate democratic 
means to pulp such publications.  
Though Nehru wanted to strengthen the statutory laws, in order to counter the tendency 
of spreading communal tension by means of vernacular press, the government did not 
initiate any legislation in this regard. Things however changed in 1961. The recurrence 
of communal violence in different parts of the country, and particularly in Assam and 
Jabalpur, forced the Nehru government to form a special committee under Indira 
Gandhi to study the causes of such incidents and the strategies to counter it. The 
committee recommended important changes in statutory laws including section 153(A) 
and Section 295(A) of the IPC. These recommendations were further approved by the 
conference of chief ministers, a forum that took shape of National Integration Council 
in 1962. Based on the suggestions from both these groups, the government introduced a 
bill in the Parliament which later became Act XLI of 1961.  
The bill was introduced in the Lok Sabha on August 11, 1961 by Home Minister Lal 
Bahadur Shastri as “The Indian Penal Code Amendment Bill, 1961” and a detailed 
discussion took place in the house on 30
th
 August after the bill returned from the Select 
Committee stage. The debate in both the houses of Parliament reflected similar concerns 
about the scope of the amendment, the fear of misuse of extended power by the executive 
and the attack on freedom of speech and expression. While initiating the debate Minister 
of State at the Ministry of Home Affairs, Mr. Dattar stressed that the amendment was 
being introduced as a constructive step in order to assure “the integration of the nation in 
the fullest sense of the term”
345
 by preventing “fissiparous tendencies within different 
religious and other groups that impact the peace in which all religions stay together.”
346
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The amendment proposed some significant changes in the statutory laws especially 
section 153(A) of the IPC. Firstly, it made the grounds of conviction explicit in sections 
153(A) by allowing punishment for the acts that “promote or attempt to promote 
feelings of enmity or hatred” on grounds of “religion, race, place of birth, residence, 
language.” Further, it proposed to increase the quantum of punishment under section 
153(A) and section 295(A) IPC from two to three years. It also proposed to insert an 
additional clause (c) to section 153(A) which made punishable any act that was 
“prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different religion, racial or 
language groups or castes or communities and which disturbs or is likely to disturb the 
public tranquillity.”
347
 But the most fundamental change was the removal of the 
explanation that was associated with section 153(A) since its inception as a colonial law 
in 1898. The explanation said: “It does not amount to an offence within the meaning of 
this section to point out without malicious intentions and with an honest view to their 
removal, matters which are producing or have a tendency to produce, feelings of enmity 
or hatred between different classes of citizens.” This explanation put the onus of 
proving malicious intentions on the prosecutor. However, its removal meant that the 




The debate over the bill in both houses of Parliament centred around a set of issues 
which were very similar to the ones raised during colonial period when these laws were 
inserted to the penal codes. The opposition to the respective bills were also based on 
similar grounds. The opposition charge was led by Jan Sangh leader and future Prime 
Minister of India Atal Bihari Vajpayee in Lok Sabha and Communist leader Bhupesh 
Gupta in Rajya Sabha who demanded that the bill should be sent for wider consultation 
and public opinion be sought before inserting amendments. Vajpayee claimed that the 
exercise would not only be representative of the true democratic process but also “help 
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in educate and train people to national integration.”
349
 But the demand to send the bill 
for wider consultation was defeated in the house by an overwhelming majority of 116 
votes against 22 as it was seen as a delaying tactics on the part of the opposition.     
One of the foremost arguments against the bill was that the already existing laws were 
potent enough and there was no need for fresh amendments. Krishnaswamy
350
 and M. 
S. Aney
351
 in the Lok Sabha, argued that the step showed the failure of the government 
to use the available laws properly. Krishnaswamy also pointed that the new law would 
be counter-effective as it would only ensure that the oppositional and disintegrative 
forces go underground and thereby it did not provide a good solution to the problem of 
communalism.
352
 There were other opposition leaders who strictly rejected the need for 
any legislation of that sort. H. Hynniewta, an independent MP in Lok Sabha 
representing hill regions of Assam, along with others like Socialist leader Ramsevak 
Yadav, considered the bill as a threat to freedom of speech and expression as it widened 
the space for state interventions.
353
 Similar views were put forward by Communist 
leader Bhupesh Gupta, and Republican Party of India MP B. D. Khobragade in the 
Rajya Sabha.
354
 There was also a great opposition to the removal of the explanation 
from section 153(A) as it was believed that the change would make the law amenable to 
misuse and make it difficult to prove innocence in cases where the charges were falsely 
implicated. Leaders like Mahavir Tyagi
355
 and Thakur Das Bhargava
356
 were 
vehemently opposed to this move. They argued that the removal of “malicious 
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intentions” from the necessary requirement to convict individuals under the law as 
contained in the explanation to section 153(A) would be a direct attack on freedom of 
expression.
357
 Hridaynath Kunzru remarked: “We are now trying in the name of 
national integration to adopt a more stringent measure than Government considered it 
necessary to adopt during the war.”
358
 Similar attitude was reflected by All India 
Mahasabha Vice President, V. G. Deshpande who in a press conference on August 12, 
1961 charged that the “section has become too wide in scope and will make innocent 
activities for social reform also a criminal offence.”
359
 
Countering these opinions, the Congress Party was well armed with the justifications 
and the need for the amendments. The foremost justification extended in support of the 
amendments was that it was required to protect the secular character of the Indian 
polity. Congress members like Raghubir Sahai and Sriram Sahay argued that it was 
necessitated because of the activities of the communal parties which tried to polarize 
votes by invoking religious contentions.
360
 Santosh Kumar Basu, Congress MP from 
West Bengal along with other members like Kasliwal and Akbar Ali Khan argued that 
the government needed such laws in order arm itself up to curb the intentions of 
communal parties of all hues.
361
 Khan even recommended that the guilty should not just 
be jailed but be hanged.
362
 The reply to the opposition was led by the Minister of Home 
Affairs Lal Bhadur Shastri who defended his government’s position aggressively. He 
not only rejected the need for circulation but also argued that unlike the opposition’s 
claims section 153(A) was being made more pointed and grounded according to the 
need of the time.
363
 On the subject of removal of the explanations he argued that the 
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onus to prove that the intention of the accused was neither malafide nor malicious 
should be the responsibility of the accused and not the prosecutor else it was very 
difficult for the executive to act even in most disastrous situations. The explanations, he 
remarked, gave an undue advantage to the accused.
364
 The overwhelming presence of 
Congress members in both houses of Parliament ensured that the bill was passed 
without any difficulty.  
As is visible, the overall debate in both houses of the Parliament concentrated on issues 
of communal violence and the role of press. The question of freedom of expression 
remained important but was overshadowed by the harms that an excess of it had caused 
to the society. The need of the hour, it was widely acknowledged, was to curb such 
liberty to promote values of “national integration” and “toleration.”
365
 Though the 
question of religious offense did not figure at all in the debates, there were clear signs 
that the legislation was going to have serious ramifications on the subject. So, any form 
of publication which could incite religious passions could face punitive action. Further 
the amendment to section 153(A) also meant, that the scope of preventive laws under 
section 99 of CrPC, were also widened and hence any such publication could also be 
proscribed without any consideration about the intentions of the author. Furthermore, 
the way in which the government introduced the amendments in response to communal 
violence in different areas meant that strengthening of the laws was seen as an 
important and easily available remedy to counter such attempts. It was overlooked, 
however, that these changes would have long term repercussions on the freedom of 
speech and expression and its impact would not be limited to communal press but could 
also affect other mediums of expression. The Congress members like S.S.N. Tankha 
insisted that the Parliament should have faith in the elected government that the laws 
would not be misused,
366
 but in practise it was no guarantee to the way in which the 
executive would translate and use such powers in its dealing with contentious subjects 
like publications which were claimed to be religiously offensive. At the least, an 
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increase in the scope of sections 153(A) and 295(A) meant a direct attack on the scope 
of freedom of speech and expression, a relation that most of the law makers overlooked 
considering it to be a necessary step to curb tendencies of communal disturbances.       
Similarly in 1968, after a series of communal riots, most significantly in Srinagar, 
Ranchi and Aurangabad, the National Integration Council recommended further 
amendments to these laws and these recommendations were readily accepted by the 
government.
367
 Following this, the government introduced “The Criminal and Election 
Laws Amendment Act, 1969” in the Parliament which became Act XXXV of 1969. 
While introducing the bill in the Rajya Sabha, Vidya Charan Shukla, Minister of Home 
Affairs pronounced that the aim of the legislation was to counter the “growing trends of 
communalism, factionalism and regionalism” in the country.
368
 He specified the role of 
communal press in disturbing peace and harmony of the country and inciting religious 
hatred among common people who get easily swayed by such propaganda material.
369
 
He specifically accused the RSS mouthpiece, Organizer, and journals like Mother 
India, in misguiding citizens on communal lines.
370
 The most significant amendments 
that the bill proposed to undertake in relation to freedom of speech and expression 
included: a) The scope for intervention of the executive under section 153(A) was 
enlarged. So unlike earlier, when promoting feelings of enmity or hatred were 
punishable, promotion of “disharmony” and “ill-will” was also added as eligible for 
conviction. However, the terms like “disharmony” and “ill-will” remained undefined 
and also there was no discussion about what parameters would be used to judge a 
particular publication’s capacity to promote “disharmony” or “ill-will” among different 
communities;  b) Along with the change in the scope of 153(A), section 196 of CrPC 
was also amended whereby the offence under section 153(A) was made cognizable and 
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unlike earlier, the District Magistrate could act suo motu in such cases without 
permission of the state government or any court. As Shukla claimed on the floor of the 
house, the District Magistrate could now directly take cognizance of such inflammable 
matters to “not only stop that sort of writing, but also seize the printing press.”
371
 It is 
explicit that both these measures were detrimental to the scope of freedom of speech 
and expression as it increased the space for subjectivity in executive action. The 
amendments only made the laws more prone to subjective intervention and hence 
available for misuse by the executive.  
As in the case of amendments in 1961, the debates in both houses of the Parliament 
revolved around the issue of communal violence. The opposition concentrated on 
highlighting the failures of the Congress government in stopping communal riots. It was 
claimed that the statutory laws, if used properly had enough scope to deal with the 
situation and that there was no need to increase it further. It was maintained that the 
continuing spree of communal violence was representative of the inability of the 
government and not the inefficiency of the laws.
372
 The Jan Sangh leaders accused the 
government of practising pseudo-secularism and argued that it had failed to inculcate 
the values of “toleration” and “national integration” among the citizens.
373
 The 
Communists and Socialists doubted the intentions of the government in widening the 
powers of local authorities.
374
 On the contrary, the Congress members and other 
supporters of the bill defended the step of the government by citing the NIC 
recommendations.
375
 They criticized the politics of communal parties like Jana Sangh 
and Muslim League in religious polarization and pointed the role of press in corrupting 
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The subject of freedom of speech and expression remained largely absent in these 
debates. Among all the participants in the debates in both houses of the Parliament, 
the only member who raised the issue of freedom of speech and expression 
extensively was Pranab Kumar Mukherjee, a Congress Party member and first time 
MP of Rajya Sabha representing West Bengal. Though Mukherjee supported the bill, 
he raised serious issues about the attitude of politicians regarding freedom of 
expression. He remarked: 
Whatever be our feelings about any particular journal, whatever be our 
feelings about any particular press, whatever be our sentiments about the 
opinions expressed in a publication, we cannot advocate on the floor of 
the house that the freedom of the press be curtailed.
377
  
He was critical about any attempt by the government to curtail the freedom of press and 
though he belonged to the ruling party, he raised doubts about the future of freedom of 
expression if the power of the executive was increased. He said:  
If we want to curtail the freedom of the press only from the view of 
stopping communalism, it will not stop there. If we give this power to 
the government of India, give this into the hands of the bureaucrats, they 
will control them and will say what should appear. It will not stop there, 




He raised objections with clause 6 of the bill which maintained that freedom of 
expression could be restricted for maintaining communal harmony. According to him 
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eight exceptions were mentioned in article 19(2) of the constitution and maintenance of 
communal harmony did not figure there and therefore he was not sure if the bill itself 
was in accordance with the spirit of the constitution.
379
 Mukherjee asked pointed and 
pertinent questions regarding the constitutionality of the bill as well as on the subject of 
freedom of expression. Unfortunately when the concerned minister, Vidya Charan 
Shukla delivered the final comments on the bill, he continued his attack on leaders 
belonging to the Jana Sangh as well as the Communist and Socialist parties, but he 
evaded throughout his speech any discussion about the probable impact of the bill on 
the scope of freedom of speech and expression. Mukherjee’s name or concerns raised 
by him did not even appear in the speech of Shukla. The context of communal violence 
trumped any concern for freedom of speech and expression and as in 1961, the 
amendments to statutory laws in 1968, was dominated by the aim of the government to 
control communal press from inciting and spreading communal hatred. It resulted in 
further strengthening the hands of the executive by widening the scope of statutory 
laws. 
6. Attitude of the Lawmakers towards Freedom of Speech and 
Expression in Independent India 
Two aspects dominated the attitude of lawmakers in the debates of parliament, during 
the amendments of constitution and the statutory laws. The first was the sense of 
urgency, and the second was the sense of paternalism reflected by the lawmakers. The 
urgency of the context – communal violence and the role of press in it – guided these 
debates. In order to respond to the threats of communal violence, the lawmakers 
concentrated on enlarging the space for executive action. Though a constitutional right, 
freedom of speech and expression was considered a threat for maintenance of 
communal and social harmony. The sense of urgency is reflected throughout the 
debates, where leaders consistently argued for the need of making laws more stringent 
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in order to strengthen the process of “national integration” by curtailing “fissiparous 
tendencies,” and enforcing “toleration” and “communal harmony” among the citizens 
through fear of punishment for deviants. In order to curb the capacity of communal 
press in the context of disturbed communal context, it was overlooked that an 
amendment to the law would not only affect newsprints, but would be detrimental to all 
forms of expression, and the increased scope for applicability of such laws ensured that 
the right to freedom of speech and expression would remain conditional on what the 
executive thought was permissible within the law. 
The debates also reflected another important aspect in the attitude of the lawmakers i.e. 
the sense of paternalism. Repeated concern was raised about the vulnerability of Indian 
citizens and how they were being easily misguided by the communal press. For 
example, during the debates over first amendment, it was argued that most Indians were 
“ignorant and illiterate,” and therefore “easy to mislead.”
380
 When the opposition 
criticized the government citing examples from other democracies, it was held that 
other countries had a long tradition in freedom, and that had “instilled discipline and 
restraint” in them.
381
 It was also argued that Indians “respond to incitement easily,” 
unlike citizens of other countries, and therefore the comparison was faulty.
382
 Similarly, 
while introducing the amendment to the statutory laws, B. N. Dattar, the then Minister 
of Home Affairs claimed that the bill was aimed to contain “fissiparous tendencies” and 
was required because “each man often times here and there thinks more of his religion... 
than common binding links of the Indian society.”
383
 It was therefore considered as the 
duty of the government, to protect the citizens from the impact of communal press that 
was misguiding them. The above discussions reflect that in the context of urgency, the 
attitude of the lawmakers was paternalistc and reactionary, and a debate about the 
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ramifications of the proposed changes to law on fundamental right to freedom of speech 
and expression was avoided.  
7. Conclusion 
In the Indian case, the right to freedom of speech and expression was considered a 
natural ally to independence and therefore its inclusion in the constitution as a 
fundamental right was neither doubted nor debated. In the process, an opportunity was 
lost to seriously reflect about its importance, and the role it could play in making Indian 
democracy more vibrant. Rather, the need for national unity and public order motivated 
the constitution makers to severely limit its scope. Uday Singh Mehta has very well 
presented the situation as an irony “that the successful culmination to free oneself from 
imperial subjection led almost immediately to freedom itself becoming a subsidiary 
concern; that is subsidiary to national unity, social uplift, and a concern with 
recognition.”
384
 But for the constitution makers, it was not an irony, rather an “ideal” 
produced under compulsion of the complex context in which they were operating.  
The Constituent Assembly faced the classic dilemma of how to preserve individual 
freedom, while promoting the public good.
385
 It attempted to create a happy marriage 
between different ideal values, overlooking the possibilities of clashes among them. 
The debates that followed reflected three important strands: a) the idea of liberty, 
though important, was seen as subsidiary to the promises of social equality and the need 
for fraternity. So although important freedoms were included as fundamental rights, 
they were accompanied with caveats that made space for state intervention; b) there was 
an attempt to balance individual rights with community/group rights, but as was visible, 
in relation to freedom of speech and expression, it further increased the ambiguity of 
state intervention, as it did not say anything about the situation when both these aspects 
could clash; and c) though the assembly did not approve the inclusion of “communal 
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hatred” as a proviso for state intervention, it was not because they did not recognize it 
as a threat, but because they believed that other laws especially under IPC were enough 
to deal with such issues. These strands made space for state intervention from three 
directions: firstly, through the constitutional provisions whereby laws could be made to 
limit freedom of speech and expression; secondly, through the ambivalence created by 
not considering the situation where individual and group rights might clash in the form 
of potential contradiction which were yet undeveloped; and thirdly, the recognition of 
criminal laws as a deterrent to excesses of free speech, which incidentally, were to be 
imported as formulated during British rule.    
Soon after its formulation, the constitution faced newer contradictions, resulting in its 
amendment. However, again rather than engaging in a debate about the prospects of 
free speech, it was posed as a threat to state capacity and hence resulted in increased 
powers to the state against such freedom. It can be said that different contexts call for 
different ways of treating the issues of rights and liberties, and it is often depended on 
the socio-cultural and political contexts. Some scholars have pointed at the “paradox of 
constitutional democracy” which assumes a strange merger of “constitution” and 
“democracy,” which often stand for contradictory values and ideals.
386
 Habermas has 
argued that such paradox can only be settled if we try to understand the principle of 
“co-originality”- that private and public autonomy require each other. The argument is 
not therefore that there should, or should not be limitations, rather it is about the kind of 
limitations forwarded and whether it improves the space for liberty or restricts it.
387
 The 
laws in such cases should consider freedom at its core, which apparently did not happen 
during the CAD. The terms used to delimit the scope of freedom of speech and 
expression- libel, slander, defamation, contempt of court, decency, morality- are vague 
and uncertain, that there is every possibility for multiple interpretations. This not only 
invited state intervention, but increased the possibilities of its misuse. Adding to these 
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were the already existing and newly developed legal instruments, be it either in the form 
of IPC, CrPC or the state based laws which did not only severely limit, but also 
introduced similar ambiguities about the scope of free speech as experienced during 
colonial times. 
The attitude of law makers and executive towards freedom of speech and expression 
has also been a matter of concern. The way in which it is juxtaposed to maintenance of 
social harmony has reduced the space, both legal as well as substantive, of this right. As 
the debates in both houses of Parliament showed during the amendment to penal codes 
in 1961 and 1969 showed, the lawmakers were not interested in discussing the issues of 
freedom of expression, and even in cases where the concerns were raised, it attracted 
little attention due to the context in which the legislations were introduced. The series of 
communal violence, and the role of press in escalating polarization, convinced the 
legislators that freedom of speech and expression needed to be curbed. However, the 
repercussions of the amendments were largely overlooked, as it affected not only the 
communal press, but also other forms of expressions like books etc. Also, an increase in 
the powers of the executive to act upon such laws meant that the space for freedom of 
speech and expression was further left conditional, to the prerogative of the 
administrators. Two conclusions can be drawn from such exercise: a) freedom of 
speech and expression as a fundamental right did not enjoy any significant status in 
India. It was allowed with several caveats that defined its scope; b) The political class 
was insistent in allowing greater space for government intervention in free exercise of 
freedom of speech and expression. It was believed that on the one hand, it was the 
responsibility of the government to maintain communal harmony and social cohesion, 
and therefore, the need to balance freedom of expression with such challenges; on the 
other hand, it was considered the duty of the government to adopt a paternalistic role to 
inculcate values of national integration and toleration, among its citizens, and therefore 
there was the  need to allow excessive powers under its command on contentious 




PREVENTING RELIGIOUS OFFENSE: LAW, COURTS 
AND “REASONABLE” RESTRICTIONS TO FREEDOM 




In the last chapter I discussed the role of law makers in shaping the legal provisions that 
govern the claims of right to freedom of speech and expression. The overall analysis 
was based on a review of the debates in the legislature, where important interventions 
marked the scope and limitations of this fundamental right. For this purpose I examined 
important moments like the discussions in the Constituent Assembly during the making 
of the constitution as well as its first amendment and later amendments of the statutory 
laws like section 153(A) and 295(A) in 1961 and 1969. I showed that in each case the 
lawmakers were responding to some emergent situation with the belief that redefining 
the laws would strengthen the executive to deal with challenges to law and order posed 
by press or publications either aimed at religious defamation or promoting hatred 
among different religious groups. I argued that in an attempt to balance freedom of 
expression with the concern for social cohesion and communal harmony, the law 
makers introduced provisions which significantly limited the scope of freedom of 
expression and the ambiguity in defining the limits of the right allowed for executive 
overindulgence. An overlapping consensus was reached that restrictions were justified 
in order to contain the misuse of freedom of speech and expression. At the same time it 
was left upon the courts to determine if the action of the government could legally fall 
under the category of “reasonable restrictions” as defined under the constitution.       
Some commentators have argued that “unlike most western democracies, liberty was 
neither a political nor a primary social norm” for the post-independence Indian State.
388
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As discussed in the last chapter, one of the primary challenges before the newly formed 
state was to balance competing claims of liberty and social tranquillity, and as a 
response, it endorsed the restrictions on individual freedoms. In fact the concern for 
public order “tilted the balance in favour of policing rather than civil liberties,”
389
 
whereby the state used its executive powers extensively to curtail fundamental rights 
like freedom of speech and expression in the pretext of public interest. It made the role 
of the courts as defender of citizen’s fundamental rights especially significant in the 
post-independence period. In this chapter, I examine the role of the courts particularly 
in relation to the claims of religious offence. Commentators have convincingly shown 
that government’s decision to curb freedom of speech is guided both by the real and 
imaginary fear of threat to public order, as well as the pressure exerted by socio-
religious groups so that “social censorship” comes to be linked with “state 
censorship.”
390
 As the final arbitrator of law, the courts in India have the power to 
define the scope of freedom of speech and expression, and under the reviewing 
authority assigned by the constitution the courts can also check the arbitrary actions of 
the government.
391
 If that is the case, how do the courts respond to the competing 
claims of freedom of expression and religious offence in order to judge whether 
government’s action is justified under the provisions of “reasonable restriction?” 
Legal practitioners and scholars like Soli J. Sorabjee
392
 and Rajeev Dhavan
393
 have 
argued that though some High Courts are more prone to allow restriction of freedom 
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of speech on the pretext of “offence” and threat to public order, the Supreme Court 
generally maintains wide protection in its favour. Ratna Kapur
394
, based on her study 
of case laws, has held that there is no evidence of “either an overuse of the provisions 
or a judicial abuse of the power of censorship” on the part of the courts. In fact, she 
argues, the courts have done an excellent job of protecting minority groups from 
hatred of the Hindu Right, which according to her was an important objective of 
India’s hate speech laws. Contrary to this opinion, however, Pratap Bhanu Mehta
395
 
has claimed that the laws on the subject are so ambiguous that the courts often seem 
to be upholding any form of censorship by the government, particularly in relation to 
religiously contentious speech acts, either due to the presumed threat to public order 
or based on its effect on the religious sensibilities of the followers within the 
community in question. 
In this chapter, I engage with these interpretations based on my study of court cases 
involving religiously offensive publications. In the first section of the chapter, I discuss 
the idea of religious offence in order to explain what is at stake. The aim is also to 
highlight the contemporary debates on the issue and put India’s statutory laws in 
perspective. I argue that the Indian laws on the subject are ambiguous and open for 
subjective interpretations. The courts have held that the claims of religious offense are 
very sensitive and need to be balanced with the right to freedom of speech and 
expression. However, courts’ judgments and observations in different cases do appear to 
hint a tilt in favour of the “offended.” This is because the courts define “religious offense” 
very expansively and consider the suppression of publications containing defamation of 
religion or promoting religious hatred as important. In the second section, I demonstrate 
how the courts allow a preference for suppressing contentious publications based on their 
interpretations of the statutory laws. I show this through a discussion about the “manner-
matter debate,” as well as the distinction maintained by the courts between “punitive” and 
                                                           
394
  Kapoor, “Who Draws the Line?” 15-30. 
395
  Mehta, “Passion and Constraint”, 311-338. 
136 
“preventive” laws. I argue that though the courts do not explicitly support a “right not to 
be offended,” the consequentialist approach that the courts employ to interpret laws in 
this regard does serve to justify wide latitude for government’s intervention in favour of 
censorship. In the third section, I discuss why the courts treat the claim of religious 
offence with such importance that it often seems to trump over freedom of expression. 
This attitude of the court, as I shall show, flows from two central assumptions: a) the 
courts maintain that religiously offensive publications have a strong tendency to lead to 
public order problems and therefore government’s action in this regard is often upheld; 
and b) the courts believe that the secular state in India is obligated to protect the right to 
religion and conscience and is further expected to create conditions whereby this right can 
be freely exercised. So, if need be, government can curtail freedom of expression in case 
it hinders the free exercise of freedom of religion. Based on these analyses, I argue that 
though the courts in India have been sensitive to the idea of freedom of speech and 
expression, the threat posed by religiously offensive publications has allowed the courts 
to define the statutory laws very broadly, and that the tilt is in favour of censorship and 
other forms of government interventions. 
For analysis, I use cases both from the Supreme Court as well as different High 
Courts in India.
396
 The High Court cases are significant because most of the 
controversies about contentious publications fall under the category of law and order 
subjects that are primarily dealt with by the High Courts. Few of these cases travel to 
the level of Supreme Court: only if the constitutionality of any statutory laws is 
challenged, or if review petitions against the decision of High Courts are filed, does 
the Supreme Court consider the case. More importantly, a review of Supreme Court 
cases reveals that many of these High Court judgments and observations of the judges 
play a guiding role in Supreme Court decisions and appear recurrently in the debates 
of the court room.      
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2. Religious Offense and Reasonable Restrictions to Freedom of 
Speech and Expression 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, “offence” means annoyance or resentment 
brought about by a perceived insult or disregard for oneself. The expression contains 
two aspects – an action and an effect. In the present dissertation, I use “offence” to refer 
to the hurt or wounded feelings produced, either voluntarily or involuntarily, by speech 
acts, most notably books and publications. In this context, the idea of “offence” also 
implies a relationship between two parties i.e. one who offends (who gives offence) and 
the offended (who takes offence). The one that gives offence can be either an individual 
or an object (in the present case books and other publications). At the same time, the 
offended can be an individual as well as a group (when the offence is experienced by 
many individuals from the same social group or community).
397
 Religious offense, 
therefore, refers to the hurt generated to the religious sensibilities of individuals or 
groups, through the invocation of contentious religious subjects like defamation of 
religion or promoting hatred on the basis of religion. Considering that the injury is 
caused by speech acts, the subject under examination here is: when should law 
interfere, if at all, to regulate such speech acts in cases where religious offence is 
claimed? 
There are several advocates of absolute and universal freedom of expression. Asserting 
this position in relation to religious offense, legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin opined 
that everyone had “the right to ridicule” and no one had the “right not to be insulted or 
offended.”
398
 He was against the idea that freedom of speech should have limits or that 
it ought to be balanced against any other good that society aspires to achieve, like the 
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virtues of multiculturalism. Dworkin’s views were based on the basic principle of 
human dignity, whereby he argued that expressing attitudes, opinions, fears and even 
the libel, confirmed the speaker’s standing as a responsible agent in collective action.
399
 
But Dworkin’s position emphasized on the dignity of the “speaker” and did not take 
into consideration the dignity of its putative target, i.e. against whom the speech act was 
aimed.  
Jeremy Waldron, for example, raised this issue and further maintained that “freedom 
from censorship of someone who uses ‘hate speech’ does not outweigh the freedom 
from defamation of his or her target.”
400
 Developing this approach Waldron provides a 
liberal defence to hate speech laws. But Waldron’s use of “dignity” is very specific. He 
defines dignity as the confirmation of equal membership in a society – “basic social 
standing… as a proper object of society’s protection and concern.”
401
 Waldron suggests 
that the concern for dignity should be distinguished from concern to avoid offense.  He 
argues that the feeling of offense is highly subjective, and it is the “public nature of hate 
speech – in time, manner and place – that takes it outside the realm of offense of 
feelings.”
402
 The aim of hate speech laws, he contends, should not be to prevent people 
from being offended. As is visible, neither Dworkin nor Waldron support legal action 
against religiously offensive speech acts. Dworkin completely rejects any basis 
whatsoever to restrict freedom of speech, and Waldron’s idea of “hate speech,” though 
it allows some forms of restrictions, does not allow religious insults and offense as a 
valid and justifiable ground to restrict speech acts.   
Perhaps one of the most significant and enduring contributors to the debate over 
validity of religious offense, as a cause for restrictions, was John Stuart Mill. Mill in his 
classic On Liberty devised, what is popularly known as the “harm principle.” The 
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central tenet of Mill’s idea is that “the only purpose power can be rightfully exercised 
over any member of any civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others.”
403
 In case of speech acts, Mill would not support any action solely on the basis 
of the content of an opinion because he defended “fullest liberty of professing and 
discussing, as a matter of ethical conviction, any doctrine, however immoral it may be 
considered.”
404
 For him, the circumstances in which the opinion is expressed could only 
make a speech act punishable. Further, the harm produced in such cases had to be in 
immediate reaction to the speech act. The corn dealer example that Mill forwarded to 
explain his argument is also indicative of the difference he would place between 
“advocacy” and “instigation.” For example, Mill argued that it was acceptable if 
someone advocated through print that the corn dealer starved the poor. But when the 
same view is expressed in front of an angry mob standing outside a corn dealers’ home, 
it can lead to violence and hence harm to the dealer. In this case there appears to be a 
direct link between the idea advocated and the action of the mob, and hence the speech 
act was punishable. According to Mill, a speech act is only punishable if it is in the 
form of instigation and results in an “overt act” and “at least a probable connection can 
be established between the act and instigation.”
405
 However, “instigation” is different 
from “advocacy” in that in the case of “instigation” there is a direct urge to action and 
the action follows immediately. So, for Mill, even a religiously offensive speech act 
could only be punished if it was in the form of “instigation,” which means defamation 
of religion would not constitute a valid crime and could only be punished if, for 
example, it promotes hatred among the witness and instigates them to harm others as a 
result. Religiously offensive publications in the form of books or printed articles would, 
similarly escape punishment according to Mill’s standards. 
Some critiques feel that Mill’s consequentialist argument set the bar too high and if this 
principle was taken seriously, it will be difficult to constrain any form of speech. Joel 
Fienberg, for example, argued that there were human experiences that might be 
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“harmless” but still so unpleasant that a demand for legal protection against them would 
be justified even if it is at the cost of an individual’s liberty.
406
 Therefore, Fienberg 
formulated the “offense principle.” The basic assumption is that offence is less serious 
than harm and the offended mental state is a condition different from harm. According 
to Feinberg “offense” takes place when: a) one suffers a disliked or unpleasant state; 
and b) one attributes that state to wrongful conduct of another; and c) one resents the 
other for his role in causing to be in the state.
407
 However, Feinberg was very clear that 
not all such claims could be legally protected at the cost of freedom of speech. 
Therefore he derived certain standards for analysing whether an action in this regard 
was warranted or could be justified as reasonable. These standards included: a) the 
“extent of offense” standard- in order to allow consideration of the intensity and 
durability of repugnance produced; b) the “reasonable avoidability” standard- to check 
whether the offensive displays could be easily avoided by the subject; and c) the 
“volenti” standards- to assess whether or not the witness has willingly assumed the risk 
of being offended.
408
 For Feinberg, an action against a speech act could only be 
justifiable if the witness had to face it involuntarily and was in such a position that there 
was no way in which the displays could be avoided and the “offense” produced by the 
display was deeply hurting. This scale could be useful for all kind of offense, including 
that caused by religiously injurious speech.
409
 Feinberg held that the offense principle is 
dependent on “cultural standards” that vary greatly from place to place, and within each 
nation “constantly and rapidly change.”
410
 This stress on context-based analysis of the 
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Modern democracies have come up with their own set of laws to restrict freedom of 
speech and expression according to their specific needs and challenges.
413
 As discussed 
in Chapter 3, in India, laws were drawn up to restrain freedom of expression in order to 
prevent the threats it posed to peace and tranquillity in society. The process began with 
the introduction of the penal codes during the colonial regime. Based on the “unique” 
context of India, specific laws were created to take care of the performative dimension 
of speech, but more specifically these laws were characterized by a predisposition 
towards protecting against mental agitation and hurt sentiments in response to loaded 
words, offensive gestures, and transgression of hierarchical order.
414
 Gradually newer 
laws were added to prevent harmful impacts of religiously offensive speech acts, 
significant among them being the addition of section 153(A) in 1898 and section 
295(A) in 1927. In the post-independence period, these laws were adopted as part of the 
revised penal codes. So, with regard to defamation of religion and incitement of 
religious hatred, other than the limits drawn under Article 19(2) of the constitution, the 
two older, colonial-era statutory laws became particularly important. Section 295(A) 
aimed to prevent acts where nuisance is not the physical aspect of a communication, but 
arises because the message is considered provocative, indecent or denigrating. It 
prohibits “deliberate and malicious acts, intended to outrage religious feelings of any 
class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs.” Though it is not a blasphemy law, it 
was meant to serve a similar purpose. It does not punish an imputation to god but to the 
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followers, whereby the outrage and hurt felt by the followers is protected. Section 
153(A) is aimed to prevent the consequences of a communication that may indirectly 
bring about harm to others by promoting hatred against any religious group. So, it 
criminalises the promotion of “enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, 
race, place of birth, residence, language, etc.,” or “doing acts prejudicial to maintenance 
of harmony.” Both these laws form the basis of state action against offenders who 
indulge in any of the above mentioned activities. Unlike Dworkin and Waldron’s 
propositions where the individual is the unit of analysis, these laws are meant to 
respond to the threat experienced by a “group” or “class” of citizens. Also unlike in 
Mill’s argument, these laws criminalized not just instigation, but any speech act that 
intended to outrage religious feelings or promoted hatred. There is no necessary 
emphasis on either the consequences of the outrage, or the hatred produced. Such laws 
allowed the government to criminalize a wide range of activities in the name of 
protecting the religious sensibilities of the citizens. The “reasonableness” of 
government action was to be based on the test about how justifiably the government has 
used these statutory laws within the limits approved by the constitution. In order to 
make that judgment, the courts first needed to define the scope of these laws, which 
could help in understanding when and why religious offence became punishable.   
3. Understanding “Religious offense” in the Light of Statutory Laws: 
A Perspective from Indian Courts 
In the present section, I examine what according to the courts is problematic in religious 
offence that warrants government’s intervention either in form of punishing the agent or 
in the form of censoring the speech act. Firstly, I discuss courts’ understanding about 
what makes a publication contentious – whether it is the “manner” in which the opinion 
is expressed, or the “matter” contained in the publication. Secondly, I show how the 
courts further open the interpretation of statutory laws by emphasizing the essential 
difference between “punitive” and “preventive” laws. The subject-matter under 
consideration here shifts from the publication itself, to the judgment of the government 
officials, thereby expanding their powers to proscribe or forfeit contentious publications 
without proper examination of the facts.   
143 
3.1. The “Matter v. Manner” Conundrum 
Debates over legal intervention against freedom of expression include a vital concern 
about what should be the determining factor in such decisions: is it the substance of the 
speech, or the form of expression? There is a strong belief among scholars that it should 
be the “manner” in which the views are expressed, and not the “matter,” that should be 
the basis of analysis. The expression of an opinion can only be curbed, it is argued, to 
the extent that offence is caused by the manner in which it is expressed.
415
 If the 
emphasis is shifted from “matter” to “manner,” it allows the bar to be set higher and 
hence more favourable environment is produced for a marketplace of ideas in search of 
truth by not interfering with people’s ability to make judgments about religion, without 
allowing the speech act to be deliberately offensive. Thus it offers a balanced position 
to those who value freedom of expression but also want the avoidance of offence.
416
 It 
also helps to maintain a distinction between what people disagree with or disapprove of 
and, what causes offence. One of the extreme positions on this subject is reflected in the 
“content-neutrality” doctrine popularised by American jurisprudence.
417
 The “content-
neutrality” doctrine assumes that the state would not punish or restrict speech acts on 
the basis of the content or substance of the expression. “Content-neutrality” includes 
both “subject-matter neutrality” as well as “viewpoint neutrality,” which means that 
speech acts could not be restricted on grounds of either the matter of the expression or 
the idea that the matter represented. 
However, in the Indian context, the courts have emphasised the need to consider 
both the “manner” as well as the “matter” of the speech. The concentration on the 
“manner” of speech helps in two vital aspects that substantiate the “reasonableness” 
of legal intervention: 1) It helps the courts to trace the “intention” of the accused; 
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and 2) It helps the courts to weigh the intensity of the hurt. An important component 
of the punitive law under section 153(A) and 295(A) of the IPC is the idea of mens 
rea, which emphasises the need to examine the intention of the accused. In both the 
above mentioned laws, punishment is only justified if it can be proved that the 
accused had “deliberate and malicious” intentions involved in the contentious 
speech act. The courts analyse the “manner” in which an idea is represented in order 
to test for “deliberate and malicious” intention. Courts in India have upheld this 
reading of law in several of its judgments. For example, in 1960 the Allahabad High 
Court heard a case where the government of Uttar Pradesh had ordered the forfeiture 
of six books written by Baba Khalil Ahmad.
418
 The controversy was regarding the 
character of a historical figure, Muwaiya, who was considered reverend by certain 
Sunni Muslim communities, whereas others thought him to be an evil person. The 
counsel for the applicant urged that the notification of the government was flawed, 
as any hurt caused was not intentional and the only aim of the author was to educate 
the masses about the negative character of Muwaiya and his role in Islamic history 
as a tyrant and a villain. Counsel also argued that the claims in the books were based 
on historical facts and therefore it could not be seen as a deliberate attempt to hurt 
religious sentiments. The court held that the “….intention of the writer of a book 
must be judged primarily by the language of the book itself…... If the language is of 
a nature calculated to produce or to promote feelings of enmity or hatred, the writer 
must be presumed to intend that which his act was likely to produce.” The court 
further remarked that “even a true statement may outrage religious feelings” and 
therefore the argument about the content being based on historical facts did not 
really matter. In order to test whether the books were “injurious” in the above case, 
an inquiry into the language used in the publication, with reference to Muwaiya, was 
therefore considered important. It was reflective of the fact that the court believed 
that the “manner” in which ideas or arguments are presented become the primary 
indicator of the intentions of the author.   
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Secondly, the courts also examine the “manner” in which the subject of speech is 
presented to differentiate between the content of speech acts that people disagree with 
or disapprove of, and those which cause offense, and are liable to legal intervention. 
Considering that it is impossible to quantify the feeling of hurt or offense, the courts 
concentrate on the intensity of offense. One of the primary tests that the courts have 
endorsed is that of the “reasonable man” doctrine, which implies that only those speech 
acts that have the capacity to “grossly offend” any “reasonable man,” deserve to be 
restricted.
419
 To apply this test, the court maintains that the expression “outrage” (as 
used in section 295(A)) needs to be distinguished from feelings like “wound,” “hurt,” 
and “injury”. In Sujato Bhadra 
420
 case, the West Bengal High Court differentiated 
between “wounding” used in section 298 IPC and “outraging” used in section 295 IPC. 
It held that the expression “outraging” is much stronger than “wounding” and the term 
“outrage” meant “to wrong grossly, treat with gross violence or indignity.”
421
 The 
expression “grossly offensive” is a natural extension of this distinction maintained by 
the courts.
422
 Also, the courts have repeatedly asserted that the impact of a speech act 
should not be judged on the basis of reaction that is expected out of a believer or an 
emotional person, rather the effect is “to be judged from standard of reasonable, strong 
minded, firm and courageous” person.
423
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The most important signifier in each of the above-mentioned tests is the language used 
to express the opinion, since this is considered to be an explicit indicator of both – the 
intention of the accused as well as the intensity of the hurt caused. Based on the 
emphasis on the “manner” of expression in general, and “language” in particular, a 
study of courts’ judgements provides some understanding about how they perceive the 
idea of religious “offense.” The courts have held that “rational criticism of religion 
couched in restrained language”
424
 or “doctrinal disagreement”
425
 could not be 
considered an offence under law. However, even if the criticism of the religion is based 
on truth claims, the use of vile and insulting language would make the speech act 
eligible for punishment and prohibition.
426
 The courts went so far as to argue that if the 
writing in question was not intended to insult other religions, or to promote hatred 
among different religious groups, then proseltyzing writings could also not be 
restricted.
427
 The emphasis on language to decipher the intention, however, provides an 
extremely subjective tinge to the analysis. It further highlights the moralising aspect of 
courts’ behaviour, whereby they dictate what form of expression is allowed or 
disallowed in a civil discourse.  
I would be wrong to conclude, however, that the courts in India only depend on the 
“manner” of expression or the language used in the publication to judge its legality. In 
different cases courts have also emphasized the need to look into the “matter” or the 
content of the publications. It is maintained that in several instances, though the 
publication may not contain offensive language, the matter itself might be volatile and 
thereby attract legal injunction. Two primary reasons can be attributed to this approach: 
a) the extensive scope of statutory laws especially section 153(A) of IPC; and b) 
difficulty in deriving clear clinical tests to maintain the manner-matter distinction to 
contemplate religious offense. As discussed above, the emphasis on the “manner” of 
speech acts helps in judging the intention of the author as well as the intensity of the 
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“hurt” caused by the speech. However, the statutory laws governing legal intervention 
to speech acts in India includes section 153(A), where the subject under analysis is 
whether a speech act “promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion …. 
disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will” between different religious 
communities. In order to judge whether a publication falls under this category, the 
courts cannot solely depend on the “manner” of the expression, but are also required to 
analyse the content or the “matter.” Consider for example the case of Babu Rao Patel 
428
 in the Supreme Court, where the court was considering the constitutionality of 
section 153(A). An additional question under analysis was whether political writing or 
historical truth could attract the provisions under section 153(A). The case was 
regarding the arrest of Babu Rao Patel after two of his articles – “A Tale of two 
Communalisms” and “Lingering Disgrace of History” – were published in the political 
magazine edited by him called Mother India. These articles were considered to be 
deliberate and malicious attempt to promote feelings of enmity, and hatred among 
Hindus and Muslims. It appeared in the Supreme Court in the form of special appeal 
from the plaintiff after the High Court had refused to quash the arrest order.   
In the first article “A Tale of two Communalisms,” Patel discussed Muslim 
communalism and argued that communalism in India was an instrument employed by 
political minorities. The central thesis of his article was that Muslims were a “violent 
race” with a “radical tradition of rape, loot, violence and murder.” The second article, 
“Lingering Disgrace of History,” was written as a protest against the naming of Delhi 
roads after the Mughal Emperors whom he calls “lustful perverts, rapists and 
murderers.” He extended his criticism to argue that: 
From Mohammad Ibn Qasim, who landed in India in June 712 AD with 
6000 Muslim cut-throats, to Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who cut the ancient 
cradle of a peace loving human race into three bleeding birds in August 
1947, we have had 1235 years of bloodstained history in which our life 
has been constantly punctuated by endless raids, rapes, loots, arson and 
slaughter.  
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After discussing various atrocities and tyrannies of the Mughals ending with 
Aurangzeb, he wrote:  
To have a street named after this Mughal bastard in New Delhi, the 
capital of India, is not only a disgrace to the Hindus but a raging insult to 
the brave community of Sikhs. Had the Muslims been insulted thus, they 
would not only have burnt every house on the road named after the 
tyrant but also set fire to the whole damned city. The Muslims know 
how to guard their traditions.   
In the Supreme Court, A. K. Sen, the counsel of the appellant argued that if the articles 
were seen as a whole, it would be visible that “A Tale of two Communisms” was no 
more than a political thesis, and the second article “Lingering Disgrace of History” was 
no more than a protest based on historical truths. It was contended that none of the 
articles attacked any religion and so there was no question of promoting and attempting 
to promote feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will between different religious groups. But 
the court rejected these arguments and held that both the articles were deliberately and 
maliciously written to promote feeling of enmity, hatred and ill-will between the Hindu 
and Muslim communities and this, the court maintained, “cannot be done in the guise of 
political thesis or historical truth.” The method applied by the court to reach this 
conclusion is indicative of its approach. The court discussed the content of each article 
in detail, citing important sections and highlighting possible interpretations. Based on 
an extensive analysis of the “matter” contained in the articles, the court concluded that 
the possible implication of the publication was well within the scope of 153(A), and 
required action by the government. As we can see, both the subject-matter as well as 
viewpoint expressed in the publication together played a significant role in examining 
the consequences of the articles under controversy.   
However, the pressure of statutory law is not the only reason why the courts include as 
part of their analysis, the “matter” of speech acts. They face extreme difficulty in 
maintaining a principled distinction between “matter” and “manner” of the speech act, 
in relation to religious offence. Can an expression be held to be offensive to the 
religious susceptibilities of the followers only if vile or insulting language is used to 
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denigrate religious beliefs, a revered personage, or a basic religious value system? The 
courts have held that freedom to criticise religion is only allowed if the criticism 
pertains to the practices of that religion and does not extend to its principles or basic 
tenets.
429
 Also, any criticism or questioning of the character of a religious personage, or 
of a religious text is clearly prohibited.
430
 The courts have held that even if the language 
used in the publication is neither aggressive nor outrageous, commentaries on these 
subjects have the potentiality to offend the religious sensibilities of the followers of any 
religion as well as promoting hatred among different religious groups. The use of 
restrained language, or the claims of historical truth, does not make the publication any 
less volatile, nor do they decrease the intensity of harm that such publications can 
cause. In such cases the reference point for the courts is the probable impact such 
expression could have on the religious followers.           
The case of Master Aman Preet Singh
431
 heard at the Punjab High Court in 1996 is 
reflective of this complexity. A Public Interest Litigation was filed by Master Aman 
Preet Singh, a class XII student of a school under CBSE (Central Board of Secondary 
Education) for issuance of appropriate directions for deleting remarks alleged to be 
derogatory to Guru Gobind Singh (the tenth Guru of Sikhs) contained in a History text 
book prescribed for Class XII students called Modern India. The book was written by 
historian Bipan Chandra and published by NCERT (National Council of Educational 
Research and Training). The applicant had claimed that the chapter on Guru Gobind 
Singh presented the Guru in a bad light, noting in particular a reference to him being an 
employee of Bahadur Shah, a Mughal king. It was alleged that such references were 
contrary to facts and opposed to the teachings and writings of the Guru and hence 
“offensive” to the Sikhs. In this case, the primary complaint was not about the 
“manner” in which the subject was discussed or about the language being vile or 
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insulting, but rather the content itself. A historical claim about the life of the Sikh guru 
(even though duly supported by historical evidence) came under controversy.  
The respondents including the publisher and the author, rejected the charge that the 
section deemed offensive in any way hurt the religious sentiments of any person. It was 
argued to be a fact based on historical research. They forwarded three arguments in 
favour of their position: 1) that the contentious section was extracted out of context and 
the chapter as a whole aimed to situate the Sikh religion in perspective and to stress the 
popular, egalitarian, and socially radical character of the Sikh religion founded by Guru 
Nanak; 2) that the authenticity of the objectionable remarks was a matter of “legitimate 
historical debate.” It was maintained that many historians disagreed with the view 
expressed and the truth content could only be extracted by historians alone “by 
discussing it in a spirit of historical objectivity on the basis of acceptable historical 
evidence”; 3) the writer’s view in this chapter was based on historical writings of 
eminent historians like Joseph Davey Cunningham (History of the Sikhs), William 
Irvine (Later Mughals), Sir Gukul Chand Narang (Transformation of Sikhism) and also 
upon a Gurmukhi script, Panth Parkash, written by Bhai Gian Singh and a persian 
work Umdat-ul-Twarikh.  
The court, however, remained unimpressed by the arguments of the respondents. It 
upheld the petition and ordered the removal of the offensive passages. It held:  
A Guru who is respected, revered and worshipped and is admitted to 
have fought against Moghul emperor throughout his life and sacrificed 
all that which was precious to him cannot be permitted to be projected to 
students to be an employee of Moghul emperor as the same is likely to 
hurt the religious feelings of the community.  
The court approached the case as a question about protection of secular values of the 
Indian polity rather than as an infringement of freedom of speech and expression. It 
maintained that freedom of speech and expression could not be treated as a license to 
infringe the rights or faith of others. In fact, it claimed that “the State is under a 
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constitutional obligation to preserve and protect the interests of Sikh Community,” and 
therefore, “the respondent/authorities are under an obligation to refrain from becoming 
a party to such controversial writing, which may ultimately hurt the feelings of the Sikh 
community as a whole or a part of it.”  
Most significant was the observation of the court on the claim about historicity. This 
case was an explicit example of the blurring of the manner-matter distinction in relation 
to the impact of a publication. As there was no complaint about the form of expression 
or the language used, the decision was based strictly on the content or subject of the 
writing. The fact that the subject was related to a “controversial” historical episode in 
the life of Guru Gobind Singh was considered reason enough to restrict the publication 
in the name of protecting the values of secularism. The subject-matter expressed was 
seen as an insult to the Guru, and though the language was neither abusive nor libellous, 
it was thought to be potentially offensive to the religious sensibilities of the followers of 
Guru Gobind Singh. The court also overlooked the fact that any kind of historical 
enquiry necessitated free flow of arguments based on historical evidence. On this latter 
point the court held: “The writings about religious Gurus cannot be permitted to be 
justified on the basis of disputed and debatable historical truths, lest it may destroy the 
very secular fabric of the Constitution.” Given that the author had never claimed that his 
views had unanimous acceptability among historians, while at the same time had shown 
that his statement was not bereft of historical evidences supported by several other 
historians, he had arguably allowed space for a view that it was aimed neither at 
denigrating any religious personage nor at hurting religious sentiments. But contrarily, 
the court suggested that “self restraint is expected in matters like- religion, particularly 
when they are apprehended to affect the sentiments of a section of the society, forming 
part of the Indian polity.”  
The above discussion shows that while interpreting statutory laws, the courts provide a 
very wide definition of religious offense and this is reflected in their consideration of 
both “matter” as well as “manner” of speech acts that are seen as requiring government 
action. Only a restrained language and non-interference in critical aspects of religion, 
152 
according to the courts, could be justified while dealing with the subject of religion. The 
immunity such a position provides to several aspects of religious belief, from attack or 
criticism, place constraints on free exercise of freedom of speech and expression, even 
historical research on the subject.  
3.2. Extending the Reach of Law: Separating “Punitive” and “Preventive” Actions  
While adjudicating over cases concerning contentious publications, the courts have 
maintained a distinction between “punitive” and “preventive” laws. The punitive laws 
like section 295(A) and 153(A) of the IPC can be used, to punish authors/publishers 
who produce religiously offensive publications, or publications that incite communal 
hatred, whereas the preventive law, like section 95 of the CrPC can be used to proscribe 
or forfeiture contentious publications. Section 95 of the CrPC empowers the 
government declare any printed material forfeited which “appears to the State 
Government to contain any matter the publication of which is punishable under section 
124(A) or section 153(A) or section 153(B) or section 292 or section 293 or section 
295(A) of the Indian Penal Code” by notification, “stating the grounds of its opinion.” 
A look at the provision under section 95 would suggest that it is concomitant to the 
crime defined under the punitive laws i.e. the powers conferred upon the authorities to 
forfeiture or proscribe can only be used if the conditions mentioned under other laws 
like section 295(A) or 153(A) are fulfilled. However, the courts have highlighted at 
least three important aspects in which the provisions are not only defined differently but 
also allow wider latitude for state action in order to prevent the circulation of 
publications containing religiously offensive subject-matter. 
Firstly, the courts have maintained that the reference of various IPC laws in section 95 
is only description of the kind of offence required to be prevented and that the use of 
section 95 is not dependent on the tests mentioned for other statutory laws. Initially, 
some High Courts held that the law expected that cases be examined based on the tests 
suggested under section 153(A) and 295(A) and only if a violation was deduced under 
these clauses could the action of the government to forfeiture a publication be justified. 
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This included tests such as mens rea, as required in the punitive laws.
432
 The approach 
of the courts seems to have departed from this position significantly after the Nand 
Kishore Singh case.
433
 In this case, the Patna High Court argued that “it would be 
somewhat fallacious to mathematically equate the proceedings under Sections 95 and 
96 of the Code with a trial under Section 295-A of the Penal Code with the accused in 
the dock.” It held that the law under section 95 was essentially preventive in nature and 
to require the government be satisfied of the deliberate and malicious intention before 
using it was like defeating the very purpose of section 95. Also the statute did not 
specify that it should be “proved” to the state government or that the state government 
is “satisfied” that all requirements of punishing section are established. All that the 
section expected was that it should “appear” to the state government that the offending 
publication would come under the relevant section of the law. In this case the court also 
made it explicit that the “clear and present danger” doctrine, as used in the US, cannot 
be applied in the Indian case.  
This interpretation of law was significant for many reasons. On the one hand it meant 
that the state government could proscribe a publication, without being satisfied about 
the tests like “deliberate and malicious intention” of the author or publisher in the said 
case; nor was the government required to defend its decision in the courts on such 
grounds. On the other hand, it also allowed the state government to act towards pre-
emption of the threat posed by the controversial publication. Broadly, the courts 
allowed a wider space for government’s intervention on contentious publications, much 
wider in latitude than in cases under punitive laws. This interpretation of section 95 was 
upheld in several subsequent cases, most notably including the Supreme Courts 
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Secondly, within the application of preventive laws, the court expects the government 
to spell out the “grounds of opinion.”
435
 A close analysis suggests that the courts insist 
that “ground of opinion” should include at least the citation of the offending passages
436
 
and noting of the communities whose susceptibilities were allegedly hurt by the speech 
act
437
 as well as the “conclusion of facts”
438
 which led the government to forfeiture the 
publication. The ground of opinion formation helps the judges to understand the 
“application of mind” by the authorities. The courts emphasized on the importance to 
mention the grounds on which opinion of the government was based in order to avoid 
arbitrary action by the government,
439
 and a failure on the part of the government to 
mention the ground of opinion becomes the reason for cancellation of the notification of 
forfeiture.
440
 However, the courts have made this test very lenient and subjective by 
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  In Lalai Singh Yadav, 1977 AIR 202 , Justice Krishna Iyer held: “If you laze and omit, the law visits 
the order with voidness and this the State Government must realize especially because forfeiture of a 
book for a penal offence is a serious matter, not a routine act to be executed with unconcern or 
indifference. The wages of neglect is invalidity, going by the text of the Code. These considerations 
are magnified in importance when we regard the changeover from the Raj to the Republic and the 
higher value assigned to the great rights of the people.” 
440
  Lalai Singh Yadav, 1977 AIR 202; M/S Varsha Publications, Cri LJ 1446.  They argued that since the law 
allowed the victim to challenge the decision of forfeiture or ban in the High Court (under section 96 of the 
CrPC), it was important for the victims to know the reasons for proscription, in order to defend their 
position. Also, in order to decide the case, the court needed to be informed as to “which communities were 
alienated from each other or whose religious beliefs had been wounded according to the Government, or 
why the Government thought that such alienation or offence to religion had been caused.” These details, 
according to the court, were necessary for it to reach to a conclusion on the subject. 
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reducing the details expected by the officials to spell out in a notification. There was the 
threat that the objectionable content, if declared in the notification explicitly, will 
ultimately be made available in the public sphere and thereby defeat the very objective 
of forfeiture or ban. In Nand Kishore Singh
441
, the Patna High Court took cognizance of 
this problem and brought some clarity on the issue. It opined:  
The declaration of forfeiture is consequently not required to be an 
exhaustive or self-contained document incorporating all the offending 
material as also each and every fact on which it is based. Any such 
detailed recitals or contents in a notification are neither mandated by 
statute nor precedent and would perhaps be incongruous in the nature of 
the notification envisaged by the statute….. It is amply sufficient if on 
the grounds of opinion, that is, the conclusions of fact being duly stated, 
the Government's opinion arrived at there from is clearly exhibited that 
the publications come within the mischief of the law. 
The mentioning of grounds of opinion, though important, the courts held that it did not 
need to include detailed exposition of subject-matter but should exhibit the link between 
the conclusion of facts and the decision by the government. This is not an exception, as 
the courts have been consistently citing this case in order to check the validity of the 
notifications. The detailed notification was mandated in order to ascertain that the 
officials had conducted a thorough examination of the contentious publication before 
acting against it. The exemption pronounced in Nand Kishore Singh, therefore, 
protected the authorities from this mandatory procedure making it easier for them to act 
against a contentious publication, even without a survey of the publication in question. 
The decision of the authorities to act may be guided in such cases, less by the content of 
the publication, and more by the form of opposition or threat to public order that such 
publication would have attracted.  
Thirdly, the court also held that in cases where any person appealed to the High Court 
against the forfeiture order, the onus of proof fell on the aggrieved i.e. it is for the 
petitioner in such cases to prove that the book does not contain anything disallowed in 
the section under which the order was passed. This followed from an interpretation of 
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law under section 96(1) of CrPC which deals with the application in the High Court 
against forfeiture. Section 96(1) states:  
Any person having any interest in any newspaper, book or other 
document, in respect of which a declaration of forfeiture has been made 
under section 95, may, within two months from the date of publication 
in the Official Gazette of such declaration, apply to the High Court to set 
aside such declaration on the ground that the issue of the newspaper, or 
the book or other document, in respect of which the declaration was 
made, did not contain any such matter as is referred to in sub-section (1) 
of section 95.  
Therefore, in order to challenge the order of forfeiture, the applicant would have to 
show that: a) the book in question does not contain anything “which will offend or 
outrage the religious feelings of any section of the society”
442
; b) Further, that there did 
not exist any intention on the part of the author to do so;
443
 and c) therefore the opinion 
of the government to proscribe the publication, could not be sustained. This was in 
complete contradistinction to the requirements of punitive laws where the state 
government was expected to defend its decision to prosecute an individual by 
presenting evidences that not only proved the commission of offence but also pointed at 
“deliberate and malicious” intention involved in the act.   
Considering all these aspects together shows that if the state government follows the 
technical requirements, the probability of its action being upheld by the courts are quite 
high. It is far easier for government authorities to proscribe and forfeiture a contentious 
publication than to punish (under statutory law) an individual attached to that 
publication. This also reveals the courts’ attitude towards the balance that it was 
expected to maintain between freedom of expression and claims of religious offence. Its 
interpretation of statutory laws provides wide space for government’s action against 
publications that are charged with defaming religion or promoting hatred against any 
religious groups. This is further confirmed by the difference the courts maintain 
                                                           
442
  High Court in Baragur Ramachandrappa, (1998) CriLJ 3639. 
443
  Sanghraj Damodar Rupawate, Civil Appeal of 2010 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 8931 of 2007). 
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between punitive and preventive law. The claim of freedom of expression becomes 
weaker with respect to controversial publications as the court does not intervene against 
censorship or proscription of such material in the name of public interest, if the 
procedural aspect of law is not violated. The threat perception of the government 
agencies becomes an important guiding point and the interpretation of the preventive 
laws by the courts helps it to justify its prompt action.   
In the above section, I analysed how the courts interpret statutory laws, including the 
tests and doctrines it uses, to adjudicate on the subject of publications claimed to be 
religiously offensive. But an important question that still needs to be considered is why 
courts provide such broad definition of religious offence, thereby making government’s 
action justifiable in a wide range of cases. I turn to this question in the next section. 
4. Restricting Freedom of Expression: Courts and the Justifications 
for Legal Intervention  
There is some general consensus that limitations to freedom of expression are 
acceptable if there are fears of disturbance to public order. Yet there is much less 
agreement on how to judge whether a specific speech act is in fact a threat to public 
order, and therefore deserving prohibition. Mill’s differentiation between “advocacy” 
and “instigation,” as I have discussed earlier in this chapter, was indicative of this 
tension. That idea became more explicit in Justice Holmes’ famous advocacy of the 
“clear and present danger” doctrine that dominated American jurisprudence on freedom 
of speech questions during the last century. Justice Holmes in Schenck
444
 argued that it 
was largely a matter of “proximity and degree.” He held: “The question in every case is 
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to 
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that 
Congress has a right to prevent.” This approach was further fine tuned during his 
dissent in the Abrams
445
 case where he was joined by Justice Brandeis. In this case, 
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Holmes opined that there should not only be “clear and present” danger but rather the 
danger should be imminent and only if a direct relation could be established between 
the intentions of the actor and the consequence of the act, it would be reasonable to 
punish such acts. In other words, it is argued that there should be a direct consequential 
relation between the speech act and the threat to public order.   
In the Indian case, public order as a valid limitation to freedom of speech and 
expression was inserted in the constitution through the first Amendment in order to 
create a balance between “individual freedom” and “social freedom.”
446
 The Supreme 
Court in its various judgments has refined the definition of the term “public order” 
thereby drawing out its scope and limitations, especially when the claim of public order 
is used by the government to restrict freedom of speech and expression. In 
Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh
447
 the court defined public order as absence 
of disorder involving “breaches of local significance.” The state of public order was 
marked as the orderly state of society or community “in which citizens can peacefully 
pursue their normal activities of life.” The judges accepted that “public order” was a 
wide term, that might include minor “law and order” aspects or major issues like threat 
to state security such as attempts to overthrow it, and therefore it was asserted that the 
usage of the term should be precise. Emphasizing precision, the court in Dr. Ram 
Manohar Lohia
448
 referred to a set of three concentric circles with “law and order” and 
“security of state” in its outer and inner most circles with public order in the middle. 
The court opined that “an act may affect law and order but not public order” and that 
not all cases of public disorder pose a threat to the security of state. In Arun Ghosh
449
 
the court further asserted that the disturbances of public order needed to be 
distinguished “from acts directed against individuals, which do not disturb the society to 
the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquillity.” “It is the degree of 
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disturbances and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality” that would 
determine, according to the court, “whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of 
law and order.”
450
 Since the constitution of India devolves the power of maintaining 
law and order to the state government, it is the prerogative of the state officials to 
decide when a condition resembles a public order problem and also to determine the 
possible ways to handle the situation. However, in order to justify its action against 
freedom of speech, the government was required to show: a) the speech act had caused 
or was likely to cause actual disturbance of a local significance; and b) the speech act 
should not only affect one or few individuals but the larger community.  
4.1. Public Order and the Issue of Religiously Offensive Publications 
The threat to public order posed by religiously offensive publications became the reason 
for the birth of most statutory laws during colonial period, which govern the freedom of 
speech and expression even today. In the post-independence phase, the controversial 
religious content of political speeches and the printing press were thought to be playing 
a major role in promoting enmity and instigating violence among different 
communities, and were therefore considered as eligible for regulations.  
But how and when does religious offense lead to public order problems, and when is the 
government justified to act in such cases? In the context of independent India, the 
judiciary was expected to balance the claims of social cohesion with that of individual 
liberties. The fear was that the government in power could use the threat of public order 
for political purposes, thereby restricting freedom of speech and expression 
unreasonably. Contrarily, there was also a fear that even small misjudgements on the 
part of the authorities could lead to severe public order problem. So the court was 
expected to draw the line between freedom of expression as a fundamental right to be 
freely enjoyed by all citizens, and its misuse that threatened public order. In this regard, 
Pratap Bhanu Mehta is very critical about the role of judiciary.
451
 He argues that since 
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legally the fundamental right to expression can be regulated on grounds of “maintaining 
public order,” the court allows any “insult” to religion to be regulated. This, according 
to him, is primarily allowed because the courts read the public order exception in article 
19 and 25 so broadly that whenever a restriction is said to be associated with public 
order, the courts do not pursue any further question. In the process, as Mehta argues, the 
courts also assume that every attempt to insult religion must have a tendency to disrupt 
public order. This analysis of judiciary’s role, though suggestive, is not free from 
limitations. While Mehta’s conclusion that the judiciary refrains from allowing private 
judgement to impede the “legitimate purposes of the state that can be publicly 
justified,” especially in relation to religious discourse, might be correct, his analysis of 
the cases to reach the conclusion are inconclusive and do not adequately do justice to 
the judiciary’s position.  
Let us consider two cases, one related to criminal prosecution for vilifying religious 
personage, the second related to the ban and forfeiture of a book. These examples help 
us to consider the court’s role in questions of public order from different perspectives. 
In the first case of Ramji Lal Modi, a case Mehta also considers, government’s action 
directly impacted freedom of speech and expression, as well as raising issues of the 
individual’s personal freedom. In the second case of Lalai Singh Yadav, government’s 
action was limited to proscription of the controversial publication.  
Case 1: As early as 1957, the Supreme Court was faced with the questions concerning 
“insult to religion” and its impact on public order situation. While testing the 
constitutionality of section 295(A) of IPC, in Ramji Lal Modi, the court dealt with the 
subject in great details. In August 1952, a cartoon appeared in a popular Hindi daily 
published from Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh, Amrit Patrika, which caricatured Prophet 
Mohammed in the form of a donkey. The state witnessed protests from the Muslim 
community which turned violent in many instances. Bandhs and demonstrations were 
organized, despite prohibitory orders from the government.
452
 Repeated apologies by the 
editor, the publisher and the director-in-charge of the newspaper did not help to pacify the 
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 It was only after the government’s decision to prosecute the newspaper that the 
situation was controlled. In the month of November, when the case was still very fresh, 
Ramji Lal Modi, the editor and publisher of a monthly magazine called Gaurakshak
454
, 
wrote an article in the November issue questioning the protests by the Muslims. On the one 
hand the article questioned the rationale behind such reactions, and on the other hand it 
launched a scathing attack on the basic tenets of Muslim religion including popular beliefs 
about the Prophet. Fearing threats to law and order in the polarized communal context, the 
government ordered the prosecution of Ramji Lal Modi under sections 153(A) and 295(A) 
of the IPC. In the Sessions court of Kanpur, the judge acquitted him of the charges under 
section 153(A) but found him guilty under 295(A), and thereby sentenced him to 18 months 
rigorous imprisonment. Modi then appealed against the judgment before the High Court, 
but the court held that the article was published with a deliberate and malicious intention of 
outraging the religious feelings of the Muslims and hence was punishable. 
The accused then approached the Supreme Court with two separate applications, one 
claiming stay on the High Court order and the other, under article 32 of the constitution 
urging, that section 295(A) was ultra vires and void in as much as it interfered with the 
petitioner’s freedom of speech and expression.
455
 The Supreme Court rejected the 
application for stay and dismissed the other application, thereby upholding the action 
taken against Modi. During the trial, the counsel for the appellant argued that it was 
only in the “interest of public order” that a “reasonable restriction” to freedom of 
speech and expression could be justified, and therefore, likelihood of public disorder 
“should be a matter of proximate and not remote consideration.” He substantiated these 
arguments using Supreme Court’s observations in the Romesh Thapar
456
 and Brij 
Bhushan cases
457
 and insisted that in the present case there was no direct threat of 
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public disorder. Secondly, he maintained that insults to religions and religious beliefs 
may or may not lead to public disorder and therefore there was always a sense of 
ambiguity attached to the practical implications of section 295(A), which was 
dangerous if allowed to curtail a fundamental right. The Court rejected both these 
submissions and held that section 295(A) was well within the scope of article 19(2) 
which set reasonable restrictions to freedom of speech and expression. The observations 
of the court were significant for future cases. On the first submission, the court held that 
after the First Amendment, Romesh Thapar and Brij Bhushan’s cases were no more 
relevant as the First Amendment had significantly changed the nature and scope of 
article 19(2). The court differentiated between two significant phrases- “for the 
maintenance of” and “in the interest of.” According to the court, the addition of the 
phrase “in the interest of” public order had significantly widened the scope of article 
19(2), and therefore, even if some action by the government might not be justified on 
grounds of directly “maintaining” public order, it may still be important in “the interest 
of public order.” Chief Justice S. R. Das pronounced: “If …. certain activities have a 
tendency to cause public disorder, a law penalising such activities as an offence cannot 
but be held to be a law imposing reasonable restriction ‘in the interests of public order’ 
although in some cases those activities may not actually lead to a breach of public 
order.” The court also rejected the claim that freedom of speech and expression could 
only be restrained if the threat to public order was proximate and imminent. Countering 
the second proposition, the court did not believe that there was any sense of ambiguity 
in the law. It held that “deliberate and malicious” intentions was sine qua non of section 
295(A) and therefore only those acts of insult to religion or religious beliefs which were 
carried out with deliberate and malicious intention were punishable. Deriving a direct 
connection between the calculated tendency of an “aggravated form of insult” and 
“public order,” the court held that such intentional vilification, aimed “clearly to disrupt 
the public order and the section, which penalises such activities, is well within the 
protection of cl. (2) of article 19.” It meant that if the government could successfully 
show that an act was “deliberately and maliciously” aimed at insulting the religion or 
religious beliefs, it would be assumed to be a threat to public order and hence 
punishable under law. Based on these arguments, the court held Ramji Lal Modi guilty 
and rejected his application.    
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Significantly, in the unrecorded trial of the editor and the publisher of Anand Patrika, 
who were prosecuted by the state under section 295(A) for publishing the cartoon of 
Prophet, the accused were acquitted by the Allahabad High Court due to the failure by the 
prosecution to produce enough evidence to prove that the act was done with “deliberate 
and malicious” intention.
458
 The contrast in both cases is evidence of the court’s differing 
approach. It is significant that the reactions to the publication of the cartoon were directly 
responsible for law and order situation in Uttar Pradesh. The acquittal of the editor and 
publisher of the newspaper hinted that for criminal prosecution, it was necessary to 
establish a link between the intentions of the accused and the reaction of the members of 
religious community who claimed feeling of “offense.” In Modi’s case, the fact that his 
essay was in reaction to the events surrounding the publication of cartoon helped to 
establish deliberate and malicious intention. The same did not apply to the editor or 
publisher of Amrit Patrika who had continuously pleaded it to be a case of ignorance and 
had also publicly apologised for the same. So, it can be concluded that though the court 
believed that the government could act based on its assessment of public order problems 
and it did not compulsorily include the “clear and present danger” test, the prosecution of 
individuals under criminal law required the government to prove presence of deliberate 
and malicious intentions. 
The above analysis hints at two important aspects of the court’s position on the subject 
of criminalizing speech acts that contain religiously offensive subject. First, the courts 
allow for action if there was aggravated form of insult, presuming that such utterances 
had every chance to flare up into a public order issue. At the same time it did not 
explain what could be included as aggravated form of insult, or how it is to be 
differentiated from insults of a general kind which could not be punished. The 
reluctance of the courts to examine or provide clear directions left it largely to the 
prerogative of the government to decide when to act. Secondly, the actors in these cases 
could only be held guilty if deliberate and malicious intention was proven. Considering 
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the fact that the intention was to be derived from the content and language of the 
publication, the court tried to distance the justification of government’s action from its 
implication for an individual’s personal liberty. The only justification required for the 
government’s action is the presumption of public order problems, leaving open the 
issue of whether the prosecution was justified to be decided by the judiciary. Arguably, 
such a position enables the government to act on its presumption of public order threats 
without taking into account the reasonability of such action vis-à-vis freedom of speech 
and expression. This approach of the court has even more serious implications in cases 
involving proscription or banning of the books in a territory.  
Case 2: The second case is related to the proscription order of the book Sachchi 
Ramayana.
459
 The case was about Uttar Pradesh government’s appeal in the Supreme 
Court against the Allahabad High Court decision to strike down government order 
banning Sachchi Ramayana or Ramayana: A True Reading written by radical Tamil 
social reformer Periyar and translated and published by Lalai Singh Yadav, a resident of 
Uttar Pradesh.
460
 The government believed that by treating the main characters of the epic 
with disdain, the author and publisher had offended the religious sentiments of a majority 
of Hindus.
461
 Though the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court, it was 
essentially on technical grounds and as the judgment mentioned, it was not reflective of 
the view of the judges “on the merits of the book or its provocative vitriol.”
462
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In the unanimous judgment written by Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer, the approach of the 
court on the question of proscription of a contentious publication under the threat of 
public order situation is discussed in great depth. Firstly, the court made it absolutely 
clear that the power to ban or forfeiture controversial publication was a legitimate 
power in the hands of the government and “whoever violates by bombs or books 
societal tranquillity will become target of legal interdict.” Secondly, it was maintained 
that though the “clear and present danger” test, as popularized in American 
jurisprudence, was not very relevant for Indian conditions, extreme caution was 
required on the part of the government in its judgment of how to safeguard social 
tranquillity. Thirdly, reiterating the views of the court in Ramji Lal Modi the judges 
recognized a clear relationship between religious offense and public disorder. It held: 
“Hatred, outrage and like feelings of large groups may have crypto-violent proneness 
and the State, in its well-grounded judgment, may prefer to stop the circulation of the 
book to preserve safety and peace in society….. The actual exercise will depend not on 
doctrinaire logic but practical wisdom.” The practical wisdom of the government was to 
depend on a number of factors including the context and content of the publication. As 
mentioned earlier, the court rejected the application on technical grounds, however, it 
also pointed that if the state government thought that the peace of the state would be 
disturbed by the book under consideration, it could reissue a fresh notification, keeping 
in mind the essential legal requirements. So, though the judgment was in favour of the 
publisher of the book, the court hinted that, the technical aspects aside, the government 
was well within its legitimate capacity and powers to order proscription under the 
perception of threat to public order. 
Both the above cases had some significant similarities and differences. It is clear that 
the Supreme Court in both the cases held that the government’s intervention was 
justified and was constitutionally protected under article 19(2) if it was seen to be “in 
the interest of’ public order.” The significance of the phrase “in the interest of” was 
made explicit by the court’s reference to the First Amendment whereby the phrase was 
introduced to the constitution. This was in contradistinction to Mehta’s assumption that 
the fundamental right to expression could be legally regulated for “maintaining public 
order.” The Supreme Court reasoned that “in the interest of public order” has larger 
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connotation and implications for government’s action than “for the maintenance of” 
public order, as it allowed for intervention even if there were no direct threats to public 
order. The courts also rejected the application of the “clear and present danger” doctrine 
in the Indian context. Furthermore, the two judgments also revealed that, unlike 
Mehta’s proposition, the court did not base its judgment solely on the claims of threat to 
public order by the government. In the first case, the court held that the prosecution of 
an individual also required that “deliberate and malicious intention” was proven. In this 
way the court balanced the individual’s personal liberty with the threat posed to public 
order by the contentious publication. In the second case, the court emphasized the 
importance of mentioning in the notification order the grounds on which the 
government based its opinion, which could reflect the application of mind by the 
government in making the decision to forfeiture or ban a particular publication. 
Therefore, in such cases the threat to public order, though an important condition, was 
not considered as a sufficient claim for justifying government’s action under 
“reasonable restrictions.” However, under the looming threat to public order, the 
government was totally justified in acting against the publication or the person 
responsible for it.      
4.2. “Secularism” and the Protection of Right to Conscience and Religion 
One of the central dilemmas attached to the laws against religious offense has centred 
around the role of the state– concerning the scope and limitations of state intervention 
in such subjects. For example, a very strong justification in favour of blasphemy laws 
has been that it is the duty of state to preserve morality in society. This was especially 
true about societies where blasphemy laws were used to protect the religion of the 
majority, from insult.
463
 But in the changed context of multicultural societies, this 
position faced challenges from different quarters. One school of thought argued that the 
restriction of freedom of speech and expression on the pretext of religious offense had 
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lost its moral justification. For example, George Letsas believes that the fact that each 
religious system is based on a set of “particularities” which is represented in the form of 
doctrines, symbols or figures, any protection of religion would mean forcing people to 
accept the ethical ideas and ideals that they might not have contemplated or have been 
familiar with.
464
 This, according to Letsas, should not be the role of state, and therefore 
any law like blasphemy could not be supported. Other critiques, like Peter Jones, argue 
that “the protection of religion for moral purposes ceases to be feasible in a multi-
religious society” because it would be detrimental to the idea of a secular state to prefer 
and protect a certain conception of good life represented by the religion of the majority, 
and on the other hand if the state “tried to avoid that inequity by protecting all religions 
it would be supporting contradictory beliefs and beliefs which had different moral 
consequences.”
465
 So, it was asserted that the state should either not indulge in 
restricting freedom of expression in the name of religious offence, or it should look for 
a more potent justification to legitimize its action, like the threat on public order. 
However, there were others who believed that the law of blasphemy should be extended 
to protect all religious subjects. It was argued that the changing nature of societies, 
whereby it was becoming multi-religious and plural, required a secular state to extend 
such protections to followers of all religions. For example, Lord Scarman, who 
favoured the expansion of the common law crime of blasphemy to protect the religious 
feelings of non-Christians in Britain, during the Lemon case
466
, urged that the common 
law be changed by legislation to protect the sensibilities of all religious groups. 
Scarman cited the example of India to build a case for the need of protection of all 
religions in a plural society. He said: “. . . . In an increasingly plural society such as that 
of modem Britain it is necessary not only to respect the differing religious beliefs, 
feelings and practices of all but also to protect them from scurrility, vilification, 
ridicule, and contempt ....When Macaulay became a legislator in India, he saw to it that 
the law protected the religious feelings of all. In those days India was a plural society: 
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today the United Kingdom is also…. My criticism of the common law offence of 
blasphemy is not that it exists but that it is not sufficiently comprehensive ….”
467
 
Britain abolished the offences of blasphemy and blasphemous libel from its common 
law in 2008.
468
   
Looking at the history of laws against religious offense in India one can conclude that 
ever since it got codified under the colonial state, it was meant to protect followers of 
all religions. But the question about how a secular state should behave in a multi-
religious and plural society still remained a puzzle. Unlike many western democracies, 
where the principles of secularism expected an approach of neutrality from the state on 
the issues concerning religions, in India it was expected to maintain what Rajeev 
Bhargava has famously called “principled distance.” On the one hand, it meant equal 
treatment of all religions and non-interference in matters internal to religion
469
; on the 
other hand, on subjects that affected the public in general, it had every right to assert its 
authority. Protection of the right to freedom of religion as guaranteed under article 25 
also became a constitutional as well as a moral duty for the state to uphold in India’s 
multi-religious society.  
But how was the state expected to behave when freedom of religion was threatened by 
publications that vilify and insult religious beliefs, symbols and practices? In its various 
judgments, the court has been conscious that freedom of speech and expression does not 
clash with other constitutional guarantees, including freedom of conscience and the 
right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion. The courts’ attempt to preserve 
the balance is based on two premises: First, as discussed earlier in the chapter, the 
courts held that wounding religious susceptibilities of other religious denominations 
could lead to disruptions of public order; and second, the courts asserted that, freedom 
of conscience and religion needs to be protected and it is the duty of the state to create 
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environment where this right could be freely enjoyed. One of the earliest examples of 
this attitude of the court was reflected in N. Veerabrahmam case.
470
 The Andhra 
Pradesh High Court in this case was considering the constitutionality of Section 99(A) 
and ban of the book Bible Bandaram- which was claimed to be a rationalist critique of 
the Bible. The critique pointed at the incongruities and inconsistencies in the Bible; 
raised doubts about its authorship; and made controversial claims: for instance, since 
nobody can be born of a virgin, Jesus was a product of adulterous union and the 
Immaculate Conception theory was a cover-up. Introducing a balanced approach the 
court held: “People are at liberty to write books without offending deliberately the 
religious sentiments of other citizens who are as much entitled to certain freedoms as 
the petitioner himself.” Rejecting the argument from the counsel for the petitioner that 
the book was based on rational and free thinking and was therefore eligible for 
protection under article 19(1)(a), the court defined the boundary of such claim by 
arguing that free thinking did not “involve freedom to make scurrilous attacks on the 
religion and religious beliefs of other sects with impunity.” “It is not free-thinking to 
abuse and insult other religions,” the court observed. Deliberating the subject further, 
the judges held that “no citizen could claim a right to insult the religion or religious 
beliefs of another section of the population.” It maintained that it was the duty of the 
state to ascertain that citizens are able to exercise freedom of religion and conscience, 
and according to the court, section 99(A) of the CrPC as well as section 295(A) of the 
IPC were legitimate power in the hands of the government to ensure such protection to 
the rights of all its citizens. The emphasis on protecting freedom of conscience and 
religion was based on the understanding that though freedom of speech and expression 
was important, it did not enjoy any special status and hence needed to be balanced with 
competing claims based on other fundamental rights. In the final section of the 
judgment, the court observed that “all the citizens of India are guaranteed freedom of 
religion and freedom of conscience by our Constitution and each one has a right to 
pursue his own way of attaining salvation, unhampered and without interference from 
others.” 
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This attitude of the court provides both a moral and a legal protection to freedom of 
conscience and religion against freedom of expression. By recognizing that freedom of 
religion should be “unhampered and without interference,” the courts provide a certain 
immunity to religions against criticism. This perspective is further reflected in the way 
courts determine what constitutes legitimate criticism when it is directed against 
religion. So for example, the courts have proved to be lenient against criticism of 
religious practices but at the same time made it explicit that any insult or vilification of 
religious personage and criticism of religious texts and beliefs could not be allowed.
471
 
It was based on the perception that a criticism or insult of religious personage and of 
religious texts amounted to interference in the faith of others, something that could not 
be allowed in a secular and plural society like India. This position of the court was 
reiterated in the Supreme Court’s judgment in Sri Baragur Ramachandrappa where the 
court observed:  
...no person has a right to impinge on the feelings of others on the 
premise that his right to freedom of speech remains unrestricted and 
unfettered. It cannot be ignored that India is country with vast disparities 
in language, culture and religion and unwarranted and malicious 
criticism or interference in the faith of others cannot be accepted.
472
  
The court emphasized that the secular values needed to be protected and the state was 
duty bound to act in case such values are threatened, even if it was done under the garb 
of freedom of expression. Therefore, the courts provide a justifiable reason for 
government’s intervention by warranting a restriction on freedom of expression in cases 
where it is found to interrupt free exercise of right to freedom of religion.  
Government’s action is also justified, according to the court, in cases which include acts 
of vilification or wounding religious susceptibilities of followers of any religion as it is 
judged to inevitably lead to the disruption of public order. “If there is no law authorising 
the executive to take necessary action …… there will be disorder in society and bitter 
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feelings and even hatred between various sections of society which is not conducive to 
the maintenance of order,” the court observed in N. Veerabrahmam case.
473
 This was 
another ground on which section 99(A) was considered well within the limitations set by 
article 19(2) to the freedom of speech and expression. This aspect was further elaborated 
by justice Krishna Iyer in Lalai Singh Yadav.
474
 He maintained that in a country like 
India, the secular state was obligated “to create conditions where the sentiments and 
feelings of people of diverse or opposing beliefs and bigotries are not so molested by 
ribald writings or offensive publications as to provoke or outrage groups into possible 
violent action.” Justice Iyer believed that the state was expected not only to protect 
society against breaches of peace but also to prevent the causes of such state of order. 
This essentially involved proscribing publications which were deeply offensive to the 
religious sentiments of any section of population. He says, “…public power comes into 
play not because the heterodox few must be suppressed to placate the orthodox many but 
because every- one's cranium must be saved from mayhem before his cerebrum can have 
chance to simmer. Hatred, outrage and like feelings of large groups may have crypto-
violent proneness and the State, in its well-grounded judgment, may prefer to stop the 
circulation of the book to preserve safety and peace in society.”
475
 The principle of 
balancing counter claims about fundamental rights along with the assumption of threat 
inherent in misuse of freedom of speech and expression allowed the space for state 
governments to ban books which insulted or even criticized religions.  
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examined the way courts in India have responded to the claims of 
freedom of expression in relation to religious offence. I have argued that the decisions 
and observation of the courts show a tilt towards protecting the religious sensibilities of 
citizens from being offended by religiously offensive publications. In the process, the 
courts allow wide latitude for government intervention both in its punitive as well as 
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preventive actions. This reading of the court’s attitude departs from Sorabjee’s and 
Dhavan’s study whereby they held that courts in general and Supreme Court in 
particular has put a strong defence in favour of freedom of speech and expression. A 
point to note in this comparison is that both Sorabjee and Dhavan talk about freedom of 
speech and expression in general and my study concentrated only on religiously 
offensive publications.
476
 Though Sorabjee and Dhavan’s arguments may be more 
generally valid, I would argue that my own analysis of publications that defame religion 
or promote religious hatred certainly qualifies their more general claims. The question 
then is: why do courts behave as they do in response to claims about religious offence? 
I have tried to respond to this issue in two ways: a) by trying to show how courts 
contemplate the idea of religious offence, based on their interpretations of statutory 
laws; and b) by studying the arguments the courts build in reaching to such an 
expansive definition of religious offence. 
In the first part of the chapter I discussed two forms of the court’s interpretations of 
statutory laws which affect the definition of religious offence in the Indian context. 
Firstly, the court looks at both the – “matter” of the opinion expressed and the “manner” 
in which it is presented – in order to decide about the justifiability of government’s 
action on the subject. This includes an emphasis on the language used in the 
publication, whereby the courts decipher the intention of the author as well as the 
intensity of the hurt caused. At the same time, the courts also maintain that there are 
some subjects that cannot be discussed even in mild and non-harmful language. These 
include criticism or insult of religious personage, denigrating religious texts or sacred 
beliefs. This, as I have shown, gives very broad scope for state intervention and also 
some kind of immunity to religion from criticism, a point also made by Mehta.
477
 
Secondly, I argue that this definition receives a far broader support in case of preventive 
laws than punitive laws. The distinction that the courts have maintained between 
punitive and preventive laws allows state governments to act promptly based on their 
perception of harm that can be caused either due to defamation of religion or promotion 
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of religious hatred. The overall approach of the court favours governmental 
intervention, more so in terms of proscription and bans, than criminalizing individual 
acts of violation. The claim of religious offence receives a much more favourable 
response than do the claims of freedom of expression. 
In the second part of the chapter, I discussed why the courts prioritize protection from 
religious offence and liberally allow government censorship. I developed two 
arguments in this regard – firstly, the importance that the courts lend to the subject of 
public order, and the perception of the court that religious offence have very high 
tendency to harm social tranquillity; secondly, the courts’ arguments regarding 
preserving the secular values of the constitution, whereby it holds that the state is 
obliged not only to protect all religion from harm, but also to create conditions so that 
freedom of conscience and religion are exercised unhampered. These reasons become 
the basis on which the court justifies protection of religious sensibilities of citizens 
against assault in the name of freedom of speech and expression.    
In the next chapter, I examine the role law and legal process play in the process of 
censorship. The aim is to shift from the philosophy of the court in such matters, as 
discussed in this chapter, to the practise of law, in order to get the complete picture 
about what happens in the cases of publications that are claimed to be religiously 











LAW AND LEGAL PROCESS AS HURDLES TO 




In May 2015, PEN Canada and International Human Rights Programme, University of 
Canada’s Faculty of Law produced a report titled Imposing Silence: The Use of India’s 
Laws to suppress Free Speech.
478
 The report argued that “vague overboard laws” and a 
“corrupt inefficient justice system” have given rise to an environment in India where 
free speech can easily be censored. It further discussed the regulatory framework used 
by government officials, individuals, and social and religious groups, in order to curtail 
freedom of expression. The report looked at various aspects of the legal process that 
account for the diminishment of freedom of speech in India. Issues ranging from filing 
of criminal charges and civil suits, the role of police and judicial corruption, and on to 
questioning the competence of the judiciary to hear cases on the subject were examined. 
On the one hand, the report discussed the limiting attitude of Indian law and judicial 
process, and on the other hand, based on a comparative analysis with international legal 
provisions it criticized India’s position in protecting freedom of speech and expression. 
The report also forwarded a list of suggestions, which included issues such as reform in 
the police and judiciary, and scrapping as well as amending significant statutory laws. 
The sentiment embodied in the report has also been reflected earlier by scholars like 
Lawrence Liang
479
 and Sohini Ghosh
480
, among others, who believe that the real threat 
to freedom of speech and expression in the Indian context emanates from the “slippery 
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 effect produced by the legal provisions. They recommended repealing of laws 
like section 153(A) and 295(A) in order to prevent misuse. For example, Liang argued 
that “once you have a law that allows for the making of legal claims on the basis of 
charged emotional states, you begin to see the emergence of cases that steadily cultivate 
a legal vocabulary of hurt sentiments.”
482
 It is in this sense that Ahmed notes that 
attempts to “regulate wounded attachments and religious passions” through law may 
“conversely constitute them.” Such legal construction of “offence,” Ahmed argues, 
gives space to “social groups to organize in order to ensure the state takes cognizance of 
blasphemous events and practices”.
483
 Though the slippery slope argument forwarded 
by these scholars holds strong ground, it fails to explain how it is a unique phenomenon 
attached to laws governing freedom of speech and expression. Any law can be misused 
in case the executive is not sensitive to its usage. Further, the criticism of law forwarded 
by these scholars does not take into account the responsibility of the judiciary as 
interpreter of law in drawing the boundaries of the legal discourse. The analysis 
therefore suffers limitations.  
In this chapter, I highlight the operative and functional inadequacies attached to the 
legal process, including the role of judiciary that impacts free speech cases. I argue that 
lacunae in the procedural and functional aspects of the working of law have together 
contributed in strengthening the role of non-state actors in cases related to censorship. 
These weaknesses have inspired the claimants of hurt sentiments to approach the legal 
route as a means to censor free speech. On the other hand, the labyrinth of law and legal 
process produce an environment of fear and confusion for authors/publishers. Their 
struggle to defend freedom of speech and expression are setback due to the insecurities 
and uncertainties surrounding the legal process and system. It may even result in their 
surrender to the demands of censorship by non-state actors, in order to escape the long 
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and exhausting legal process. The fissures in the law and legal process, therefore, act as 
constraints upon the free exercise of freedom of speech and expression. 
In the first two sections of this chapter, I discuss the procedural and the operative 
dimensions of the legal process which impact free speech cases. The procedural 
dimensions relate to those aspects of law’s working which are not directly related to the 
functioning of the court but still have severe ramifications on the overall judicial 
experience of the authors/publishers who reach the court, either defending their freedom 
of speech and expression, or being criminally charged for offending the religious 
sentiments of others. In this section I discuss three such dimensions: a) the phenomenon 
of “spurious charging” and “overcharging”; b) the liberty of the complainant to lodge a 
case in any part of the country; and c) the issue of delay in judgment. These aspects 
pave the way for harassment of the author/publisher in different forms. This may range 
from the issue of financial burden in order to pay for advocates in lengthy judicial 
process, to psychological distress produced by multiple appearances in the courts. In the 
second section of the chapter I discuss the functional dimension of legal process that act 
as hurdle to freedom of speech and expression. Here I concentrate primarily on the 
handling of the free speech cases in the court rooms. I show that the experience of case 
laws related to free speech indicate that the approach of the judiciary, both at the High 
Court and the Supreme Court, towards free speech cases have only added to the already 
existing ambiguity related to the language and the interpretation of the statutory laws 
governing freedom of speech and expression cases. The analysis in the two sections is 
based on a study of thirty two court cases related to contentious books, claimed to be 
religiously offensive during the period 1947-2010. It includes an extensive list of cases 
drawn from All India Reporter (AIR) and other records. I have tried to include almost 
all the court cases on the subject but have primarily concentrated on those cases which 
recur in discussions in the courtrooms as well as in the written judgments as precedents. 
Though I do not claim that the list of cases is exhaustive, I am convinced that it 
represents the most important cases on the subject, and consideration of this set of cases 
provides a clear sense about the trends that I want to highlight as part of my argument in 
this chapter. 
177 
In the last part of the chapter, the case of pulping of Wendy Doniger’s book The 
Hindus: An Alternative History by its publisher Penguin is used as an example to 
illustrate how the uncertainties attached to law and the legal process act as hurdle in the 
free exercise of freedom of speech and expression. On the other hand, such 
uncertainities also act as a motivation for non-state actors to use legal recourse against 
publications they consider offensive to their religious sentiments. Both these aspects 
converge together, I argue, to create an environment for “public self-censorship.”
484
    
2. The Procedural Dimensions of Legal Process as Hurdle to Freedom 
of Speech and Expression  
The procedural dimensions refer here to both the process through which the cases 
related to contentious publications arrive in the court room as well as the procedural 
aspects of functioning of the courts. In this section I highlight three important issues 
that impact freedom of speech and expression in significant ways, and ensure that 
directly or indirectly the legal process acts as hurdle in its free exercise. This includes 
the following issues:  i) spurious charging and overcharging; ii) the tendency to file case 
against the author/publisher in different parts of the country; and iii) the delay in 
administering justice. The first two aspects are related to pre-courtroom hurdles but 
once the case reaches the stage where formal legal process begins the courts invariably 
take a long period of time to deliver judgment. All these factors contribute in a general 
sense to making the process itself a form of punishment for the author/publisher, 
thereby demoralizing and dissuading them from seeking legal recourse when such 
freedom is curtailed by either the state or non-state actors.
485
 On the contrary, the legal 
                                                           
484
  This concept was developed by Philip Cook and Conrad Heilmann. See, Cook and Heilmann, “Two 
Types of Self-Censorship,” 178-196. They differentiated between public and private self-censorship 
based on who the censors and who the censee were.  
485
  See, Dhavan, Publish and be Damned, 223. Dhavan calls this phenomenon “Process as Punishment”, 
to explain how the long legal process harasses authors/publishers/painters who are targeted by the 
socio-religious groups, who in the name of hurt sentiments create hurdles for their freedom of 
expression. The sense of alienation from the legal process is reflected in the fact that some 
authors/publishers, as in Wendy Doniger’s case (discussed later in the chapter) agree for out-of-court 
settlement of the issue with the non-state actors. 
178 
process becomes an easy option for non-state actors to harass the author/publisher and 
to force them to agree to their demands for censorship. 
2.1. Spurious Charging and Overcharging  
The phenomenon of spurious charging and overcharging are related to vagueness of 
law as well as the tendency among government authorities to react under pressure and 
act in order to avoid immediate threats to public order. Spurious charging refers to 
instances where the police register cases under different sections of laws without 
being sure about the legal validity of such laws in the cases. Overcharging includes 
framing multiple accusations in a single case. It may result in charges being framed 
against authors and publications under sections of law which might not even be 
relevant in that case. The vagueness of both constitutional and statutory laws 
regarding freedom of speech and expression, disallow the policeman to be sure about 
which laws should be invoked in a particular case. To add to it, the pressure exerted 
by the groups, who claim that their religious sentiments are hurt by the publications, 
leaves it as the legal prerogative of the executive to decide upon the sections to be 
invoked, and to register a FIR (First Information Report) on that basis. One of the 
aspects about statutory laws governing freedom of speech and expression in India, as 
many legal scholars have also noted, is that the kind of offences that fall under their 
purview are “cognizable,” and “non-bailable.”
486
 This means that the government 
officials do not require any form of prior approval either from the state government or 
the judiciary to act in such cases. Further, the “non-bailable” nature of offence ensures 
that the accused has to face trial and can only be granted bail after the matter is 
debated in the court. So, the investigation and opinion of the officer on duty becomes 
central in such cases, which might be affected by the pressure being asserted by the 
complaining party. Legal commentators have observed that the police use these 
provisions as tools to avoid any kind of altercation in the public order situation arising 
                                                           
486
  Important statutory laws like 295 (A), 153 (A), and 505 (2), fall under this category. See, Narrain, 
“Harm in Hate Speech Laws,” 41-42; Bhatia, Offend, 139-145. 
179 
due to contentious publications. At the same time it also ensures that even if all the 
charges against the publication and the author/publisher do not stand in the court of 
law, the accused party could still be found guilty under some section of the law.
487
 A 
study of the 32 cases (mentioned earlier), related to publications considered as 
vilifying religious sentiments, shows that in most of the cases where criminal charges 
were invoked, the executive accused the guilty of violating multiple sections of the 
penal codes. In most of the cases, section 153(A) was invoked together with sections 
295(A) and 298. It was left to the judiciary to decide whether the case fell within the 
legal brackets defined by any of these provisions. In the courtroom, the judges 
pronounced their verdict based on their assessment of each of these sections under 
which the author or publisher was charged. In most of the charges framed, the courts 
found the publishers and authors not guilty. Further, as the accusation against the 
publisher/author under criminal charges, and the case of forfeiture of their 
publication, form  two different cases, the publishers/authors have to appear for trials 
in both these cases separately.
488
 This meant extra expenditure both in terms of time 
and resources for the authors and publishers to defend their position.      
2.2. The Liberty to lodge Case against the Book or Author/Publisher in any part 
of the Country  
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 under section 19 allows that a case may be 
instituted either in the jurisdiction in which the defendant resides or carries on 
business or where tort was committed. This means that a book published in India in 
any part of the country irrespective of the place where the author/publisher reside, or 
where the work was indeed published, could be accused of the hurting sentiments of 
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author/publisher to approach the court under section 96 of CrPC, if they want the notification be 
revoked and publication should be relieved of charges.  
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people in any other part of the country, wherever the publication may have been made 
available. On this basis, a case could be filed in the local court or a complaint lodged 
in the local police station of that area. It further means that if an author resided in 
Delhi, and such complaints or cases were lodged against him/her in Mumbai, he/she 
would have to visit the courts in the state of Maharashtra to defend him/herself. Take 
for example, the case of Historian D. N. Jha’s book Holy Cow: Beef in Indian Dietary 
Conditions. Even before the book was officially released, it became controversial with 
regard to its subject matter.
489
 Jain Seva Sangh, a Hyderabad based organization 
dedicated to the propagation and protection of Jainism, filed a civil suit against the 
author and CB Publishers, the publisher of the book, in a civil court in Hyderabad. 
The author, who was a Professor at the University of Delhi, had to travel to 
Hyderabad to appear in the court, in order to defend his position.
490
 Similarly, in the 
controversy over the NCERT textbook on History (discussed in chapter 4), the 
petition was filed in the Punjab and Haryana High Court, and historian Bipan 
Chandra, who was one of the respondents in the case and was based in Delhi, had to 
appear in the court at Chandigarh, each time he was summoned. This legal provision 
therefore becomes a source for harassment if it is used against any author/publisher. 
At times, as has been demonstrated by legal scholar Rajeev Dhavan, this legal 
provision is used consciously by non-state actors, who claim hurt sentiments due to 
the publication, to put pressure on the author/publisher, so that they render submission 
to the alleged demands of the non-state actors.
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489
  The book discussed, with the help of historical evidence, how beef had been an essential component of 
Indian dietary habits since ancient times; and this practise, he argued, was present among all religions, 
including Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism. Before the book was released, a Member of Parliament from 
the right-wing BJP, R. S. Rawat, wrote to union Home Ministry demanding a ban on the book and the 
arrest of the author and publisher. See, “Book on beef eating runs into trouble,” Hindu, August 9, 2001. 
490
  Sheela Reddy, “A Brahmin’s Cow Tales,” Outlook, September 17, 2001. The court issued a 
temporary stay on the publication of the book. Though, the stay was lifted after a year of judicial 
process, the publisher, fearing further controversy, and prosecution, refused to publish the book. As a 
result Jha had to look for another publisher and the book was published later by London based Verso 
publishers, under a new title, The Myth of the Holy Cow.  
491
  Dhavan, Publish and be Damned, 173. 
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2.3. The Issue of Delay in Judgment  
The amount of time each case takes in the Indian judicial process has been a significant 
concern for the justice delivery system.
492
 In the case of contentious publications, this 
delay also means that the relevance of the publication declines with time. In order to 
understand the delay in the courts I examined a data set of 32 cases related to both 
punitive and preventive laws that appeared in the High Courts and the Supreme Court 
during the period 1947-2010. These cases were related to publications that were deemed 
controversial owing to their comments on religious subjects. From the table given below, 
which indicates the Date, Month and Year (based on availability) of government 
notification or registration of case, and the date on which the High Court or the Supreme 
Court delivered the final judgment in the case., it is clear that on an average it took 2.63 
years for the High Court to deliver judgement in all such cases, with an average of 2.35 
years in cases under section 96 of CrPC
493
 (which is related to challenge against 
proscription order of the state), and an average of 3.06 years for cases under section 
295(A) and section 153(A) (is related to criminal charges against the author or the 
publisher). The time taken by the High Court varies from 1 month in a case to 7 years 2 
months. Similarly, if the case is further appealed in the Supreme Court, the average time 
taken for a final judgement on the subject is 6.87 years. This data clearly reflects that the 
legal process is exhausting. The fact that in each case the court judgment finally arrives 
after several rounds of hearings, where both the plaintiff and the accused need to be 
present, means that it is a constant source of difficulty for the author or publisher who 
wishes to defend him/herself or his/her work. This process requires both- the expenditure 
on advocates who argue the case in the courts, as well as the loss of valuable time for the 
author/publisher, since whereby he/she has to be present in the courts for the hearings – 
which as my evidence indicates, can continue for years. 
                                                           
492
  This is not unique to cases related to the subject of freedom of expression cases. There have been 
various reasons cited for such delay like number of judges in the judiciary among others. For details 
on such concerns see, Law Commission of India’s 77
th
 Report titled, Delay and Arrears in Trial 
Courts, November 1978, lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/51-100/report77.pdf; Nick Robinson et al., 
“Interpreting the Constitution: Supreme Court Constitution Benches Since Independence,” Economic 
and Political Weekly 46, no. 9 (2011), 27; Abhinav Chandrachud, “An Empirical Study of the 
Supreme Court’s Composition,” Economic and Political Weekly 46, no. 1 (2011), 71-78. 
493
  Note that the maximum time allowed for a complainant to file case against the government’s 
notification for forfeiture is two months since the notification order is made public.  
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Table 1: Includes list of cases, the law primarily invoked in the court in each case, year of issuance of notification, date of delivery of final judgment and 
the time taken by the courts in each case 
S.No. Case Section of IPC/CrPC 
(primary charge as 
invoked in court) 
Year of Notification/ 
Order of arrest 
Date of Final verdict 
at High Court 
Date of Final verdict 
at Supreme Court 
Time taken in 
High Court 
Time taken in 
Supreme Court 
1. Shiv Ram Dass Udasin v. The Punjab 
State 
99(A) {equivalent to 
95 of current CrPC} 
29/02/1952 05/04/1954 NA 2 years 2 month  
2. Ramji Lal Modi v. The State of UP 295(A) IPC 12/12/1952 25/10/1956 05/04/1957 3 years 10 month 4 years 4 month 
3. Harnam Das v. State of Uttar Pradesh 99(A) CrPC 30/07/1953 07/05/1957 27/04/1961 3 years 10 month 7 years 9 month 
4. N. Veerabrahm-am v. State of Andhra 
Pradesh 
99(A) CrPC 23/03/1958 12/03/1959 NA 1 years  
5. Baba Khalil Ahmad v.The State 99(A) 1956 (Only year 
mentioned) 
20/04/1960 NA 4 years  
6. The State of Mysore v. Henry Rodigues 
and Another 
295(A) January 1959 11/10/1961 NA 2 years 9 month  
7. Public Prosecutor v. P. Ramasami 295(A) February 1961 16/10/1963 NA 2 years 8 month  
8. Mohammad Khalid v. The Chief 
Commissioner, Delhi 
99(A) 27/11/1959 10/12/1962 02/03/1967 3 years 1 month 7 years 4 month 
9. Sant Das Maheshwari v. Babu Ram 
Jadoun and others 
Writ petition under 
article 226 
27/03/1961 06/02/1968 NA 6 years 11 month  
10. Ramlal Puri v. State of Madhya Pradesh 99(A) CrPC 28/09/1970 24/12/1970 NA 3 month  
11. Chinna Annamalai v. The state of Tamil 
Nadu 
Writ petition 12/02/1971 24/02/1971 NA 1 month  
12. Babu Rao Patel v. State of Delhi 153(A) IPC March 1968 14/08/1973 21/02/1980 5 years 5 month 11 years 11 month 
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S.No. Case Section of IPC/CrPC 
(primary charge as 
invoked in court) 
Year of Notification/ 
Order of arrest 
Date of Final verdict 
at High Court 
Date of Final verdict 
at Supreme Court 
Time taken in 
High Court 
Time taken in 
Supreme Court 
13. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Lalai Singh 
Yadav 
99(A) CrPC 08/12/1969 19/01/1971 16/09/1976 1 year 2 month 6 years 9 month 
14. Lalai Singh Yadav v. State of Uttar 
Pradesh 
99(A) CrPC 26/08/1970 14/05/1971 NA 9 month  
15. M/S Varsha Publications Pvt. Ltd. v. State 
of Maharashtra and Others 
95 CrPC 31/07/1982 03/05/1983 NA 8 month  
16. Nand Kishore Singh and etc. v. State of 
Bihar and another 
95 CrPC 29/10/1983 04/09/1984 NA 11 month  
17. Chandmal Chopra v. State of West Bengal Writ petition for 
proscription under sec 
95 CrPC 
March, 1985 24/11/1987 NA 2 years 8 month  
18. Master Aman Preet Singh and others v. 
Govt. of India and others 
PIL (Public Interest 
Litigation) for removal 
of content 
1996 19/04/1996 NA NA NA 
19. G. Jairaj and others v. State of Karnataka 
and others 
Writ petition to apply 
section 95 
June, 1994 25/07/1997 NA 3 years 1 month  
20. Baragur Ramchandra-ppa and others v.  
State of Karnataka and another 
95 CrPC 27/03/1997 16/04/1998 02/05/2007 1 year 1 month 10 year 2 month 
21. The Trustees of Safdar Hasmee Memorial 
Trust v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi 
95 CrPC 21/08/1993 16/07/2001 NA 7 years 11 month  
22. Zac Poonen v. Hidden Treasure Literature 295(A) IPC 1998 27/07/2001 NA 3 years  
23. Yashwant Venilal Sanghvi v. Sahdevsinh 
Dilubha Zala 
295(A) IPC January, 2004 16/08/2004 NA 1 year 7 month  
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S.No. Case Section of IPC/CrPC 
(primary charge as 
invoked in court) 
Year of Notification/ 
Order of arrest 
Date of Final verdict 
at High Court 
Date of Final verdict 
at Supreme Court 
Time taken in 
High Court 
Time taken in 
Supreme Court 
24. Sujato Bhadra v. State of West Bengal 95 CrPC 28/11/2003 22/09/2005 NA 1 year 10 month  
25. State of Maharashtra and others v. 
Sanghraj Damodar Rupawate and others 
95 CrPC 20/12/2006 26/04/2007 09/07/2010 4 month 3 year 7 month 
26. R. V. Bhasin v. 2 Marine Drive Police 
Station 
95 CrPC 09/03/2007 06/01/2010 NA 2 years 8 month  
27. Prasad Jacob (US citizen) v. State of 
Kerala 
153(A) IPC 29/03/2010 06/04/2010 NA 1 month  
28. Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of 
Maharashtra 
153(A) IPC 23/02/2004 06/05/2004 05/04/2007 3 month 3 years 2 month 
29. Hulikal Nataraju v. State of Karnataka PETITION- 153(A) 
IPC 
27/02/2006 13/09/2010 NA 4 years 7 month  




11/06/2010 09/04/2013 NA 2 years 10 month  
31. Maninder Singh and another v. State of 
Punjab and another 
295(A) IPC 09/09/2010 02/08/2013 NA 2 years 11 month  
32. Piara Singh Bhaniara v. State of Punjab 
and another 
95 CrPC 27/09/2001 11/11/2008 NA 7 years 2 month  
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3. The Functional Dimensions of Legal Process as Hurdle to Freedom 
of Speech and Expression 
The issues discussed in the previous section are not unique to cases related exclusively 
to freedom of speech and expression, but form part of the legal process in general. The 
attempt has been to show how these issues impacts the author/publisher against whom 
the accusations are filed, or who seek to defend their publication against government’s 
action. In the present section I highlight functional aspects of the courts that act as 
impediments against cases related specifically to freedom of speech and expression and 
particularly related to contentious publications. Two issues that will be discussed in this 
section are: i) The low importance rendered to the cases related to freedom of speech 
and expression by the courts; and ii) inconsistency in judgments creating confusion 
regarding precedent thereby encouraging high degree of subjectivity.  
3.1. Court’s Interest in Free Speech Cases 
Abhinav Chandrachud in a recent study of free speech cases in the Supreme Court has 
shown that these cases don’t fall under “high priority” status on the docket of the 
Supreme Court of India.
494
 Chandrachud undertook a quantitative study of 107 cases 
related to freedom of speech and expression under section 19(1)(a) untill November 2011. 
The conclusions were based on a set of structural and behavioural observations related to 
the treatment of these cases in the apex court. Structural observations included such 
aspects as instances where the Chief Justice formed part of the judgment bench, and size 
of the panel which heard the cases. As is the general trend, the Chief Justice forms the 
panels for each case, and it is argued by legal scholars that he forms a part of those panels 
which he considers involve the most important cases.
495
 Chandrachud’s study shows that 
Chief Justices have formed at part of the panel of judges only in 40.1% cases related to 
                                                           
494
  See, Abhinav Chandrachud, “Speech, Structure, and Behavior on the Supreme Court of India,” 
Columbia Journal of Asian Law 25, no. 2 (2012), 222-74. 
495
  Robinson, et al., “Interpreting the Constitution,” 31. Robinson argues that the apex court in India are 
“Chief Justice-dominant” and highlights the important role that Chief Justice plays in the court.  
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free speech, and the possibility of the Chief Justice forming a part of such panel has 
significantly declined over years – from a high of 85.7% during the 1950s down to just 
3.8% during the period 2000-2010. Similarly, Chandrachud shows that the size of panel 
for hearing such cases is extremely small and at most times it was a two member bench 
that heard cases related to free speech (in 44.8% cases). Constitutional benches of five or 
above are a rarity in such cases.
496
 These observations conform to Nick Robinson’s 
assessment about the size of Supreme Court benches in all cases related to constitutional 
subjects. While scholars tend to agree that the smaller size of benches could also be due to 
the increasing number of cases, they also are unanimous in the view that whenever a 
particular case is held to be important, it is referred to a larger bench.
497
 The behavioural 
observations that Chandrachud gleans in his study include aspects like the judges’ voting 
pattern in each case and the registry of concurring and dissenting opinions. A large degree 
of homogeneity and a smaller number of dissents or concurrence statements is traced 
back to the idea that the degree of deliberation is less compared to other cases and also 
seen as an indication that other judges concur with the senior-most judges’ views, who is 
most often responsible for writing the judgment on behalf of the bench. So, Chandrachud 
shows that in 51.4% of cases related to freedom of speech and expression, the senior 
judge writes the judgment on behalf of the bench; and only in 15.8% of cases do we find 
evidence of concurring judgments by other judges; and in only 10. 2% cases where 
dissenting opinion were registered. These findings of Chandrachud are indicative of the 
importance the apex court attaches to free speech cases. I applied a similar method to test 
if the conclusions reached were in conformity with studies of scholars like Robinson and 
Chandrachud. However, my own data set – which includes both Supreme Court as well 
as High Court cases – differs from studies by Robinson and Chandrachud, which only 
examine cases heard in the Supreme Court. Further, I have focused only on cases related 
to contentious publications on religious grounds, unlike Robinson who provided a 
detailed study about constitution benches in Supreme Court, or Chandrachud who worked 
with all cases related to section 19(1)(a).  
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  As article 145(3) of the Indian Constitution suggests, the “minimum number of Judges who are to sit 
for the purpose of deciding any case involving a substantial question of law,” has to be five.  
497
  Robinson, et al., “Interpreting the Constitution,” 27-31. 
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My own research suggests that Chandrachud’s and Robinson’s observations were indeed 
applicable even to free speech cases in High Courts. For example, in my study of 32 cases 
(as reflected in the table below), the Chief Justice formed part of the bench only six times, 
once in the Supreme Court and five times in High Courts. However, my conclusions 
about the size of the Court benches differ from other studies. Section 96 makes it 
mandatory that any case where the proscription notification of the government is 
challenged, a bench of three High Court judges will hear such pleas and therefore most of 
the cases in my study consisted of three judges. But in other cases, the benches consisted 
of either one or two judges, with only two instances where the case was sent for hearing 
to a bench consisting five members (both times in the Supreme Court in years 1957 and 
1961). So, Chandrachud’s observation that the sizes of benches hearing free speech cases 
are usually small is also borne out by my own research. Similarly his points about 
behavioural aspects are equally valid. I found that only in five instances (all in the High 
Courts) did judges other than the one who wrote the judgment registered their 
concurrence, and in only two instances (both in High Courts) did the other judge 
dissented. In only five such cases where the opinion was registered, it was supported by a 
detailed explanation of the judges’ position. The list of cases where concurrence by other 
judges was registered includes: Nand Kishore Singh, Shiv Ram Dass Udasin, Baba Khalil 
Ahmad, N. Veerabrahmam, and Sujato Bhadra. Out of these, in Shiv Ram Dass Udasin 
and in Baba Khalil Ahmad, only the concurrence of the other judges was registered, 
without any explanation. The two cases where a dissenting opinion was registered 
included one in the Andhra High Court by Justice Bheemshankaran in N. Veerabrahmam, 
and another in the Supreme Court by Justice Das Gupta in Harnam Das case. In all other 
cases the judges preferred either to remain silent or were completely convinced both by 
the opinion of the judge writing the judgment and by his grounds for forming that 
opinion. The statement of concurrence or dissent is important because it helps us to 
understand why the judges agreed or disagreed with the judge who pronounced the 
judgment. It can add to the description of the case and also suggest the grounds on which 
the judgment was arrived. A complete silence on the part of other judges does not 
contribute to the analysis of the judgment in any way, and also indicates that the other 
judges might not have taken equal interest in the case as the judge who was expected to 
write the judgment on their behalf. So based on earlier studies like that of Chandrachud 
and Robinson, and their appositeness to my own analysis, it is indicative that cases related 
to freedom of speech and expression do not attract particular interest from the judiciary.
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Table 2: Including details of cases along with size of bench, presence of Chief Justice and whether it included opinion of judges other than the one who wrote the 
judgment.
498
 Years mentioned in the table are according to the year the final judgment was delivered.   
S.No. Case & year of controversy Sections of statutory laws 
invoked 
Size of bench of judges 
hearing the case 
Was the Chief Justice a 
part of the panel? (Yes/No) 
Whether judges other than the one writing 
judgment register their oncurrence/dissent? 
1. Shiv Ram Dass Udasin v. The Punjab State 
(1954) 
Section 99(A)  
(Currently section 95) 
3 No Yes. Only agreement, no explanation 
2. Ramji Lal Modi v. The State of UP (1956) Section 295(A) IPC 5 Yes No 
3. Harnam Das v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1957) Section 99(A)  
(Currently section 95) 
5 No Yes. Each judge expressed their opinion and 
explanation 
4. Harnam Das v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1961) Section 99(A)  
(Currently section 95) 
3 No No 
5. Baba Khalil Ahmad v. The State (1960) Section 99(A)  
(Currently section 95) 
3 No Yes. Only agreement, no explanation 
6. N. Veerabrahmam v. State of Andhra Pradesh 
(1959) 
Section 99(A)  
(Currently section 95) 
3 Yes Yes. Each judge expressed their opinion and 
explanation 
7. The State of Mysore v. Henry Rodigues and 
Another (1961) 
Section 295(A) IPC 2 No No 
8. Mohammad Khalid v. The Chief Commissioner, 
Delhi (1967) 
Section 99(A)  
(Currently section 95) 
3 No No 
9. Public Prosecutor v. P. Ramasami (1963) Section 295(A) IPC 1 No NA 
10. Sant Das Maheshwari v. Babu Ram Jadoun 
and others (1968) 
Section 295(A) IPC & 
Section 95 
2 No No 
11. Babu Rao Patel v. State of Delhi (1973) (in 
High Court) 
Section 153(A) 1 No NA 
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  The data set is of 32 cases. However the difference in serial number is because in three cases, I have also included the data of the same cases appearing both in the High Court 
as well as Supreme Court. 
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S.No. Case & year of controversy Sections of statutory laws 
invoked 
Size of bench of judges 
hearing the case 
Was the Chief Justice a 
part of the panel? (Yes/No) 
Whether judges other than the one writing 
judgment register their oncurrence/dissent? 
12. Babu Rao Patel v. State of Delhi (1980) (in 
Supreme Court) 
Section 153(A) 2 No No 
13. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Lalai Singh Yadav 
(1976) 
Section 99(A)  
(Currently section 95) 
3 No No 
14. Lalai Singh Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh 
(1971) 
Section 99(A)  
(Currently section 95) 
3 No No 
15. Ramlal Puri v. State of Madhya Pradesh 
(1970) 
Section 99(A)  
(Currently section 95) 
3 No Yes. Each judge expressed their opinion and 
explanation 
16. Chinna Annamalai v. The state of Tamil Nadu 
(1971) 
Section 99(A)  
(Currently section 95) 
3 No No 
17. M/S Varsha Publications Pvt. Ltd. v. State of 
Maharashtra and Others (1983) 
Section 95 3 Yes No 
18. Nand Kishore Singh and etc. v. State of Bihar 
and another (1984) 
Section 95 3 Yes Yes. Each judge expressed their opinion and 
explanation 
19. Chandmal Chopra v. State of West Bengal 
(1987) 
Section 95 2 Yes Yes. Each judge expressed their opinion and 
explanation 
20. The Trustees of Safdar Hasmee Memorial 
Trust v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi (2001) 
Section 95 3 Yes No 
21. G. Jairaj and others v. State of Karnataka and 
others (1997) 
Section 95 2 No No 
22. Baragur Ramchandra-ppa and others v.  State 
of Karnataka and another (1998) (in the High 
Court) 
Section 95 3 No No 
23. Sri Baragur Ramchandra-ppa and others v.  
State of Karnataka and another (2007) (in 
Supreme Court) 
Section 95 2 No No 
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S.No. Case & year of controversy Sections of statutory laws 
invoked 
Size of bench of judges 
hearing the case 
Was the Chief Justice a 
part of the panel? (Yes/No) 
Whether judges other than the one writing 
judgment register their oncurrence/dissent? 
24. Master Aman Preet Singh and others v. Govt. 
of India and others (1996) 
Section 95 2 No No 
25. Zac Poonen v. Hidden Treasure Literature 
(2001) 
Section 295(A), 505, 508 
IPC 
2 No No 
26. Piara Singh Bhaniara v. State of Punjab and 
another (2008) 
Section 95 1 No No 
27. Sujato Bhadra v. State of West Bengal (2005) Section 95 3 No Yes. Each judge expressed their opinion and 
explanation 
28. Yashwant Venilal Sanghvi v. Sahdevsinh 
Dilubha Zala (2004) 
Section 295(A), 505, IPC 1 No NA 
29. Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra 
(2007) 
Section 153, 153(A), 34 
IPC 
3 No No 
30. State of Maharashtra and others v. Sanghraj 
Damodar Rupawate and others (2010) 
Section 95 2 No No 
31. Hulikal Nataraju v. State of Karnataka (2010) Section 153, 153(A) IPC 1 No No 
32. R. V. Bhasin v. 2 Marine Drive Police Station 
(2010) 
Section 95 3 No No 
33. Prasad Jacob (US citizen) v. State of Kerala 
(2010) 
Section 153(A) IPC 1 No No 
34. Father C. R. Prabhu v. State of Jharkhand and 
another (2013) 
Section 153(A) IPC 1 No No 
35. Maninder Singh and another v. State of Punjab 
and another (2013) 
Section 295(A) IPC 1 No No 
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3.2. The Problem of Conflicting and Confusing Precedents 
One of the pressing problems related to the courts’ position on freedom of speech and 
expression cases has been the issue of conflicting and confusing precedents. The 
“doctrine of precedent” allows the courts to provide a legal framework for individuals 
to plan their lives and take decisions based on settled laws. The absence of a settled 
precedence related to law invokes a context of confusion and doubt. Further, lack of 
coherence also undermines the rule of law whereby two litigants are not treated equally. 
This makes the operation of the law unequal and uncertain.
499
 The conflicting 
precedents in the higher courts also cascade down  to the lower courts, and have 
significant impact on the decisions taken at the level of lower courts. Confusion and 
indeterminancy tend to produce two lines of precedents, which lead to unpredictability 
of outcomes of the cases. In the present section I shall focus on this aspect of the 
courtroom to discuss the broad themes around which such cases are dealt with in the 
courtroom, in order to make evident the space for creative interpretation that such 
differences allow. In order to highlight inconsistency, I present an analysis of the same 
32 cases as mentioned in the table earlier.    
The debates and decisions of the courts on various cases of censorship can be 
categorized into two types. Firstly, the cases where the court looked into the procedural 
aspects as mentioned in section 95 of CrPC. This includes the operative aspect about 
justification of government’s action, as well as the scrutiny of the basis on which 
decisions are made. Second, there are the cases where the court examined the validity 
and applicability of the government’s action in the light of the publication in question. 
This has often included an evaluation of the order of the state government based on the 
evidences presented. It largely revolves around the questions of “intention” of the 
author or mens rea, the nature of the subject dealt in the book, and the assessment of the 
method employed in making sense of the book’s contents. On all these above 
mentioned grounds, the courts have had diverse opinions, which have resulted in similar 
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  Pratap Bhanu Mehta, “India’s Judiciary: The Promise of Uncertainty,” in Public Institutions in India: 
Performance and Design, ed. Devesh Kapur and Pratap Bhanu Mehta (New Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 158-93. Also see, Arghya Sengupta, “Inconsistent Decisions,” Frontline, May 3, 2013. 
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books meeting quite different fates – which has only served to increased ambiguity 
about a settled position. A more detailed analysis will show the range of variance. 
3.2.1. The Operative Part of Government’s Action 
The courts have generally held that it is the state government’s prerogative to decide 
whether it believes that a book falls under the prohibitive sections or not. Making its 
position clear in this respect, the court in Sri Baragur Ramachandrappa held that as 
section 95 was preventive in nature, the government could take action if it pre-empts 
any danger to public order and there was no need for the actual occurrence of such 
incidents.
500
 This attitude is also reflected in the cases of Nand Kishore Singh
501
 and R. 
V. Bhasin
502
.  Though it is also explicit from the law that under section 95 the state 
government needs to issue a notification for any ban or forfeiture, there have been 
diverse opinions about the accepted content of such impugned notifications and in 
different cases the proscription and forfeiture orders were set aside citing the lack of 
necessary inclusions in the notification.
503
 Through the content of the orders, the court 
tries to look at the “application of mind” in the decision. In the Sanghraj Damodar 
Rupawate case the Supreme Court held that it was important to mention the grounds on 
which the government formed the opinion of forfeiture. It should also include the 
“conclusion of facts” on which opinion was based, so that the court can base its 
judgment on evaluating those facts.
504
 The Andhra High Court further held in the N. 
Veerabrahmam case that it was not the work of the court to make such order of 
forfeiture, “but only to examine the correctness of any such order made by the 
government.”
505
 In Mohammad Khalid the Supreme Court extended the net and held 
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  Sri Baragur Ramachandrappa, 5 S.C.C. 11. 
501
  Nand Kishore Singh, A.I.R. 1986 Pat. 98. In this case the court also made it explicit that the “clear 
and present danger” doctrine as used in US cannot be applied in the Indian case. 
502
  R. V. Bhasin, Criminal Application No. 1421 of 2007. 
503
  Harnam Das, 1961 A.I.R 1662; M/S Varsha Publications, Cri LJ 1446.   
504
  Sanghraj Damodar Rupawate, Civil Appeal of 2010 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 8931 of 2007).  
505
  N. Veerabrahmam, AIR 1959 AP 572. 
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that mere opinion, or grounds of opinion, was not enough. The objecting communities 
as well as objectionable passages should also be clearly mentioned in order to 
substantiate the basis of such opinion formation. Any absence of such reference could 
lead to such notification being set aside.
506
 However, quite contrarily, in N. 
Veerabrahmam and Nand Kishore Singh, the respective High Courts held that though 
opinion should be mentioned, an absence of grounds of opinion cannot be reason for 
not proscribing the book.
507
 As under section 99-D (96 of the current CrPC), the court, 
it was argued, was expected to either uphold or dismiss such decision based on 
evaluation of the content of the book.
508
 The mention of grounds of opinion can 
therefore only be indicative and not a conclusive aspect of the notification order. 
3.2.2. The Evaluative Aspects of Government’s Decision  
The second set of cases in my study involved those where the court evaluated the order 
of the government in the light of evidence, to find whether the case in question came 
under the preventive clause of those sections as mentioned in the order. One of the 
important aspects of all such laws including 153(A) and 295(A) is the presence of 
“deliberate and malicious intentions” on the part of the author/publisher. Though courts 
broadly agreed with the necessity of this clause, there are different views about how 
such intentions could be extracted and about tests that could enable such examination. 
In different cases the court held that the whole book and not isolated passages should be 
taken into consideration to make sense of the intention of the author.
509
 However, in 
other cases it was also held that it did not prevent the state from taking decisions based 




                                                           
506
  Mohammad Khalid, A.I.R. 1968 Delhi 13.  
507
  N. Veerabrahmam, 1959 A.P. 572; Nand Kishore Singh, A.I.R. 1986 Pat. 98.  
508
  This position was also upheld by Justice Das Gupta in his dissenting note in the case of Harnam Das, 
1961 A.I.R 1662. 
509
  Sujato Bhadra, 39 A.I.C. 239; Nand Kishore Singh, A.I.R. 1986 Pat. 98.  
510
  Sanghraj Damodar Rupawate, Civil Appeal of 2010 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 8931 of 2007).  
194 
Further, in N. Veerabrahmam, the Andhra High Court held that the “intention of the 
author has to be gathered primarily from the language used.”
511
 It was also mentioned 
by the Allahabad High Court in Baba Khalil Ahmad that if language was problematic, 
there was no need to look for any other evidences. No defence could stand for 
vituperative and offensive language.
512
 In Sanghraj Damodar Rupawate the court 
extended the test to include content and import of offending passages. So, if passages 
were drawn from “folklore, tradition or history something in extenuation could perhaps 
be said for the author.”
513
 In Nand Kishore Singh, the court maintained that only the 
language, the import of offending passages and the audience to which the book is 
catered to, should be kept in mind and no other external evidences should be 
considered.
514
 However in Sujato Bhadra, the court extensively depended on the 
external context the book was referring to.
515
 The importance of external circumstances 
was also upheld in Manzar Sayeed Khan, where the Supreme Court held that the 
intention could be derived from the language of the book as well as the circumstances 
in which the book was written and published.
516
 Similarly, in R. V. Bhasin, the Bombay 
High Court observed that the category of audience that the book is addressing and for 
whom it was intended is equally important to identify the intentions of the author.
517
 It 
would appear, therefore, that there is no fixed criteria about how to make sense about 
the intention of the author even though this is seen as an important aspect of all such 
laws.  
In many cases the court also held that if the intentions were proven to be deliberate and 
malicious, even the claims of truth and history could not be used as excuse to defend 
offensive writings. For example, in Sanghraj Damodar Rupawate the Supreme Court 
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observed that “if the writing is calculated to promote feeling of enmity or hatred, it is no 
defence to a charge under section 153(A) of the IPC that the writing contains a truthful 
kind of past events or is otherwise supported by good authority. Adherence to the strict 
path of history is not by itself a complete defence to a charge under section 153(A) of 
the IPC.”
518
 However, quite contrarily, the Bombay High Court argued in the M/S 
Varsha Publications case that these sections should not be extended so far as to affect 
historical research or writings criticizing religions. The court maintained: 
Different considerations will prevail when we are to consider a scholarly 
article on history and religion based upon research with the help of a 
number of reference books. It will be very difficult for the State to contend 
that a narration of history would promote violence enmity or hatred. If such 
a contention is accepted a day will come when that part of history which is 
unpalatable to a particular religion on the pretext that the publication of 




Another test that the courts use is of “reasonability,” which means that the impact should 
not be judged on the basis of the reaction that is expected out of a believer or an 
emotionally invested  person, rather the effect is “to be judged from standard of 
reasonable, strong minded, firm and courageous.”
520
 So, only works which are considered 
“grossly offensive to reasonable man” should be eligible for proscription or forfeiture.
521
 
However in Baba Khalil Ahmad, the court held that if the content was insulting to some 
sacred figure, it naturally led to a feeling of offense for its followers and hence the content 
itself should be the guide in the subject. Also in Baragur Ramachandrappa, the 
Karnataka High Court made it explicit that “we are concerned with impact of the book on 
the minds of ordinary people with religious beliefs and not discerning intelligentsia.”
522
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The above discussions show that the jurisprudence relating to the ban and forfeiture of 
publications has been chaotic to say the least, and leaves considerable room for subjectivity 
of judges.
523
 In similar cases, the courts have used quite different yardsticks and have come 
up with starkly opposite and irreconcilable conclusions. Such inconsistency has significant 
consequences, both in terms of principles as well as practical aspects. Its impact on the 
principle of precedents has already been discussed. In practical experience, it encourages 
non-state actors to exert pressure on state governments to issue ban orders. In the absence of 
a clear mandate on the subject, the magistrate and the state government consider it better to 
act against the publication, the validity of the action being left to be decided in the court. 
Dhavan views this as “problem solving” politics, whereby, the government “solves” the 
problem of social pressure by imposing the ban, and the court later provides the “legal” 
solution by taking decision on the ban.
524
 The lack of clarity of the judiciary’s position on 
the subject also encourages non-state actors to file criminal cases against authors/publishers 
in the hope that the court’s verdict could run in their favour. From the perspective of the 
author and publisher, both these strategies are particularly intimidating. There is a constant 
fear of loss of civil liberty, punishment, and even imprisonment. Add to this the tiring legal 
process including the duration for verdict, which may take decades, and the whole 
experience in itself can be like a punishment. Even after all that, one can never be sure 
about which side the court’s decision would go. All these facts collate to produce an 
environment where courts and the legal process in general cannot be considered to be 
particularly favourable to the claimants of freedom of speech and expression. The tough 
and exhaustive legal battle in a judiciary where free speech cases are not high in the docket 
of cases and which works in the context of a lack of conclusive precedent, can have a 
lasting impact on the experience of authors/publishers defending their freedom of 
expression.
525
 This also creates an environment of fear and uncertainty where the 
author/publisher often chooses to desist from such engagement at the level of judiciary, and 
instead gives in to the demands of the people who demand censorship either by removing 
controversial sections or by pulping the publication itself. The case of Wendy Doniger’s 
The Hindus is an explicit example.  
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4. The Pulping of Wendy Doniger’s The Hindus: An Alternative 
History: A Case Study 
On February 10, 2014 the district court in Delhi accepted the settlement agreement 
between Penguin Books India Pvt. Ltd. and Dina Nath Batra
526
 of Shiksha Bachao 
Abhiyan Samiti. After a legal battle for four years, the publishers of the book, in an out-
of-court settlement, succumbed to the demands of Batra. Penguin agreed to “recall and 
withdraw” all copies of the book from Indian territory with immediate effect. It also 
promised that it would pulp all the “recalled/withdrawn/unsold copies of the book” at 
their own cost. In return Batra, agreed to withdraw all the civil/criminal cases/complaints 
filed against the author or the publishers of the book.
527
 
The ordeal surrounding Doniger’s book The Hindus began in 2010 when Saraswati 
Research and Education Trust, a right-wing body, started an online petition claiming 
that the book contained factual errors about the historical past as well as vilification of 
Hinduism.
528
 It highlighted sixteen factual errors including distortion of maps, mistakes 
in historical accounts and bibliographic inaccuracies among others. It also cited eight 
passages which it claimed to be highly derogatory, defamatory and offensive to Hindus. 
These concerns were reiterated in a legal notice sent by Batra to the author and the 
publishers of the book in the same year.
529
 He charged the author and publishers of the 
book of consciously misrepresenting the Hindu religion by quoting passages from 
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religious books out of context, distorting facts and providing wrong information. He 
further claimed that the author also promoted obscenity and vulgarity through images 
and writings in the books which were aimed to vilify Hinduism. Doniger’s approach to 
the question of religion, Batra argued, was that of a “woman hungry of sex” and the 
book was written with a “Christian missionary zeal and hidden agenda to denigrate 
Hindus and show their religion in poor light.” The notice asked the author and the 
publisher to seek an “unconditional apology,” “withdraw the said objectionable parts 
from book”, and “undertake not to offend the religious sentiments of the Hindus in 
future.” Failing that, he warned that “legal action under section 153, 153(A), 295(A), 
298, 505(2) of IPC” would be initiated and that he would further ask Hindus to “boycott 
the books published by Penguin Books India Pvt. Ltd.”
530
 When no action was taken in 
response to the legal notice, Batra took the author and the publishers to court and filed 
several civil and criminal suits against them.
531
 After battling the court cases for more 
than four years, the publishers finally decided to give in to the demands of Batra. 
The settlement agreement was criticised by several scholars and intellectuals as 
surrender by the book company to the radical conservative forces thereby weakening 
the battle for freedom of speech and expression.
532
 But here I shall only concentrate on 
the debates surrounding the legal aspects associated with the case. I argue that the fact 
that Penguin agreed to succumb to the legal pressure generated by Batra indicated the 
complex role that law and legal process play in the discourse of censorship. On the one 
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hand it highlights how law and legal process could be used as legitimate tools for 
censorship by those claiming hurt sentiments, and on the other hand it also shows the 
vulnerability experienced by authors and publishers when such pressure is exerted. In 
the process, the practical limits of the theoretical debates surrounding freedom of 
speech and expression were clearly exposed. 
4.1. The Role of Law and the Legal Process in Penguin’s Surrender 
It was not the first time that Dina Nath Batra was using the legal route to censor 
historical work which he considered as objectionable. In 2008, Batra on behalf of 
Shiksha Bachao Andolan Samiti (SBAS) moved the Delhi High Court by requesting it 
to issue orders to University of Delhi to remove A. K. Ramanujan’s essay titled “Three 
Hundred Ramayanas: Five examples and Three Thoughts on Translation” from its 
history syllabus taught at undergraduate level.
533
 The High Court judges decided not to 
interfere in the subject as it was an internal matter of the university and also because 
according to them the court lacked the capacity to judge academic matters. The plea 
was therefore rejected. But Batra filed another civil suit in the Supeme Court. Hearing 
the matter in July 2010, the Supreme Court asked the university to set up an expert 
committee competent to look into the matter. This eventually led to the removal of the 
essay from the syllabus.
534
  
So, Batra had previous experience about how to use legitimate legal means to enforce 
censorship. Unlike the violent mob that threatened authors or vandalized bookstores, 
Batra claimed to be a law abiding citizen, and expressed it to be his legal right to raise 
objections and bring it to the notice of the government and the judiciary if anything 
denigrating his religious beliefs was published and circulated. Batra’s legal counsel 
Monika Arora, justified his act in an article written in Organizer, the mouthpiece of 
right-wing group RSS. Arora argued that the Indian constitution did not allow for 
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unlimited freedom of speech and expression and that “reasonable restrictions” could be 
imposed, which were to be defined on case to case basis by the judiciary.
535
 Therefore, 
Arora argued that Batra was right in bringing these cases to the judiciary and leave it 
upto the judges to take decision about the future of such controversial publications.
536
 It 
is evident that people like Batra use law as a potent weapon in their battle against 
publications they consider hurting their religious sentiments. In fact just after his 
success in the Doniger case, Batra reportedly sent similar legal notices to other 
publishers regarding other books that he thought were offensive to Hindus.
537
 
An equally important aspect related to such incidents of censorship is the effectiveness 
of the legal methods. When the above case of settlement between Penguin and Batra 
became public, legal scholars and practitioners who criticized the company for 
succumbing to legal threats presented two sets of arguments about why they thought the 
step was completely unnecessary. On the one hand, some scholars argued that the 
provisions of Indian law under which civil and criminal charges were registered did not 
even apply to the case. It was therefore liable to be summarily rejected by the courts. 
Noorani claimed that Batra was able to win the battle “with a toy gun.”
538
 He and other 
commentators like V. Venkatesan
539
 believed that Penguin did not receive the right 
legal guidance on the subject because, as Noorani held, “the High Court is there to 
ensure such a dismissal even if the District Judge or the Magistrate or the police did not 
follow the law. If not the Supreme Court would have surely done that.”
540
 They opined 
that instead of surrender, Penguin should have continued the legal battle. Another set of 
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legal scholars, like Saurav Datta, claimed that if Penguin would not have given up, it 
was assured of a legal victory, if not in the lower courts than at least in the Supreme 
Court.
541
 To substantiate this point Datta used cases from Supreme Court where it 
handed a favourable judgment to authors and publishers in similar cases. 
The issues raised by both these sets of commentators are significant. Yet the arguments 
that were offered by either side do not fully convince. One of the primary limitations of 
these analyses is that they completely overlook Penguin’s point of view. Further, as I 
shall show, these arguments, especially in the context of Penguin’s action, missed some 
important facts which are significant. Take Datta’s analysis – a significant analysis 
because it was hailed and cited uncritically by various other scholars and journalists.
542
 
Datta claimed that “the courts have long tradition of protecting freedom of speech by 
upholding the right to express divergent and alternative views on religions even if they 
rile a majority of believers.”
543
 I would argue, however, that Datta’s conclusions are 
based on a selective analysis of court cases, and suffers from severe misreading of the 
facts in cases that he cites as evidence for his conclusions. In the last chapter, I have 
shown how the courts in India have favoured proscription of the books claimed to be 
offensive to religious sentiments of different communities, and therefore Datta is not 
completely right in making such broad claim about the courts’ behaviour, arguing that 
Penguin was assured of a legal victory, if they would have continued the legal battle. 
Even if one could agree that the criminal charges could not stand in the court of law as 
it would have been difficult for the counsel of the plaintiff to show “deliberate and 
malicious intentions” of the author/publisher, nevertheless the civil suit could still go 
against them.
544
 Further, as discussed earlier in this chapter, given the fact that the 
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courts have been inconsistent in terms of doctrines used to decide each case, it is quite 
difficult to predict, whether or not the courts would have upheld the criminal charges.  
Coming back to the arguments of legal commentators like Venkatesan and Noorani, 
though it is difficult to comment whether Penguin was misled by its legal advisors, it is 
clear that its concern were more than just concerning whether the court would uphold 
the criminal charges levelled against the author and the company. This is evident from 
the statements released by Doniger and Penguin India Ltd. in response to the criticism 
they faced after the settlement agreement. It was maintained in both the responses that 
the uncertainty over the interpretation of section 295(A) was one of the primary reasons 
for their out-of-court settlement with Batra. Doniger called the statutory laws “the true 
villain” in the case, as it threatened to “jeopardize the physical safety of any publisher, 
no matter how ludicrous the accusation brought against a book.”
545
 The company feared 
that “the Indian Penal Code, and in particular section 295(A) of that code, will make it 
increasingly difficult for any Indian publisher to uphold international standards of free 
expression without deliberately placing itself outside the law.”
546
 The concern was not 
only with the vague and broad language used in such law but also the ambiguity over its 
probable interpretations in the courts. Doniger and her publisher, Penguin, were equally 
worried about the ambiguity of the legal process. Doniger argues that in the Indian 
context “if you got the wrong judge…. you’d be convicted just for publishing a 
statement that you had good reason to believe might well offend someone.”
547
 Penguin, 
on its part pointed that it was obligated to respect the law of the land, “however 
intolerant and restrictive those laws may be”, but at the same time, it was also 
committed to protect its employees from threat and harassment.
548
 Therefore, it held 
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that its decision to settle the matter after four years of legal battle was justified. 
Although the act was seen by many legal commentators like Noorani, Venkatesan, and 
Datta, among others, as surrender to the radical forces, the reasons forwarded by the 
company indicate at the insecurities that the author/publisher faced in the absence of 




Doniger’s was not an isolated incident where legal notices from groups claiming hurt 
sentiment had forced significant changes in the attitude of the publishers. For example, 
in September 2008, while a case was filed in the Delhi High Court to order the removal 
of A. K. Ramanujan’s essay from the History syllabus being taught at undergraduate 
level, the SBAS also served a legal notice to Oxford University Press (OUP), India, the 
original publisher of the essay in an edited volume, asking them to stop printing the 
essay.
550
 The OUP not only apologised for the fact that the essay had hurt religious 
sentiments of Hindus, but also gave assurance that the essay was no more in print, nor 
did the publishers have any intentions of reprinting it.
551
 Also, in the case of James 
Laine’s book, Shivaji: Hindu King in Islamic India, even before the case reached the 
court, the publishing house had promised to stop printing and withdraw the publication 
from the market due to the fear of legal action against it.
552
 Similarly, as discussed 
earlier in the chapter, in the case of D. N. Jha’s book Holy Cow: Beef in Indian Dietary 
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Tradition, the publisher – CB Publishers, refused to publish the book, due to fear of 
further prosecution or controversy, even after the civil court in Hyderabad lifted its stay 
on the publishing of the book.
553
 The concern guiding each such publisher’s decision to 
withdraw or pulp a book is almost same i.e. to protect themselves from entering the 
vortex of legal process which harms their interest both financially as well as in the form 
of intimidation through criminal charges against its employees.  
It is evident from the above discussion that both law and legal process can act as 
hurdles in the free exercise of freedom of speech and expression by creating an 
environment of fear of retribution. This eventually encourages what Cook and 
Heilmann call “public self-censorship.” Public self-censorship is a phenomenon where 
the censor and the censee are two different agents “and where the censee censors him or 
herself in response to this external censor.”
554
 Cook and Heilmann differentiate “public 
self-censorship” from “private self- censorship” based on the absence of an external 
censor in the later case; the censor and the censee therefore being the same agent. In the 
case of Doniger’s book, it was explicitly a case of self-censorship, where the publisher 
decided to pulp the book, without any such direction from either governmental 
institutions or the judiciary. However in this case there were two sources of external 
censors. First of all, there was Dina Nath Batra who had been threatening by filing civil 
suits and levelling criminal charges against the author and the publisher; and second, 
the law and legal process played the role of another censor by creating an atmosphere of 
uncertainty and prolonged distress. As the external sources were not situated in any 
form of government order for ban or judiciary’s pronouncement in the case, it cannot be 
seen as a classic case of censorship. The role of law and legal process as external 
sources for censorship in this case cannot be put into the same bracket of overt forms of 
censorship
555
, as it had less to do with the stated position of law in the constitution or 
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statutory books or even the settled interpretation of the law by the judiciary, and much 
more to do with the ambiguity produced by the language of the law as well as the 
fluctuating position of the judiciary in such cases. In the above case, the decision to 
pulp the book by Penguin as the censee was a response to its interaction with the 
external sources of censorship. This phenomenon precisely reflects the pressures 
exerted by law and legal process in the struggle for freedom of speech and expression in 
Indian context. 
5. Conclusion 
In the present chapter I analysed the role that law and legal process play in the practice 
of censorship in the Indian context. I showcased the procedural and the functional 
aspects of the working of law that act as hurdles to the enjoyment of freedom of speech 
and expression. On the basis of a study of thirty two cases in the post-independence 
period I argued that the issues like spurious charging and overcharging, freedom to file 
a case anywhere in India, and the time taken by judiciary to deliver verdicts on cases 
together create conditions where the individual defending his/her freedom of expression 
faces distress and harassment. Further, the fact that the courts do not priortize free 
speech cases, and that the judicial precedents related to free speech cases are confusing 
and inconclusive, adds to the environment of helplessness and uncertainty. Through the 
example of Wendy Doniger’s book The Hindus, I showed that the environment 
produced by the procedural and functional lacunae exhibited by the law and legal 
process work negatively against freedom of speech and expression by encouraging 
“public self-censorship.” On the one hand, it encourages non-state censors like Dina 
Nath Batra to take the legal route to harass and force the author/publisher to submit to 
their demands of censorship; and on the other hand, the legal system discourages the 
author/publisher from expecting that the judiciary could rescue them from such 
situations. It is not to say that the judiciary has never given a positive decision favouring 
freedom of speech and expression. One can cite several cases like Sujato Bhadra or 
Sanghraj Damodar Rupawate, where the courts produced definitive judgments in 
favour of freedom of expression, but the long legal battle and the uncertainty attached to 
the outcome of the court case is exhaustive and disheartening. It is particularly true 
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about book publications as even if the court decides in favour of the author/publisher, it 
affects the financial prospects of the publication and also the relevance of the 
publication depreciates considering the amount of time taken to reach such judgments. 
The lack of institutional protection therefore increases the vulnerability of the 





















ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS IN CENSORSHIP AND 




In the last two chapters, I discussed the attitude of the courts in India towards freedom 
of speech and expression in general, and particularly with regard to contentious 
publications claimed to be offensive to the religious sensibilities of some section of the 
population. I have argued that the courts have failed to provide a solid defence to 
freedom of speech and expression. In fact, the lacunae largely associated with the 
functioning of the courts and the ambiguities reflected in its judgments have proved 
counter-productive to the defenders of free speech. It has not only resulted in creating 
an atmosphere of uncertainty and fear among authors/publishers, but has also acted as a 
source of encouragement for people demanding censorship of publications, based on 
their claims of religious offense. The case of Wendy Donigers’s The Hindus has been a 
striking example of this dichotomy. The institution of the judiciary, which was 
established by the constitution makers as the ultimate defender of civil and fundamental 
rights of the citizens – especially freedom of speech and expression – has allowed the 
curtailment of this important right in the garb of legal language and constitutional 
interpretations. Though some of the court judgments seem to favour freedom of speech 
and expression, the courts’ general attitude of defining the limits of freedom of 
expression vis-à-vis public order or other values that it considered important for Indian 
society, have resulted in producing a public context which cannot be considered 
favourable for a free exercise of freedom of expression. 
In this chapter, I examine cases related to censorship where the government, the 
judiciary, and non-state actors interact. The process, through which social forces 
collude with state power, often renders subordinate the role of the courts in the politics 
of censorship. To highlight this aspect I discuss two types of cases: a) cases where the 
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use of statutory laws like the Customs Act, renders an immunity to the decision of the 
government; and b) cases where the prevailing atmosphere forced the author to censor 
controversial writing, regardless of the fact that the court had found nothing 
objectionable in the text and hence revoked the official ban on the book. In each of 
these cases we see an active role played by non-state actors which include socio-
religious groups as well as political parties. The main arena of the contestation between 
the claims of religious offence and freedom of expression remain, I argue, outside the 
courtroom. However, the language of law was predominantly used as a legitimizing 
source for demands of censorship.  
 I argue that though the claims for censorship are generated by the non-state actors, it is 
primarily the failure of state institutions that allows such demands to restrict freedom of 
speech and expression. In fact, non-state actors are able to manipulate the state 
institutions by exerting pressure through deliberations, mobilization or protest. The 
government appears to give in under such pressure, either in the name of protecting 
religious rights or under threat of nuisance produced by the public display of hurt 
sentiments. In its role of managing diverse claims, the government’s functioning 
reflects a tilt towards the claimants of religious offense. This creates what one might 
describe as a “web of censorship,” where an author/publisher finds him/herself locked 
and his/her claim for freedom of speech and expression remains unheard. This has been 
one of the main reasons for scholars of censorship in India to claim that all forms of 
intervention by non-state actors in the process of censorship is problematic and 
unwarranted in a democracy like India. I argue that we need to look into the 
interventions of non-state actors, by distinguishing their participation through the legal 
process, and their use of violence and threats, to impose censorship. This distinction 
helps us to understand that on many occasions, the grievances may be genuine, and that 
the expression of such grievances, even the protests to attract attention of government 
officials towards their grievances, may fall well within the democratic rights of citizens. 
However, any use of violence, or threats is not only illegal, as the courts have also 
maintained on various occasions, but also detrimental to the free exercise of freedom of 
speech and expression as a constitutional right. The courts, in such cases, are the sole 
authority, to determine the permissible limits to freedom of speech and expression, as 
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sanctioned under the constitution. This approach helps us to develop a more rational 
and sensitive approach, to view the role of non-state actors, in the process of censorship.           
2. Trivializing the Role of the Court in the Politics of Censorship 
The role of the court in censorship is significantly limited by the fact that there exist 
laws within the Indian legal system that protect the executive’s decisions from judicial 
scrutiny. For example, the Customs Act
556
 is one of the notable laws used by the 
government to prevent the import of any publication that it holds may create problems 
in the country or may be in the bad taste to the government. Historically, the law has 
been used to stop the import of propaganda material and political manuscripts, but also 
publications on religion which according to the government had the potential to create 
unrest among any section of the population.
557
 In many such cases, government’s act 
goes unnoticed as it does not become part of the popular discourse nor does the news 
get appropriate mediation. As early as in 1956, Nehru’s government decided to ban the 
import of Aubrey Menen’s Rama Retold, which was believed to contain material that 
could hurt the sentiments of the Hindus in the country.
558
 The use of the Customs Act to 
prevent entry of any publication in the territory of India reflects a paternal attitude on 
behalf of the state where it decides for its citizens which material is readable and which 
ones could instigate sharp reactions. One of the significant cases of censorship where 
the Customs Act played a role was in the ban of Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses. This 
example clearly highlights the phenomenon whereby the public debate over the issue 
                                                           
556
  Section 11 of the Customs Act, allows for prohibition of import of any material, including 
publications, for maintenance of public order, standard of decency and morality, and also for any 
other purpose conducive to interest of public order.  
557
  Books whose import to India was banned under the law included Pakistan-Pasmazarwa Pashmanza 
(1950); Cease Fire (1950); What has Religion done for Mankind (1954); Captive Kashmir (1958); 
The Heart of India (1959); Nine hours to Rama (1962), among others. Some of these were held to be 
demeaning to the image of India, and others considered material for political propaganda. The list of 
books to be banned from import owing to its commentary on religion included the likes of Marka-e-
Somnath by Maulana Muhammad Sadiq Husain and Sadiq Siddiqui (1952), Ayesha by Kurt Frischler 
(1963), and Early Islam by Desmond Stewart (1975), among others.   
558
  Aubrey Menen’s Rama Retold was one of the earliest books to be banned in independent India in 
1955 on this ground.  Menen’s was a satirical work and dealt with the characters of Ramayana in a 
very different way than as in the popular discourse.  
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interpreted variously the scope of censorship laws in India including its validity, but all 
this happened outside the purview of the court. The banning of The Satanic Verses 
raised several moral and normative questions, about religious offense and freedom of 
expression, which became subject of intense debates within political theory. However, 
here I am primarily concerned about the debates on the subject of law in this episode, 
and the role played by the non-state actors. 
2.1. Banning of The Satanic Verses and the Public Debate over Law 
Much before the formal launch of the book, The Satanic Verses, there were 
apprehensions about the probable impact the book could have on Indian readers. 
Khushwant Singh
559
 advised the publishers of the book, Viking Penguin, not to publish 
the book in India as he feared that the comments and the content of the novel, especially 
satirical references to the Prophet and his wives would not be received in good spirit by 
the country’s Muslim audience. Before the launch of the book, an interview by the 




Syed Sahabuddin, the Member of Parliament (MP) from the Janata Party, along with 
other prominent Muslim representatives like Khurshid Alam Khan
561
 brought the 
interviews of Rushdie and the extracts published in India Today to the notice of the 
government.
562
 They feared that the book might create communal disturbances in the 
country and therefore requested that the book be banned. The Rajiv Gandhi government 
felt that the concerns were reasonable and hence the ban order was passed on 5
th
 
                                                           
559
  Singh was a well known literary figure of India. The publishers of The Satanic Verses, Penguin, 
approached him for comments on the book six months before its formal release. 
560
  The interview with Madhu Jain was published as, “My theme is fanaticism,” India Today, September 
15, 1988; Interview with Sharbani Basu was published as, “Of Satan, Archangels and Prophets,” 
Sunday, September 18-24, 1988. 
561
  Khurshid Alam Khan was a minister in Rajiv Gandhi government and a prominent Muslim leader of 
Indian National Congress. 
562
  “The Day After,” Sunday, November 6-12, 1988. Khurshid Alam Khan was a prominent Cabinet 
minister in Rajiv Gandhi government during this period. 
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The call for a ban incited a controversy as it was argued that the government had 
succumbed to the demands of Muslim politicians, showing disregard for the freedom of 
expression, and misuse of the legal provisions. Some legal luminaries argued that the 
Custom’s Act did not contain any provision to ban a book on the basis of religious 
insults. For instance, Soli Sorabjee remarked that the law “curiously does not impose 
any ban on books which insult religion or offend religious sentiment of the people, as 
have been erroneously assumed in some quarters.”
564
 However, the official statement 
by the government maintained that the ban under section 11 of the Customs Act (1962) 
was a “pre-emptive step” to avoid “misrepresentation” of passages of the Satanic 
Verses for “political purposes,” which it feared – could lead to public order problem.
565
 
It further held that the order did “not detract or otherwise reflect on the artistic or 
literary worth of the book or its author.”
566
 The government presented it as a judgment 
based on public order concerns, rather than the merits or contents of the book. Although 
a ban under the Customs Act was immune from any challenge in the judiciary, the 
decision could be justified in the public realm as pragmatic and necessary and well 
within the constitutional limits set for freedom of expression under article 19(2).
567
  
                                                           
563
  “Book banning, Philistinism and Freedom of Expression,” Frontline, October, 15-28, 1988. Interestingly, 
Satanic Verses was released on 26
th
 September, 1988 in the UK, and advance copies had reached India 
soon afterwards. However, Government’s notification only prevented the importation of the copies of the 
book to India and did not say anything about the copies that had already reached Indian territories. So, 
even today, possession or reading of the novel in India is not legally banned. 
564
  Soli J. Sorabjee, “Ban on Rushdie’s Book: A Pernicious Precedent,” Indian Express, October 14, 
1988. 
565
  Official statement as presented in, “Book banning,” Frontline, October, 15-28, 1988.  The Custom’s 
Act did allow for prohibition of import for maintenance of public order, standard of decency and 
morality, and also for any other purpose conducive to interest of public order. See, section 11 of 
Customs Act (1962). 
566
  Ibid. 
567
  This argument was also forwarded by Buta Singh, the Minister of Home Affairs, when while 
answering one of the queries on the subject in the Rajya Sabha he justified the ban by arguing that 
“the contents of the title were likely to be detrimental to the maintenance of public order.” Though 
legislator B. Satyanarayan Reddy had also asked about the objectionable material found in the book, 
the Minister chose to evade the question. See, Rajya Sabha Debates, November 3, 1988, 41-42.    
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The decision to ban the book initiated a public debate about the state of freedom of 
speech and expression in India. On the one side were those who raised issues about the 
intentions of the government. In particular, they pointed to the tendency of the 
government to succumb to pressure from some Muslim leaders.
568
 On the contrary, the 
supporters of the ban invoked both moral as well as legal aspects of the case. They 
applauded the role of the government in the whole episode, and lauded it for protecting 
the constitutional spirit of secularism and multiculturalism.
569
 The support for the ban 
was broadly based on three sets of arguments. The first argument was that vilification 
of religious personalities, contained in the book, could hurt religious sensibilities. 
Sahabuddin argued that insulting the respected figures of Islam could not be a part of 
satire, and any act of casting aspersions on such pious symbols could not be tolerated. 
He commented, “You depict the holy Prophet…as an imposter and you expect us to 
clap for you. You have the diseased mind and the evil pen to situate the wives of the 
holy Prophet… the mothers of the community, in a brothel and you expect the Muslims 
to prove your power of imagination.”
570
  
The second argument was that the book could ignite religious sensibilities, and could 
lead to rioting and communal disturbances. This was contrary to Rushdie’s comments 
during the early phase of the controversy that “no book can cause riots.”
571
 This claim 
was effectively rebutted by Khushwant Singh who remarked that Rushdie was “naïve” 
to think that way, as Indian history was full of cases where hurt sentiments had led to 
                                                           
568
  Rushdie wrote an open letter to Rajiv Gandhi in this regard, which appeared in several news `dailies. 
See Lisa Appignanesi and Sara Maitland, ed., The Rushdie File (London: Fourth Estate, 1989), 42-
45. He believed that the step of the government was senseless as his work about a secular person’s 
view on the ideas of religion and revelation. See, “A Senseless step, says Rushdie,” Times of India, 
October 8, 1988.   
569
  Shahbuddin said, “If to seek redress of a religious grievance from the government which is the custodian 
of the dignity of all our people is fundamentalism in your lexicon, so be it.” See, “You did this with Satanic 
Forethought, Mr. Rushdie,” Times of India, October 13, 1988. He applauded the responsiveness of the 
government and claimed that it signified that the government was not “insensitive to the religious 
sentiments of the people.” See, “Ban Welcomed,” Times of India, October 9, 1988. 
570
  Syed Sahabuddin, “No, Mr. Rushdie, You Acted with Satanic Forethought,” Muslim India, 
November, 1988. 
571
  As quoted in, “A Senseless step, says Rushdie,” The Times of India, October 8, 1988. 
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communal mobilization culminating into violence and riots.
572
 The third argument was 
about violations of Indian laws. It was argued that the demand for the ban, as well as the 
government’s decision, was not based on abstract principles or force; rather it had firm 
support from within the legal structure of the country and was therefore justified. 
Salman Khurshid, a prominent Congress leader and also a lawyer, charged Rushdie of 
defying “Indian laws relating to obscenity and religious practice.”
573
 The laws within 
IPC were quoted along with the Customs Act to convey the point that if Rushdie had 
been present in India, he could even be convicted under sections 295(A) and 153(A).
574
 
So, overall the book was found objectionable by those supporting the ban of the book 
on three grounds: it was considered to be “a crime against human decency”; “an insult 
to Islam”; and “an offence under Indian law.”
575
   
The case of the ban on Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses in the Indian context became 
infamous for several reasons. The demand for the ban was raised by influential Muslim 
legislators and ministers, like Shahbuddin and Khurshid Alam Khan, and the government 
was accused of responding to such demands simply to distract public attention, as well as to 
regain the confidence of India’s Muslim population that it had lost due to its position in the 
Ayodhya case.
576
 As a result, it was claimed by those who opposed the ban that the 
decision of the government was arbitrary and lacked cogent justification for imposing the 
                                                           
572
  “A Riot has been averted: Khuswant Singh,” The Times of India, October 30, 1988. Reports suggested that 
such fears were not completely unfounded. After Khomeini’s fatwa riots broke out in parts of Western 
India, and 12 people were reported dead in police firings in Mumbai. Similar riots were also reported from 
Kashmir. It was indicative of the possible situation if the book was not proscribed. See, “Freedom of 
Information and Expression in India,” Article 19, October 1990, republished in the PUCL Bulletin of April 
1991. Also see, “Uneasy calm in Riot hit Areas,” Times of India, February 26, 1989. 
573
  As quoted in Kumar, The Book on Trial, 202. Similarly, Shahbuddin maintained that indecent 
remarks about “the Prophet’s wife violated the Indian Penal Code, which prohibited any writing that 
hurt the religious sentiments of the people and were in bad taste.” Here Khurshid and Shahbuddin 
were referring to the laws within IPC like Section 295(A), and 153(A). “Ban Welcomed,” Times of 
India, October 9, 1988. 
574
  “Ban Welcomed,” Times of India, October 9, 1988. 
575
  “You did this with Satanic Forethought, Mr. Rushdie,” Times of India, October 13, 1988. 
576
  Ayodhya is the place in Uttar Pradesh where it is claimed that Rama, the Hindu deity was born. At the 
site of his birth, it was claimed that Babar, the Moghul king had forcefully constructed a mosque after 
destroying an age old temple. The Union government of Rajeev Gandhi had decided to open the doors 
of the deserted part of the temple so that prayers could be offered by Hindus. It created an atmosphere 




 Though it was not the first time that a book was banned in India, or its 
import prevented by the government, the case of Rushdie attracted international attention 
owing to polarized reactions on the subject world over. This included a fatwa by a Muslim 
cleric in Iran for beheading Rushdie, and the explicit position of governments in countries 
like Britain on not banning the book despite pressure from Muslim communities.
578
 In all of 
this, the position of the Indian government was severely criticized. The Indian government, 
on the contrary, justified the legality of its action based on the available statutory laws.  
Two aspects of the Rushdie episode are significant for my study. On the one hand, it 
exposed the limits of the courts when laws like Customs Act are invoked by the 
government. Though the claim that the book violated the law was used as an important 
excuse by those protesting against the book, its validity could not in fact be tested, since the 
case could not be pitched in the courts. Secondly, it had shown that the government could 
be forced to order a ban on publications in the name of hurt sentiments, and the fear of 
threats to public order. This aspect was crucial to examine the role of non-state actors in 
censorship. The opposition created between freedom of expression, and protecting the 
interest of a religious community, in the name of the state’s role in a multicultural society, 
persisted after the ban on The Satanic Verses. In fact, in certain cases the binary became 
more acute, with a more direct role for non-state actors like socio-religious groups 
(including political parties) demanding censorship on the pretext of protecting the 
sentiments of a community from hurt.
579
 In all of these cases, the role of the courts as 
protector of free speech was severely undermined. This phenomenon was also visible when 
Taslima Nasreen, the Bangladeshi author, who was physically attacked, and after being 
placed under pressure from socio-religious groups, agreed to delete controversial portions 
                                                           
577
  It was reported in several foreign newspaper of the time. For example, The Independent, under the 
title, “Rushdie novel banned in India” on October 6, 1988 reported: “The Indian government, bowing 
to pressure from Muslim groups, yesterday banned Salman Rushdie’s latest book.” A letter signed by 
21 prominent arbiters led by Dom Moraes and Adil Jussawala, was sent to the Prime Minister of 
India, Rajiv Gandhi, on October 20, 1988.   
578
  The details of the case and the reactions world over have been extensively discussed in Appignanesi 
and Maitland, ed., The Rushdie File; Daniel Pipes, The Rushdie Affair: The Novel, The Ayatollah, 
and the West (N. Delhi: Voice of India, 1998).   
579
  These included cases like the demand to not publish Ambedkar’s Riddle in Hinduism in the Collected 
volume published by Maharashtra government in 1989 by Shiv Sena, among others.  
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from her novel Dwikhandito, regardless of the fact that the High Court had found nothing 
objectionable in those parts. The case of censorship in Dwikhandito not only uncovers the 
complexity of the censorship debate in the Indian context but also shows how censorship 
has often become a tool for instrumental politics among the stakeholders.      
2.2. The Muslim Groups and Nasreen’s Submission 
In August 2007, during the release of the Telugu translation of her novel Shodh, 
Nasreen was physically attacked by a group led by three legislators of the Majlis-e-
Ittehadul Muslimeen (MIM). The attackers justified their act by arguing that she could 
not be allowed in Hyderabad, because of her objectionable writings against Islam and 
the Prophet.
580
 The immediate reason given for the attack was provided by her articles 
in Outlook magazine in January 2007, where she had criticized Muslim society for 
imposing a restrictive way of life on women, especially by insisting on purdah, and also 
the Quran, for enjoining such impositions. With the publication of her article, Nasreen 
faced opposition including threats to her life. The issue caught the attention of Muslim 
organizations all over India. Following this, Muslim organizations in Kolkata organized 
a protest against her visa extension. There was a general feeling that her attack on Islam 
and on religious symbols had demeaned Muslims. The protests culminated into city-
wide rioting on 21 November, 2007.
581
 Responding to the situation, the government 
                                                           
580
  However, some commentators believed that it was a planned strategy of MIM for publicity. It was argued that 
MIM was losing its Muslim base in Hyderabad because of the left’s increasing popularity in the Muslim pockets 
of the city. Hence its legislators felt the need to rekindle its image as the authentic protector of Muslim rights. 
Saba Naqvi, “No Orchids for Miss Nasreen,” Outlook, August 27, 2007. 
581
  The immediate reasons for the protest and attacks were different. In this background appeared an unsigned 
article in the CPI(M) backed journal Pathasanket which endorsed Nasreen’s views on Islam and the 
Quran. The article argued that Nasreen’s hitting out at fundamentalists from a rational and scientific point 
of view could not be treated as an offence. It further compared her with Galileo and even made a vitriolic 
attack on the Prophet over his marital life. The article shocked the Muslim community and was construed 
as an attack on Islam. The Muslim groups, especially the AIMF led by Idris Ali took strong exception to it. 
 AIMF demanded a ban on the magazine and seizure of all copies in the market. The Muslim organizations 
also demanded that Nasreen’s visa be revoked and that she should be sent out from India as she had time 
and again created communal tensions here. The state government promptly banned the autumn issue of the 
magazine, but the decision over her visa did not fall under its jurisdiction. However, by this time, violence 
had erupted again in Nandigram where, it was alleged, the CPI (M) cadres had opened fire killing around 
30 villagers. Prominent anti-left Muslim organizations including AIMF, Jamiat Ullema-e-Hind and 
Furfura Sharif Muzadeedia Ananth Foundation came together to protest against violence in Nandigram 
and unethical refuge to Taslima Nasreen in order to expose the government on 21 November 2007. The 
protests turned violent and soon took the shape of riots. The army was called in to manage public order 
situation. See, “Left Magazine’s Autumn number banned,” Times of India, November 9, 2007.  
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planned her secret escape to Rajasthan, and from there she was later shifted to Delhi 
where she stayed in a safe house for 110 days before leaving for Sweden.
582
  
In the context of charged Muslim sentiments, no political party was in a position to 
explicitly support Nasreen. It was the ruling Left Front government of West Bengal that 
decided to deport Nasreen, and the Congress-led Central government that provided 
logistics for the same. The state government defended its action by maintaining that 
they respected individual freedom and rights “but it does not mean a person can hurt the 
sentiments… and abuse religion.”
583
 Jyoti Basu, the top leader of the ruling CPI(M) 
commented, “No Muslim will stand the way she criticized the Quran and the Prophet. 
That is why we banned her book Dwikhandito.”
584
 A statement was issued in the 
Parliament on November 28, 2007, by the Minister of External Affairs, Pranab 
Mukherjee, who made it clear that though the government would continue to provide 
shelter to Ms. Nasreen, it was expected that the “guests will refrain from activities and 
expressions that may hurt the sentiments of our people.”
585
  
Consequently, Nasreen asked her publishers to withdraw the controversial parts from 
Dwikhandito. She issued a note that said:  
I have withdrawn some parts of my book Dwikhandito. Some said parts 
of the book were hurting the sentiments of the people. I hope after its 
withdrawal, there would be no more controversies… The decision to 
                                                           
582
  Though there were obvious links between the attacks in Hyderabad and her deportation from 
Kolkata, owing to the similarity of the issues raised and nature of opposition, but the immediate 
reasons that forced the government to act was different. It was a period of intense political instability 
in West Bengal owing to violence at Nandigram and Singur where land acquisition by the 
government for industrial expansion was being opposed by villagers. The government took a strong 
stand and the opposition witnessed extremes of police brutality. Nandigram was a Muslim majority 
area and it took no time for the violence there to develop a communal logic. The government was 
further cornered after the controversy generated by the case of Rizwanur Rehman who was allegedly 
murdered for marrying a Hindu girl belonging to a reputed trading family. His death saw a heavy 
backlash from Muslims in Kolkata and a difficult law and order situation developed in late 
September. Such incidents had alienated the Muslims and the West Bengal government was already 
on the defensive. See, “Exiled to the vote Bank,” India Today, November 30, 2007. 
583
  Minister Abdus Suttar, as quoted in Times of India (December 29, 2007). 
584
  “Basu: Taslima welcome to Kolkata,” Times of India, December 21, 2007.  
585
  The statement was made in both houses of Parliament. 
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withdraw these parts from Dwikhandito is to prove that I never wanted 
to hurt the people’s sentiments.
586
  
This decision was seen as an apology and welcomed by different parties, including non-
state actors, which were involved in the controversy.
587
 Siddiqullah Chaudhary, general 
secretary of the Jamiat Ullema-e-Hind, one of the prominent Muslim organizations 
involved in the controversy, said: “This is a good step and we are happy that good sense 
has prevailed. If she had taken this step before, then a lot of conflict could have been 
avoided.”
588
 Even Jyoti Basu issued a statement expressing that she could return to 
Kolkata.
589
 The act of deletion was seen as a setback to the struggle for freedom of 
expression by authors, journalists, and other members of the civil society, who only few 
days earlier had organized a massive rally in Kolkata in her support.
590
   
2.2.1. The Curious Case of Dwikhandito and the Role of Courts 
Nasreen’s decision to delete controversial portions from her book was seen as forced 
censorship, given the surrounding political circumstances. Yet, the tokenism of 
Nasreen’s submission, expressed by the act of removing sections from the controversial 
book to render an apology, and the acceptance of all the stakeholders of it as such, 
undermined the role of the courts as agents of censorship. To understand the paradox 
involved we need to look at the history of the controversy, particularly after the 
publication of Dwikhandito.  
The book was the third volume of Nasreen’s autobiographical series, and discussed the 
author’s multiple sexual relationships with some of the most prominent authors and 
poets both in Bangladesh and India during her youth. It first came to public scrutiny 
                                                           
586
  “Taslima removes controversial lines from Book,” Hindustan Times, November 30, 2007. 
587
  This included Muslim organizations such as AIMF, Jamiat Ullema-e-Hind and Furfura Sharif 
Muzadeedia Ananth Foundation, and political parties like AIMIM, Congress Party, and CPI (M). 
588
  “Taslima withdraws controversial lines from Dwikhandito,” Financial Express, December 1, 2007. 
589
  “Taslima can return to Kolkata, says Basu,” Hindu, December 26, 2007. 
590
  “Taslima’s surrender on ‘Dwikhandito’ a great setback: Intellectuals,” DNA, December 9, 2007.  
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when the West Bengal High Court passed an injunction on the publication, sale, 
marketing and circulation of the book after a defamatory suit was filed by Syed Hasmat 
Jalal, one of the figures with whom Nasreen had claimed sexual relations in the book. 
The government of West Bengal banned the book only a week after this injunction 
order. Some Muslim organizations like Jamiat Ullema-e-Hind and All India Minority 
Forum (AIMF) had complained about the book: in particular, they held, certain 
passages contained insults against the Prophet Muhammad and Islam.
591
 Justifying the 
ban, the Chief Minister of West Bengal, Budhadeb Bhattacharjee said, “I’ve read the 
book, not once but several times. I’ve discussed the contents with 25 people who matter 
and have finally decided to proscribe it.”
592
 The government argued that if the book 
were not banned, “it could ignite communal tension.”
593
  
As in Rushdie’s case, there was fierce opposition to the government’s decision by those 
who believed that the government had submitted to the demands of extremists. Some 
critics believed that the reaction of the government was not based so much on the fear 
of communal violence but on her reference to sexual relationships with prominent 
personalities of Bengal who, as it happened, were also close to the Left Front 
government leaders of Bengal.
594
 Taslima Nasreen expressed shock on the ban order. 
She argued that there was nothing “in the relevant pages of the book that might cause 
riots.” “Also”, she pointedly asked, “is it correct to underestimate Muslims so much? 
Are Muslims so ignorant, illiterate, intolerant, and convertible when faced with any 
kind of criticism about their religion?”
595
 However, the government had decided to ban 
the book, and the decision was actively supported by other major political parties. They 
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believed that the book contained perversions of the teachings of the Quran and hence 
would give sustenance to anti Islamic views. Further, it was claimed that the adjectives 
used for the Prophet were not in good taste.
596
 
Human rights activist from Kolkata, Sujato Bhadra, appealed against the ban in the West 
Bengal High Court. After almost two years the court lifted the ban from the book on 
September 22, 2005. The Court’s observations were crucial. The court believed that the 
intention of the author, “who herself profess the same religion has to be gathered from the 
context of the book.”
597
 It held that though the book contained harsh language against the 
Prophet, there was no deliberate and malicious intent on the part of the author of 
Dwikhandito to outrage the religious feelings of any class of citizens of India based on the 
fact that “the insult to religion was not the central theme of the book, read as a whole.” 
Further, it argued that if the insult to religion is in good faith in “his/her endeavour or 
object to facilitate some measure of social reform by administering such a shock to the 
followers of the religion, as would ensure notice being taken by any criticism so made 
would not attract the mischief of section 295(A).” The court also held that the author was 
dealing with the specific situation in Bangladesh “which was a theocracy and not India, 
which is a secular country.” Though the court came to the defence of Nasreen’s freedom 
of expression, one might see it as a case of “overindulgence” with the text. For example, 
the court overlooked the insulting references to the Prophet because it believed that the 
subject of the book itself was not based on it. Further, the emphasis laid on the context 
rather than content was questionable, as it did not say anything about the possible fate of 
the text, if the narrative was based in the Indian context.  The observation by the court 
that the author was dealing with a situation specific to Bangladesh, “which was a 
theocracy and not India, which is a secular country”, gives an impression that the court 
would have dealt with the book differently if it discussed about similar situation in India. 
The judgment of the court was largely prescriptive. In absence of a principled position, as 
discussed in earlier chapters, it remained open to interpretation in other cases. The stress 
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placed upon the context also seemed to imply that the court did not believe that freedom 
of expression could be an absolute right. However, once the court had decided in favour 
of Nasreen, by rejecting the ban on the book and holding that there was nothing 
objectionable contained in it, the legality of her book was established beyond doubt. The 
state government also did not pursue the case further by either filing a review petition or 
pleading at the higher court.  
The events leading to Nasreen’s decision to herself delete controversial sections raise 
some important aspects of censorship. The incidents at Hyderabad and Kolkata in 2007 
which themselves qualified as crimes, produced a context where the legality of a book, 
even when pronounced by the court was, of no rescue to the author. The sentiment of 
hurt made visible in the streets of Kolkata was silenced with an act of self-censorship, 
where the court had no authority to sit on judgment.   
This was not an isolated case in the history of censorship in India - where the court in its 
legal submissions found nothing wrong with a book, but the social pressures forced the 
author to censor his/her writing. Another notable case was the withdrawal of 
Agnipariksha (The test on fire) from public circulation by its author Acharya Tulsi, a Jain 
monk, in 1970. In September 1970, Acharya Tulsi, a very respected and popular Jain 
preacher, reached Raipur
598
 to stay at the Anuvrat Ashram
599
 during the holy period of 
“chaturmasa.”
600
 During one of the sessions of a discourse on 16 September, he referred 
to his work Agnipariksha which was recently published and was based on Jain version of 
Ramayana. He was particularly referring to some episodes where the character of Sita
601
 
was questioned. This caught the attention of some orthodox Hindus, who claimed that 
such references had offended their religious sensibilities: they demanded apology from 
the spiritual leader. The confrontation rapidly escalated and there were demands for 
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banning the acharya’s book and for his exit from Raipur. Orthodox Hindus argued that 
certain couplets were vulgar and profane and were designed to cast aspersions on Sita’s 
character. The following months saw a massive campaign against the acharya, led by the 
Sanatan Dharma Sabha, a prominent Hindu organization in the area. The Sabha observed 
an “anti-acharya week” from 19 September during which massive protest demonstrations 
were organized, hartals (strike) and bandhs (closure) were held. Effigies of the Jain 
leaders and copies of the book were also burnt in Raipur.
602
 Though the state government 
tried to control the situation, the protesters defied the prohibitory orders and violated 
section 144
603
 that was imposed in the city. There were also reports that some workers sat 
on fast demanding ban of the book.
604
 
The acharya promised an unconditional apology if anyone could show the mistakes in 
what he had said. He also maintained that the book did not contain any vilification as 
claimed by the protestors, but only an interpretation of the story as present in Jain 
tradition. He even offered to leave Raipur, if that could restore peace. Under pressure 
from the protestors and in view of the fact that law and order situation was continuously 
deteriorating, with reports coming in of demonstrations taking violent form at several 
instances, the state government issued notification for banning of the book and 
forfeiture of all the copies available under section 99(A). The protestors had succeeded 
in preventing the circulation of the book in Madhya Pradesh. 
The publisher of the book and the sponsor approached the court against the forfeiture 
and ban orders of the state government. The full bench of the Madhya Pradesh High 
Court heard the case and delivered its judgment on December 24, 1970. The court set 
aside the impugned order arguing that the grounds on which the state government based 
the order of forfeiture did not exist. The Advocate General representing the case 
initially argued that the couplets used in the book were objectionable as it hurt the 
sentiments of Sanatan Hindus. The applicants on the other hand argued that the order 
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contradicted their fundamental right to freedom of expression and freedom of religion 
as guaranteed under article 19(1)(a) and article 25 of the Constitution.  
The court maintained that state had every right to interfere with fundamental rights, as both 
– freedom of expression and freedom of religion – were conditional to public order.
605
 
However after a close reading of the controversial couplets, the court concluded that it 
could not find anything “grossly offensive or provocative matter,” nor did the court 
“visualize any deliberate and malicious intention on the part of the author to outrage the 
religious feelings of Sanathani Hindus.” Both these basic requirements to charge a work 
under section 295(A) were judged to be absent. Delivering the judgment Justice Tare noted: 
People may have their own views and it cannot be denied that there have 
been different versions of Ramayana through the ages which have been 
prevailing at least for more than 2500 years and it may be that different 
people might give a version which might serve their purpose. But a 
propagandist version, which does not come within mischief of the law, 
can in no case be considered to be objectionable.
606
  
The court, therefore, came to the rescue of the book against the order of the state 
government. The comments of the court on the freedom of expression and freedom of 
religion were truly significant. The court held that such rights were subject to 
government’s understanding of the situation at practical level. Hence though the order 
of forfeiture was set aside, the right of the state government to act in the way it did was 
upheld. Yet, even after the forfeiture notification was quashed by the High Court, the 
author decided to withdraw the book from public circulation, as it had initiated conflict 
among different groups which was not his motive in writing the text.
607
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The act of censorship in the cases of Nasreen and Acharya Tulsi cannot be best 
captured through its conventional lens of understanding. There is no doubt that the 
government was involved in banning the texts, but it is equally true that the courts came 
to the rescue of the author/publisher. So the decision either to remove controversial 
passages of the book or the text from public circulation does not qualify as a fit case of 
state censorship. It also does not fall into the category of what modern theories of 
censorship have called “new censorship” – a concept derived from the writings of 
Foucault and Bourdieu.
608
 The category of “new censorship” equates the phenomenon 
of state censorship with all other forms of censorships like that of market.
609
 
Consequently, the analytical rigour of the concept of censorship is diluted, as it 
becomes extremely difficult to locate the agency of the censor in such acts of 
censorship. But in the above mentioned cases, the censors can be identified clearly. The 
decision of the authors remains primary in both the cases. So, it can be seen as a case 
for self-censorship. But it is important to view such self-censorship as a consequence of 
interrelated events rather than arising from the independent judgment of the authors. In 
the cases of Nasreen and Acharya Tulsi, the pressures exerted by different non-state 
actors including political parties, created an atmosphere where the act of censorship 
occurred. The dominance of a particular discourse defined what could or could not be 
allowed in the public sphere. This type of censorship is closely related to the category 
of “public self-censorship” discussed in Chapter 5, where the censee decides to censor 
him/herself but the main agent enforcing the decision stays outside the agent. 
In the cases of Nasreen and Acharya Tulsi, the interplay between the state and non-state 
actors is also clearly visible. The interventions by the non-state actors compelled the 
state agency to respond, and as a result the author seems to be caught in a web of 
censorship which tests their potential to fight back. In such cases, the courts are the only 
institutions to which the author/publisher can turn for respite. However, if the authority 
and the views of the courts are undermined in strategic ways, as occurred in these two 
cases due to fear of social forces, in practice the scope of freedom of speech and 
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expression is thereby restricted. The political willingness to respect the position of the 
court becomes crucial. In the above cases, even though the courts held that the 
publications did not contain anything objectionable according to law, the government 
did not do enough to protect the publications from harm caused by the actions of non-
state actors. In fact, it colluded, with the non-state actors at different moments, as 
visible in the case studies. However, it cannot be claimed that the government cannot 
resist the attack on publications. If the government wants, it can definitely restrain 
attempts by non-state actors to impose their will when the court has pronounced its 
judgment in a case. A clear example of this was the case of Sachchi Ramayana 
controversy.
610
 The text Sachchi Ramayana was banned in Uttar Pradesh in 1969 after 
which, the Supreme Court held the notification order null and void on technical 
grounds. When the demand for its banning resurfaced in 2007, a demand lead by the 
opposition parties in the Legislative Assembly, the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) 
government under the leadership of the Chief Minister Mayawati used the court order 
as pretext to counter the demands.
611
  
In the Indian context, the act of censorship is predominantly devised by means of an 
instrumental logic for the government. The legal landscape related to censorship gives 
primary importance to the judgment of the government in using laws. It is expressed 
both in the provisions of the statutory laws as well as the court judgments. It is assumed 
that the state, being the custodian and protector of law and order, would take fair 
decisions based on the merit of the case. However, as has been evident in the cases 
discussed in this chapter, the state has emphasized the need to protect the sentiments of 
different communities from hurt, primarily because there is a feeling that these 
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emotions could result in public order issues. It is further visible that collective 
mobilization in the name of hurt sentiments has the capacity to exert pressure on the 
state, to act against a controversial publication. This pressure could either be asserted 
through public display of hurt sentiments, which includes protest and demonstrations, 
(as in the case of Nasreen), or through the channels of political leadership, (as in the 
case of Rushdie), or through threats of causing disruption to public order, including the 
use of violence (as in the case of Acharya Tulsi). The ambiguity, which reflected the 
state’s relationship with individual citizen, and its relationship with communities, gives 
identity-based claims to censorship precedence over individual’s freedom of expression. 
This ambiguity was evident during the CAD, as discussed in Chapter 3. Further, the 
political mobilization of religious sentiments, a phenomenon that developed during the 
anti-colonial movement, continued in the times of electoral politics, after India became 
independent.
612
 In the context of growing constraints developed by the pressure of 
highly competitive electoral democracy, no political party, either in government or in 
opposition, takes the risk of not attending to the claims of hurt sentiments as presented 
by socio-religious groups or other non-state actors.
613
 As there is no way in which the 
claim of hurt sentiments be quantified – either in terms of the actual number of people 
hurt by the offensive publication, or the nature of the hurt caused – there is a constant 
fear that the controversy might take larger shape and affect the fortunes of the political 
parties – by diminishing their electoral support. Therefore, these parties prefer to act on 
the claims raised by socio-religious groups about religious offense, rather than protect 
individual’s freedom of speech and expression.  
The role of non-state actors discussed in this chapter appears to be essentially against 
freedom of speech and expression. It seems that the non-state actors impose their will 
by exerting pressure, either on the state agencies, or directly upon the author/publisher. 
But are all forms of intervention by non-state actors unjustified, or against the ethos of a 
democracy, where freedom of expression is held to be an important value? In the next 
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section, I shall discuss the different modes of intervention by the non-state actors, and 
examine its impact on freedom of speech and expression. 
3. The Debates over Censorship in India and the Role of Non-state 
Actors 
One of the significant concerns for scholars of free speech in India has been the role of 
non-state actors.
614
 Non-state actors, especially socio-religious groups, resort to both 
legal as well as extra-legal methods, to exert pressure on the government to act against a 
publication.
615







, public burning of book
619
, or even physical attack on the author
620
. 
The legal recourse includes filing writ petitions against the author or the publication 
house or against the book itself. The use of law to curtail freedom of expression has 
been discussed extensively in the last chapter.
621
 In fact, legal practitioners and scholars 
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like Dhavan and Noorani maintain that in India frees speech faces much a bigger threat 
from social censorship than state censorship.
622
   
However, I argue that there are two significant problems with the scholarship on 
censorship in India, particularly with regard to the question about the role of non-state 
actors. First, there is a general tendency among scholars to relate the phenomenon of 
vocal and explicit forms of intervention by non-state actors (which includes the use of 
violent means) quite tightly with the period of the growth of Hindu nationalism, 




 Second, these scholars consider all forms of 
intervention by non-state actors – both legal and extra-legal – as unwarranted in a 
democracy like India. I argue that these estimations are based on overly broad 
generalizations. For example, even if we were to agree with the claim about the 
connection between explicit forms of intervention exhibited by non-state actors and the 
rise of Hindu nationalism in late 20
th
 century, it fails to explain some crucial aspects 
attached to social censorship: a) considering that Hindu nationalism is not a new 
phenomenon in India, it fails to explain why social censorship took the shape it did, in 
the later part of 20
th
 century; and b) it also fails to explain why it did not remain a Hindu 
nationalist agenda, as we see similar kind of mobilization and protests in response to 
Taslima Nasreen in West Bengal and in the Akali’s response
624
 to the interpretations of 
Adi Granth in Punjab. I have shown earlier in chapter 2 and 3, that the intervention by 
non-state actors, on the claims of religious offense, is not at all a new phenomena. 
Group mobilization on the subject of hurt sentiments has been a social reality in India 
even before Independence, particularly in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century. In fact 
scholars like Gilmartin have shown how mobilizations of these kinds formed an 
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alternative ‘public’ during the colonial rule.
625
 The analysis of censorship after 
independence also gives a similar picture, where the claims of hurt sentiments were not 
only used to exert pressure on government to censor controversial texts, but were also 
considered as a legitimate and democratic form of engaging with the government.
626
 
Nor is it the case that these mobilization and protest were always non-violent in nature. 
The violence that erupted during the controversy over the book Living Biographies of 
Religious Leaders (as shown in chapter 3), and Agnipariksha (as discussed earlier in 
this chapter), reveal that explicit or even violent forms of intervention by non-state 
groups is not a late 20
th
 century phenomenon, and it also cannot be directly linked to the 
growth of Hindu nationalism.
627
   
The second issue is – whether all forms of intervention by non-state actors is 
symptomatic of the depleting space for democratic values. One mistake that the 
scholars who hold this view arguably commit is to assume the primacy of freedom of 
speech and expression, over all other rights.
628
 Further, these studies use a teleological 
approach to judge the intentions of the non-state actors based on the consequences of 
such interventions i.e. the use of litigation or protest by any non-state actor as means to 
impose their viewpoint. It is argued that even if the non-state actors take the legal route, 
it leads to harassment of the author/publisher, and therefore, restricts the exercise of 
freedom of speech and expression.
629
 I tend to disagree with some of these assumptions 
and conclusions. First, as courts have held in various judgments, freedom of speech and 
expression does not enjoy any primacy over other rights, including the right to religion, 
and therefore the courts have held that it is the duty of the state in a multicultural and 
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secular society, like India, to balance conflicting claims based on such rights.
630
 Second, 
on the subject of intervention by non-state actors, I believe that the practise of 
demonstrating or protesting against a publication, claimed to be religiously offensive, or 
demanding the state to act against such publications, needs to be differentiated from the 
other mode of objection- one that includes use of violence, which is legally prohibited 
in any democratic set up. Both these roles should be viewed differently, even if both 
have a tendency to restrict the scope of freedom of speech and expression, as the two 
modes of intervention by non-state actors exhibit a marked difference in both form and 
content.  
My reasons for arguing this turns on the fact that forms of intervention which include 
using legal mechanisms or even the use of protests and demonstration to attract the 
attention of the government authorities towards their grievances against the contentious 
publication, are considered – both by the state as well as the judiciary – as democratic 
and legitimate rights of the citizens. However, there is an important caveat attached to 
this formal recognition of the democratic rights- that the protests and demonstrations 
should not be violent in any form. The position of the state is reflected in the reaction of 
Prime Minister Nehru and other leaders during the controversy of Living Biographies of 
Religious Leaders.
631
 Though most leaders deplored the use of violence in the protests 
that followed the controversy, they were not critical of the subject of the protest itself. 
Not only Nehru, even K. M. Munshi
632
, against whom most of the protests were 
directed, recognized that the claim of religious offence by the protesting Muslims was 
of a genuine concern. Therefore, the book was set aside as soon as the demands were 
raised without any form of engagement with the subject-matter under contention. 
Nehru, in his fortnightly letter to the Chief Ministers wrote: “I can understand people 
objecting to some passages in that book and drawing attention to them. But, there was 
something much deeper, and it was obvious that mischief was afoot and had been 
                                                           
630
  This aspect has been extensively discussed in Chapter 4. 
631
  The details of the case has been discussed earlier in Chapter 3. 
632
  Other than being the Governor of the state of Uttar Pradesh, where the controversy took shape, K. M. 
Munshi was also one of the editors of Bharatiya Vidya Bhawan, the publishers of the book. 
230 
deliberately organized. The offending passages were broadcast in cyclostyled papers by 
the very persons who objected to them.”
633
 The real concern of these leaders was about 
the continuation of the protests, even after the demand for removal of the book was 
accepted. A clear demarcation was being proposed between legally claiming democratic 
rights, like the right to protest and demonstrate, to express one’s grievances, and the 
illegal use of violence or incitement to violence for the purpose. 
The position of the judiciary on the subject of use of legal route by non-state actors, to 
express their grievances, can be gathered from the courts’ interpretation of statutory 
laws, particularly section 95 of CrPC, which deals with the power of the government 
officials to proscribe or forfeiture controversial publications.
634
 The courts have insisted 
that government officials should mention in the notification (issued for seizure or 
forfeiture of such publication), the details about the groups or communities offended, 
the reason for them to feel offended, and how the officials reached a rational conclusion 
that forfeiture of the publication was necessary. The nature of the complaint registered, 
or protests and demonstrations organized by the socio-religious groups, in order to 
attract the attention of the state officials towards their grievances, are legally recognized 
by the courts, as valid grounds on which the official could justify its decision to act 
against the controversial publication. It can therefore be argued that these forms of 
intervention are held by the court as important, for the officials to form a conclusive 
opinion about whether action was required in a particular case or not. The complaint 
registered, or protests, are therefore recognized as legitimate means by the judiciary, in 
order to express grievances, and request the government officials to act.      
Furthermore, there are primarily two forms in which the non-state actors intervene 
through the legal structure. The first is by registering formal complaints against the 
contentious publication in the local police station, or mobilizing and demonstrating 
against the publication to express their hurt sentiments, in order to exert pressure on the 
state officials to act. The second mode of engagement is by filing petitions against such 
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publications, or taking part in the judicial process by filing affidavits in the court 
supporting government’s decision to seize or forfeiture contentious publications. 
Although, in each of these forms of participation, the non-state actors play a dominant 
role, the ultimate decision of censorship rests with the courts. Note that, even if the state 
authorities register a formal complaint and decide to act against the publication in 
question, the author/publisher or any other affected party can, under section 96 of CrPC, 
approach the court against such action and the judiciary can then decide over the 
legality and validity of such action by the state authorities. The primary responsibility to 
act in such cases is that of state authorities, and they are expected (as reflected in 
various observations of the courts) to act rationally, judging the situation based on the 
principles of proportionality.
635
 However, even if the state authorities falter in their 
decision-making, there is the judiciary to take the final call on the act of censorship. 
Therefore, the harassment caused to the author/publisher in the process is to be 
attributed to the laws and legal process, as discussed in Chapter 5, rather than the 
intervention by the aggrieved groups.  
On the other hand, the use of violence and threats about causing disturbance to public 
tranquillity as a means to impose censorship by non-state actors does severely limit 
the scope of freedom of speech and expression. As evidence suggests, these threats or 
use of violence have regularly forced authors and publishers to succumb to the 
demands of the non-state actors, even after courts held that the publication did not 
contain anything that could be legally considered as offensive.
636
 The use of these 
means are both illegal
637
, and against the values of democracy. The courts have also 
been vigilant about non-state actors’ use of threats and violence to impose censorship. 
They have held that the threat of disruption of public order by such groups is in 
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violation of the law and should be strictly dealt by law enforcing agencies.
638
 Further, 
the courts have also taken serious note of the fact that state authorities relent to the 
demands of non-state actors, and act erroneously at times under pressure from these 
groups, as in the case of threat to public order. In S. Rangrajan case
639
, the Supreme 
Court held that the state could not plead its inability to contain violent protestors. It is 
the duty of the state, the court maintained, to protect freedom of expression from 
attack from such groups. This position was reiterated in the court’s judgment in M/S 
Prakash Jha Productions
640
. Recently, in S. Tamilselvan, the case related to Perumal 
Murugan’s book
641
, the Tamil Nadu High Court raised serious objections on the way 
state authorities, in an attempt to maintain peace, relent to the pressure exerted by 
protesting groups. Though it maintained that it is the duty of the state authorities to 
maintain law and order in their area, “the threat to peace” cannot be used as a reason 
for compromising anyone’s freedom of speech and expression. It further noted: 
“Merely because a group of people feel agitated.... it cannot give them a license to 
vent their views in a hostile manner, and the state cannot plead its inability to handle 
the problem of a hostile audience.” The court also specified a preferred procedure to 
be followed by the state authorities, while dealing with any controversial publication, 
if the claims about it being offensive are raised by socio-religious groups. Three 
points of the preferred guidelines are indicative of the approach of the court: a) “there 
is bound to be a presumption in favour of free speech and expression as envisaged 
under article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India unless a court of law finds it 
otherwise falling within the domain of a reasonable restriction under article 19(2) of 
the constitution of India. This presumption must be kept in mind if there are 
complaints against publications, art, drama, film, song, poem, cartoons or any other 
creative expressions”; b) “The state’s responsibility to maintain law and order would 
not permit any compulsion on the artistes concerned to withdraw from his/her stand, 
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and non-state players cannot be allowed to determine what is permissible and what is 
not”; and, c) “The state has to ensure proper police protection when such artistes 
come under attack from a section.” The court has clearly stated that, the non-state 
actors cannot define the limits of a constitutional right, such as fundamental right to 
speech and expression, and the courts are the sole authorities to decide what 
constitutes “reasonable restrictions” as defined by the constitution. In the cases 
discussed above, it is clear that the courts have exhibited a zero-tolerance approach 
towards use of violence or threat to public order disruptions by these groups. The 
courts have further established that, though it is the duty of the state to maintain 
public order, the freedom of expression of any artist or author cannot be compromised 
in the name of threat to public order, and the state should deal strongly with groups 
that threaten disruption to public peace. It is evident from the above discussions that 
the two forms of intervention by non-state actors – legal and extra-legal – are 
essentially different in its form and content. It also has different impact on the legal 
space defined for the freedom of speech and expression. In the previous form of 
intervention, the courts are able to intervene and determine the reasonability of the 
action by the state authorities; whereas the later form of intervention is not only 
illegal, in this case, the non-state actors take upon themselves to determine the 
permissibility of an expression.  
The distinction also helps to respond to the claims of the scholars on censorship, who 
believe that the presence of statutory laws governing freedom of expression allow the 
non-state actors to impose their will, by harassing the author/publisher, and on this 
basis, these scholars demand that all such laws be repealed.
642
 Such claims are largely 
based on an assumption about the “slippery slope” tendency of laws. On the one hand, 
it assumes that all claims of religious offense, are essentially targeted against the 
author/publisher, and hence against the democratic values of freedom of speech and 
expression; and on the other hand, there is the assumption that if statutory laws are 
removed, it will end the arbitrariness attached to censorship due to the intervention of 
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socio-religious groups. However, both these assumptions seem to be faulty. The 
assumption that all the claims of religious offense are ploys to impose viewpoint of the 
non-state actors, seems to overlook or ignore that some of these claims may actually be 
genuine. The only institution that can judge these aspects is the judiciary, and scrapping 





 have shown, some religious beliefs and practices define the 
identity of the religious communities, and if these beliefs or symbols are denigrated, 
they will feel offended. These feelings can take the form of demonstrations and protests, 
and in absence of legal recourse, there are increased possibilities that these forms of 
expression of grievances turn aggressive, and cause real threat to public order.
645
 
Further, removal of statutory laws would also increase the arbitrary role of the state 
officials. These officials could use other available laws to their discretion, and could 
proscribe publications, or arrest author/publishers at will, in the name of preventing 
issues related to public order. After all, repealing laws governing freedom of expression 
does not disarm the officials of powers to act in such situations. So, unlike the 
assumptions of the scholars discussed above, repealing statutory laws may prove 
counter-productive, and may, in fact, add to the threats to freedom of speech and 
expression, and its free exercise.   
A significant exception, however, are laws like Customs Act, which were used by the 
government to ban the import of publications like Satanic Verses, as the nature of these 
laws put the case of such bans beyond the purview of the judiciary. In cases like that of 
Satanic Verses, if the non-state actors are able to exert pressure on the government, they 
can get a publication banned, and even the judiciary cannot come to the rescue of these 
publications. Though this exception is significant, and probably requires a rethink on 
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the part of lawmakers, repealing all statutory laws are not the solution to the 
intervention by the non-state actors. The right approach would be to argue for more 
vigilant government machinery, and a system of judiciary, that is able to restrain 
malafide intentions of the non-state actors, and at the same time take care of the genuine 
grievances.    
4. Conclusion 
The examples of Satanic Verses, Dwikhandito, and Agnipariksha indicate the ways 
the role of the courts is made ineffective in the politics of censorship, where on the 
one hand, the use of laws like the Custom Act place the government’s decision 
outside the purview of the court’s interference, and on the other hand, the general 
atmosphere of violence and threat renders even positive interference by the courts 
meaningless. Furthermore, the provisions restricting free speech in Indian context 
(like section 295(A) and 153(A)) are classified as cognizable offences. This means 
that the authorities can arrest suspects without judicial sanction. At the same time, 
there have been cases, where the government takes the role of mediator between 
conflicting claims (that of religious offense and freedom of expression), and reached 
for an out-of-court solution, while the case was still sub-judice.
646
 Though the 
government was well within its power to look for amicable solutions, it indicated the 
limitation of the scope of the courts in such matters. The Tamil Nadu government’s 
position during the controversy related to the movie Viswaroopam
647
 is one such 
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example. The problem is that in an attempt to find solutions, the government often 
manages different claims in such a way that freedom of expression is compromised. 
The settlement, though claimed to be “amicable,” opens doors for more possibilities 
to assert the claim of hurt religious or communitarian sensibilities leading to a virtual 
curb on authors/artists freedoms. So considering these cases, can we conclude that the 
role of the courts is of no use, and does not contribute at all in our understanding of 
freedom of expression in India? There are two ways to look at this issue. One 
approach is provided by Gautam Bhatia in his book Offend, Shock or Disturb: Free 
Speech under the Indian Constitution
648
, where he argues that a study of the role of 
court remains important as the laws are used or misused because the laws exist, and 
despite several constitutional challenges, the courts have not ruled against these laws. 
So we need to understand why these laws are considered important by the courts. 
Secondly, Bhatia is optimistic about a situation when law and practice “is not as 
cavernous” as in present times. So, it is essential for those future situations that a 
critical understanding of the application of these laws is understood. Another way to 
look at the subject is that though the courts have not controlled the direction of free 
speech debate in India, they have always remained an important stakeholder, and their 
observations have guided the debates outside. The lack of consistency and procedural 
problems, as discussed in the last chapter, remains a problem, but the authority of the 
court has in many cases protected the fundamental right of expression from attack of 
both state and non-state actors. It is therefore an important institution, which still 
enjoys the confidence of the citizens as the protector of their fundamental rights. This 
in itself is a reason good enough to not dismiss the role played by the courts in the 
debates around censorship and free speech. 
On the subject of intervention by the non-state actors, in the process of censorship, I 
have argued that the two forms of interventions – one that follows the legal route, and 
the other that is extra-legal, and includes use of threat and violence – need to be viewed 
differently. Both of these interventions are different in form and content. To consider 
both as unwarranted in a democracy, I have shown, would be to close all doors for even 
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genuine expression of grievances. This distinction helps us to be more sensitive 
regarding the concerns of religious communities, about offensive publications, and at 
the same time, ensures that proper judicial scrutiny takes place before any form of 
censorship is enforced. It would further help in reducing arbitrariness in the process of 
censorship, a complaint that scholars on censorship in India consistently make, 
























In the last few decades, two incidents – the publication of Salman Rushdie’s The 
Satanic Verses (1989), and the publication of cartoons of Prophet Muhammad by 
Denmark based Jyllands-Posten (2005) – became subject of intense debate regarding 
freedom of expression and the issue of religious offense. During both these 
controversies, the publications were repeatedly criticized for offending religious 
sensibilities of Muslims, and there was debate whether legal sanctions were justified in 
cases related to religiously offensive speech acts. The two cases were very similar in 
most of the relevant respects, and in fact the critical discussions that followed the 
cartoon controversy, were framed very much like those during Rushdie affair, even 
drawing explicit parallels with and analogies from the latter. However, here I am 
primarily concerned with the debates surrounding the legal aspects attached to the 
controversy. Some of the important questions that became subject of intense debate 
among academicians and scholars, after both these incidents were: Can legal sanctions 
be invoked in the name of protecting religious sentiments in multicultural and multi-
religious societies? Is the state justified in restricting freedom of speech and expression 
in order to prevent religious offense or to diffuse the threat to law and order situation 
that could follow such offense? Is there any provision for a “right not to be offended” 
within the liberal discourse? All these questions were discussed and debated by scholars 
of law, politics and anthropology in the light of “Rushdie affair” and the “cartoon 
controversy” and saw deeply divided opinions.  
Both the incidents witnessed protests from members of the Muslim community all over 




 offended their religious feelings
650
, and discriminated against Muslims, which 
was unacceptable.
651
 Some commentators argued that Rushdie and Jyllands-Posten had 
only exercised their freedom of expression, and the call for restriction was unwarranted, 
no matter how much they may have disturbed or offended a particular community. 
Posing religion as a matter of public interest, it was held that in a democracy, every 
aspect of religion should be open to scrutiny in all possible forms.
652
 It was also argued 
that incidents like “Rushdie affair” tested the toleration of the community that claimed 
religious offense, and therefore was a good thing.
653
 Furthermore, even if it was agreed 
that hurting religious sensibilities, as claimed in the two cases, was morally wrong, and 
that the argument about respecting other’s religious sensibilities had strong moral 
appeal, it could not justify the use of law in these cases.
654
 Legal philosopher Ronald 
Dworkin opined, that legal sanctions were also not justified because the claims about 
religious offense were sentimental and subjective, and hence, not eligible for legal 
protection. He further asserted that “in a democracy no one, however powerful or 
important, can have a right not to be insulted or offended.”
655
 On the question about 
legal sanctions against freedom of speech and expression, in cases such as that of 
Rushdie and Jyllands-Posten, where members of one religious group were demanding 
such sanctions in the name of religious offense, it was argued that any such protection 
could lead to a slippery slope. Preventing religious groups from hurt in such cases, free 
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speech scholar Eric Barendt feared, could become a thin disguise for protecting 
religious beliefs and truths, which had been resisted during the debates against 
blasphemy laws.
656
   
Some scholars raised reservations about the way the debate was being posed as a binary 
between objection to blasphemy and free speech,
657
 and it was argued that in the name 
of liberal discourse, commentators often ignored and rendered unintelligible the kind of 
injury involved in religiously offensive speech particularly those that vilified the 
sacred.
658
 Questioning those who opined that religious offence was subjective and 
sentimental in nature, Saba Mahmood and Talal Asad argued that religion was 
something that was inherited and naturalized, which got manifested in one’s practices, 
and lived social realities.
659
 Without understanding this aspect of religion, they argued, 
it was not possible to debate the harm caused by religious offense. However on the 
question about whether legal protection to religious feelings was justified, both Asad 
and Mahmood differed. Asad held that if “modern secular societies do have legal 
constraints on communication” such as copyrights, patents and others, questions should 
not be raised if restrictions on free speech are advocated to prevent religious offense, 
even if it  leads to blasphemy laws.
660
 Mahmood, on the other hand, believed that the 
laws do not have the capacity to provide remedy for the harm suffered due to religious 
offense and so she suggested that the legal recourse cannot be a valid or appropriate 
demand on the part of the communities who protest against such offenses.
661
 A similar 
view is articulated by Tariq Modood, who viewed it as a problem of multiculturalism, 
and argued that religious beliefs form the self-definition of a group, and incidents such 
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as the Rushdie affair and cartoon controversy have a deep impact in the group’s 
participation in society.
662
 Though he opined that legal restrictions might not be the 
most appropriate solution and societies need to develop alternate mechanisms to ensure 
that oppression caused due to such incidents are avoided, he insisted that freedom of 
expression could be curtailed to protect vulnerable groups and individuals from attack 
on their deeply held beliefs.
663
 So, though these scholars believe that the debate around 
free speech should be sensitive to the sentimentalities of communities that claim 
religious offense, they have different views on whether legal sanctions can really help 
in the situation.  
An alternative view is represented by political philosophers Charles Taylor and Bhikhu 
Parekh, who have maintained that the question of restricting free speech would depend 
on the context, in which it is being dealt with.
664
 They are of a view that free speech 
should be balanced with other rights and values that are cherished in a society. 
However, “there is no “true” way of reconciling them; it all depends”, Parekh says, “on 
the history, traditions, political circumstances, and so on of a society.”
665
 This view 
advocates a context-sensitive approach to the understanding of religious offense. The 
diversity of legal provisions and restrictions regarding freedom of speech and 
expression in different countries is representative of the point that Parekh and Taylor 
have stressed.  
Take for example, the legality involved in above mentioned cases in the countries 
which became central to the controversy – Britain in case of Rushdie affair and 
Denmark in case of cartoon controversy.
666
 The Satanic Verses was prohibited on legal 
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grounds in numerous Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Bangladesh, 
Sudan, Malaysia, among others. In Britain a case was filed by Abdal Hussain 
Choudhury, on behalf of the British Muslim Action Front
667
, to the Chief Metropolitan 
Stipendiary Magistrate to issue summons against Rushdie and his publishers for alleged 
blasphemous libel.
668
 When the appeal was rejected, he appealed to the Queen’s Bench 
Division of the High Court. The High Court upheld the decision of the Metropolitan 
Magistrate and commented that even if the publication was religiously offensive to the 
sensibilities of the Muslims, the blasphemy law in Britain was applied only to the 
protection of Christian religion, and the same to could not be extended to protect any 
other religion.
669
 Choudhury took the appeal to the ECtHR. In Choudhury v. United 
Kingdom the appellant contended that the English law was prejudicial against Islam. 
However, the appeal was declared inadmissible by the Commission, as it held that there 
was no positive obligation on states under ECtHR laws to protect all religious 
sensibilities.
670
 The central claim made by the appellant in these cases was based on the 
argument that the law of blasphemy should be extended to protect all religious groups 
in the country, and could not be limited to the protection of only the religion of the 
majority. Though the law at the time could not be invoked in the case, it built a larger 
consensus on the subject, which was also reflected in the abolition of blasphemy law
671
 
and it being replaced by a more egalitarian and inclusive Religious and Racial Hatred 
Act 2006. 
In the cartoon controversy, although complaints were filed, the editors or publishers 
were never taken to court since the Danish Public Prosecutor decided that the cartoons 
did not violate the law. The Danish penal code makes it a criminal offence “to 
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publicly mock or degrade the religious beliefs or worship of any legal religious 
community” (Penal Code 140). It also makes it an offence for anyone to make 
utterances that are “threatening, insulting or degrading to a group of persons due to 
their race, skin colour, national or ethnic origin, faith or sexual orientation” (Penal 
Code 266b). However, the Regional Public Prosecutor in Viborg, who was entrusted 
with the investigation in the cartoon case, maintained that though some cartoons had 
capacity to ridicule or express disdain for Muslims’ religious beliefs,  as protected 
under blasphemy clause, it did not constitute an infringement of the clause.
672
 It 
further exempted it from violation of racism clause as it only depicted an individual 
and could not be held to mean against whole community. Though the Public 
Prosecutor maintained that freedom of expression had to be exercised with respect for 
other human rights, he argued that the journalists responsible for the publication of the 
cartoons could not be held to be in violation of the legal codes.
673
 The legal question 
in the cartoon controversy was whether the publication of cartoons qualified as acts 
punishable within the penal codes of Denmark, and the Public Prosecutor provided a 
wide interpretation of the law claiming exemption of such acts from law under the 
guise of editorial freedom. The legal provisions in Britain and Denmark differed on 
how to treat blasphemous libel. Britain had a law against blasphemy, but it only 
protected Christian religion, and although the courts agreed that the novel was 
religiously offensive, the limitations of the blasphemy law became the justification for 
the courts to reject a case against Rushdie and the publishers of the novel. In 
Denmark, on the other hand, there existed provisions within penal codes that defined 
religious offence in clear terms, and was applicable to all religious communities, but 
the Public Prosecutor did not find the law applicable to the kind of offence in the 
cartoon controversy. On these bases the governments in the respective countries 
decided not to act legally against the publications.  
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communal disturbances, including violence was reported from different places in India 
where Muslims took to street to protest against the book and its author Rushdie. In case of 
the cartoon controversy, a few newspapers in India reprinted the controversial cartoons 
published by Jyllands-Posten which included the Patna edition of the Times of India.
674
 
The government reacted immediately against the initial publishers, and this prevented 
large scale reprints. The arrests were primarily under section 295(A) and 153(A) of IPC, 
which are meant to prevent religious offense and incitement of hate. Moreover, in an 
official release, the Indian government made its position clear, that the government was 
“deeply concerned about the growing controversy over the publication of cartoons that 
offend the Muslim community worldwide,” and that it was “incumbent on all of us to be 
sensitive to the beliefs and sentiments of others and avoid all actions that cause hurt to 
them.”
675
 The government was concerned in the way the protests against the cartoons had 
turned violent and converted to riots in different cities like Srinagar, Patna, Lucknow. The 
Indian government, fearing strong protest and demonstrations, cancelled the proposed state 
visit by Danish Prime Minister, Rasmussen.
676
 The government had indicated that it was 
not satisfied with the way Denmark had handled the situation, especially refusing legal 
actions against Jyllands-Posten. At the same time it had also signalled that if any one 
reprinted or published such cartoons, it would be dealt strongly under the available laws.  
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The legal means available with the Indian government were primarily the statutory laws 
like section 295(A) and 153(A) of the IPC, and section 95 of the CrPC. Section 295(A) 
and 153(A) are punitive in nature, where violation of section 295(A) can amount to arrest 
of publishers or authors who are found to be deliberately engaged in outraging religious 
feelings or insulting religion or religious beliefs of any class, and violation of section 
153(A) can lead to similar punishments for those who are found to be engaged in 
spreading disharmony, ill feeling or hatred between different religious groups. Section 95 
of CrPC, on the other hand, is preventive in nature and pertaining to seizure and forfeiture 
of publications in case such publications are found violating section 295(A) and 153(A) 
of the IPC. Indian laws, in that sense, do not just protect the enraged communities from 
religious hurt, but also provides strong protection to religion and religious beliefs of 
different communities from insults. This provides a wide net for the government 
authorities to act in cases where a publication is found religiously offensive and 
contentious. In cases of proscription and forfeiture, the only legal reprieve is section 96 of 
CrPC, which allows the aggrieved party to approach court against the governments’ 
action. However, the law is so framed that rather than the government defending its act of 
seizure/forfeiture in the court, the onus of proving innocence falls on the author/publisher 
where they are expected to justify that their acts do not fall under the category of offense 
as defined by the above mentioned statutory laws.
677
 Legal scholars opine that such laws 
not only make it very difficult for the advocates/defenders of freedom of speech and 
expression, but also paves way for the executive to respond to the claims of hurt 
sentiments, without serious examination of either the scope of the law, or the substantive 
principles laid down by various courts in such cases.
678
 The above discussions reflect the 
context-specific nature of laws and their implementation for similar cases in different 
societies. In every society, the nature of laws to restrict freedom of expression 
corresponds to the needs and challenges that led to the creation of such laws, and allows 
its existence in whatever form. In UK, for example, a need was realized, according to 
changing demography and nature of society, to abolish blasphemy laws, and replace it 
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with a different set of laws that protected all religious and racial communities. In the case 
of India, the creations of the statutory laws bore a colonial legacy, and were created to 
respond to a specific set of issues that were dominant in the Indian society – to curb the 
tendency to ignite communal hatred that led to violence. Subsequently these laws 
amended, as and when required, according to the demands of the context.   
2. Governing Freedom of Speech and Expression in India: The 
Colonial Laws and its later avatars   
The statutory laws that continue to define freedom of speech and expression in 
contemporary India had colonial origins. In chapter 2, I have shown that colonial subjects 
were portrayed as highly excitable and corruptible by lawmakers like Macaulay and 
Fitzjames Stephen. It was claimed that these emotional subjects were easily prone to 
taking offense and responding violently, especially where the issue of religion was 
involved.
679
 The context of communal clashes at different times laid the foundation for 
addition of new laws in the penal codes drafted by Macaulay, and adopted in 1860. The 
British approach to laws governing freedom of speech and expression reflected a two 
pronged strategy, strictly guided by the instrumental logic to serve the colonial interests. 
On the one hand, they aimed to seek legitimacy among Indians as neutral arbitrator of 
conflicting religious interests of different religious groups, and for this purpose they had a 
conscious and pragmatic approach, towards the nature and scope of each law they 
constituted.
680
 On the other hand, for all practical purposes, they wanted to avoid being 
seen as supporting a particular religious community, and hence, during religious 
controversies, they practised “selective censorship” based on instrumental calculations. At 
the same time, Indians had a dubious attitude towards freedom of speech and expression in 
the colonial context. So, they were demanding extensive freedom of expression in order to 
criticize the government, an argument derived from the consequentialist theories of free 
speech, which claimed that free speech was necessary to arrive closer to truth and 
beneficial for governance. However, where such liberty was seen as leading to religious 
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offense, Indians not only demanded for censorship from the government, but also 
participated actively in the legislatures to ensure successful creation of new laws. 
Legislative debates of the time reveal that they were not just mute observers in the law 
making process, rather they participated actively in critically analyzing the scope and 
limits of such laws. During the making of section 153(A) and 295(A), Indian legislatures 
made significant impact both in criticizing the colonial government, and at same time, 
pitching for a rational law that could prevent vilification of religious personalities, and 
incitement to religious hatred.
681
 Several leaders also cautioned against granting too much 
power to the executive as it could impact the freedom of speech and expression in 
significant way.
682
 However, an overwhelming support to the proposed amendments and 
additions in the IPC reflected a general consensus among Indians leaders that freedom of 
speech and expression should be limited in cases where it could cause religious harm or 
incite hatred in the name of religion or other forms of community based identity.  
This analysis presents a picture of the free speech debate in the colonial period as 
contrary to the one forwarded by legal scholar Arun Thiruvengadam, who characterizes 
the different historical periods in India’s free speech experience, and argues that during 
the anti-colonial struggle it presented a “universalist” nature, that got subsequently 
replaced by “particularistic” concerns during the constitution making process, and led to 
the inclusion of several grounds of restrictions.
683
 I have shown, on the basis of debates 
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surrounding religiously offensive publications that such a “universalist” approach never 
existed, and the Indian leaders, in the name of probable harm that such publications had 
caused, aggressively advocated its curtailment through legal means.
684
 At best, the 
position of Indian leaders on freedom of speech and expression can be described as an 
ambiguous one when the same freedom was used to vilify religious texts and religious 
personalities.  
The “particularistic concerns” that Thiruvengadam has discussed, dominated the 
debates in the post-independence period. These concerns included the context of 
partition and the communal violence that it accompanied. It inspired the constitution 
makers to severely limit the fundamental right promised under article 19(1)(a) by 
adding a number of caveats under article 19(2). In this split that was manufactured 
between article 19(1)(a) and 19(2) there was also an inherent dichotomy. This 
dichotomy, as also argued by legal scholar Lawrence Liang, was that article 19(1)(a) 
imagined a citizen as rational subject capable of exercising its complete autonomy in 
speech acts, whereas article 19(2) reflects the challenges of an affective public sphere, 
where the individual is seen as corruptible, and prone to outrage and provocation.
685
 
This same imagination about majority of Indian citizens being emotional beings, who 
lacked “maturity” particularly on matters related to religion, also became the rallying 
point for the introduction of significant amendments to the constitution and other 
statutory laws. The law makers took it as their duty to provide a safety net in order to 
protect common people from the misuse of freedom of speech and expression. Law was 
also seen here as a medium to inculcate the values of toleration and disciplining 
citizens.  
Two inter-related points need to be made about the amendments of the constitutional 
provisions as well as the statutory laws governing freedom of speech and expression. 
Firstly, each of these amendments was introduced in a context of urgency. This urgency 
was borne out of the challenges that the executive was facing at different moments. For 
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example, the first amendment followed the decisions of the courts, where a very 
expansive definition of article 19(1) was provided by the judiciary. The government felt 
that in the context of partition and the challenges offered to internal security by the 
separatist movements, such judgments could encourage the misuse of freedom of 
speech and expression. Similarly, when the statutory laws were amended in 1961 and 
1969, it was in reaction to the series of communal riots that had occurred on each of 
these occasions in different parts of the country. The government had significant 
evidence to prove a negative role played by the regional press in deteriorating 
communal situations, and the amendments were aimed at making laws more stringent, 
in order to prevent the misuse of freedom of speech and expression in the guise of press 
freedom. A second interrelated point is about the approach of the lawmakers. As the 
laws were amended in a context of urgency, there was a general lack of “legislative 
pragmatism.”
686
 The debates in the Parliament suggest that the concern about the 
context overshadowed any concern about the possible repercussions of the changes 
introduced in law. The issue about freedom of speech and expression scarcely appeared 
in the debates, which were dominated by a concern to increase the powers of the 
executive, to deal with communal violence. Even if concerns about freedom of speech 
and expression were raised in the Parliament, it was used as a theoretical tool by the 
opposition to attack the government, and to expose its insensitivity towards 
fundamental rights. The debates did not reflect at any stage the multiple impacts that 
any amendment act could have on the future of freedom of speech and expression. For 
example, it was assumed that sections 295(A) or 153(A) were being amended to control 
press freedom, in order to prevent its role in inciting hatred among different religious 
communities. Overlooked, though, was the possible impact that such changes could 
have on other forms of expression, such as publication of scholarly work, especially 
controversial historical accounts, satires, novels, or any other form of art, including 
movies, paintings, among others. There was no discussion about how to prevent the 
possible overspill of the amendments on freedom required for these forms of 
expression. Each time such amendments were debated in the Parliament, in 1961 and 
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1969, the concern for public order trumped all other concerns, including those related to 
scope of freedom of speech and expression in general.  
This overemphasis on public tranquillity and order also guided the proactive role of 
government agencies, in censoring or forfeiting publications or arresting authors/ 
publishers, when controversies related to such publications surfaced wherever it was 
claimed to be hurting religious sentiments, or inciting religious hatred among 
communities. The underlying assumption, that the Indian citizens lacked the capacity to 
handle hurtful speech, and could be easily swayed by the passions released if the subject 
under discussion was religion, allows as Pratap Bhanu Mehta argues, for a paternalistic 
role of the state, where the state takes part in the controversy only as a protector of 
public order, and not as a defender of free speech.
687
 This assumption is reflected in the 
IPC which uses language of “outrage”, “disgust”, and “pain” to regulate speech, and 
also in the fact, that most statutory laws regulating religiously offensive speech acts are 
cognizable offences
688
 and are non-bailable
689
 in nature. The effectiveness of these laws 
are further buttressed by the legal defence such laws enjoy under the aegis of article 
19(2) of the constitution, that pronounces “reasonable restrictions” to the freedom of 
speech and expression. Consequently, the laws governing freedom of speech and 
expression in India have allowed a wide net for executive control. As a result the 
authorities deem it prudent to play it over-safe whenever they sense a threat to law and 
order , and the general approach is to ban a book, or proscribe it, or/and arrest the 
author/publisher, at the slightest controversy where the claim of religious offence is 
involved. The authorities claim that the aggrieved person has every right to approach 
the relevant court and obtain a judicial verdict in his/her favour. On the one hand, it 
helps officials to temporarily pacify the prevalent law and order situation, and on the 
other hand, if there is any breach of peace following the judgment from the court, the 
executive can put the ball in the court of the judiciary, and disclaim the responsibility of 
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the incumbent situation, by citing its alertness at the earlier instance.
690
 In the next 
section, I shall discuss the role of the judiciary in defining “reasonable restrictions” vis-
a-vis freedom of speech and expression, and how its attitude and approach impacts, the 
debates about free speech. 
3. “Reasonable Restrictions” to Freedom of Speech and Expression: 
Courts and the Question of Religiously Offensive Publications 
From colonial times, the courts have played a significant role in defining the scope of 
freedom of speech and expression.
691
 However, the importance of this role of the court 
became more prominent after independence, when freedom of speech and expression 
became a fundamental right, and the judiciary was hailed by the constitution makers as 
the sentinel of fundamental rights. One of the central questions with which I began this 
thesis was: how have the courts in India interpreted laws and defined “reasonable 
restrictions” concerning freedom of speech and expression vis-a-vis the claims of 
religious offence? This issue has been discussed in chapter 4, where I argue that in the 
process of judging claims about religious offense, the courts have primarily employed 
two set of approaches. On the one hand, unlike the international standards, the Indian 
courts have downplayed the “manner-matter” distinctions with regard to speech acts, 
and on the other hand it has maintained a distinction between the punitive laws and the 
preventive laws. Both these approaches give a wide latitude for executive action over 
contentious publications, that were claimed to be hurting religious sensibilities. The 
emphasis on the form or “manner” in which an idea is presented helps the court in 
judging two important aspects: a) the intention of the author or mens rea as required 
under section 295(A) and 153(A) of the IPC; and b) to measure the intensity of the 
“hurt” caused by the publication for which the court uses the “reasonable man’s 
standards”, which mandates that the publication should be judged from the standards of 
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strong, rational individual, and not one who is emotional and prone to feeling hurt even 
at small issues. However, the nature of statutory laws like 153(A), which allows for 
punishment if there is an attempt to incite hatred between different communities; and at 
the same time the absence of clear demarcation between “manner” and “matter” of 
speech, has allowed the courts to also take into account the “matter” of the publications 
in judging such cases. For example, the freedom to criticize religion is only allowed by 
the courts if it pertains to practices of that religion, and does not extend to its principles 
or basic tenets. In order to judge whether a publication has exceeded the permissible 
limits, the courts look into the “matter”, or content of the publication. At times, even if 
no vile language is used, the publication may include “matter” which is prohibited. The 
use of restrained language, or even claims of historical truth, the court has ruled, cannot 
be a justification for that publication. The same applies for cases judged for section 
153(A). Even if language of the publication is docile, it may include ‘matter’ that can 
incite hatred among religious communities, and hence falls under the category of 
punishable speech act. In terms of doctrine, this is in sharp contrast to the international 




The distinction that the courts have maintained between the “punitive” and “preventive” 
laws is equally significant. The courts have held that in cases involving punitive laws, 
like section 295(A) and section 153(A) of the IPC, which may lead to punishing the 
author/publisher, it is mandatory to prove mens rea, or that there was deliberate and 
malicious intention involved in causing religious offense through the publication. But in 
cases which involve seizure or forfeiture of the publication, primarily under section 95 
of the CrPC, the courts have held that looking for mens rea, is not a mandatory 
requirement. It has been left to the judgment of the executive to proscribe or seize 
publications, on the basis of the prospective harm the publication can cause, either in 
the form of inciting hatred or hurting religious sensibilities. So, in order to punish an 
author/publisher, the government needs to prove the intention of the individual, but in 
case of seizure or forfeiture the perception of the government officer shall be supreme. 
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The repercussion is that, in cases where there are complaints against any publication on 
account of insulting any religion or inciting religious hatred, even if the government is 
not able to ensure that the author/publisher is penalized, it can proscribe or forfeiture 
contentious publications. This position renders a greater vulnerability to the publication 
against which charges of causing religious offense are levelled.    
In the above discussion, I summarized the dominant approach that courts’ judgments 
reflect in its dealing with the subject of religious offense. In the next part, I highlight the 
grounds on which the courts allow restrictions of freedom of speech and expression 
when the claim of religious offense is raised against a publication. Firstly, it should be 
pointed out that in various cases the courts in general, and Supreme Court in particular, 
has upheld the constitutionality of the statutory laws that the executives use to restrict 
freedom of speech and expression.
693
 As of now, the courts have taken a position that 
these laws fall well within the definition of “reasonable restrictions” as provided under 
article 19(2). Further, the most important justifications used by the courts for upholding 
the restrictions over freedom of speech and expression include: a) the threat to public 
order posed by the publication, against which the claim of religious offense is made; 
and b) to protect the values of secularism and religious pluralism. The former is 
primarily based on an assumption that aggravated form of insult targeted against any 
religion, or incitement of religious hatred, would invariably lead to problem of 
maintaining public order, and the authorities must take prompt action in such situation. 
However, the courts have also evolved certain balancing and protective mechanism 
with regard to executive action. For example, it has been made mandatory by the court 
that a notification mentioning the reasons for action should be issued by the concerned 
authority before a publication is seized or forfeited. Similarly, in case of arrest of 
author/publisher the authority needs to prove in the court that the act was carried with 
deliberate and malicious intent. The problem with these balancing mechanisms, 
however, is that either of these – proving intentions of the arrested individual or the 
question of validity of the notification issued before forfeiture – can only be tested on 
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the floor of the courts, which can only happen at a later stage. Considering that the 
courts take long to deliver judgments (as discussed in chapter 5), the complexities 
involved get amplified. So, broadly it can be said that government officials can act in 
these cases based on their own judgment of the situation, which is often guided by the 
instrumental logic of acting against any publication and its author/publisher, against 
whom the charges of causing religious offense is made, in order to maintain public 
tranquillity. 
The second argument for restricting freedom of speech and expression is that, though 
important, freedom of speech and expression does not enjoy any special status in the 
Indian context,
694
 and needed to be balanced against competing fundamental rights. The 
doctrine of proportionality
695
 reigns supreme in such cases, and the courts have 
maintained that right to profess, practise and propagate ones religion guaranteed under 
article 25 is one such provision, with which the right to free speech needs to be 
balanced, when the issue of religious offense crops up. Other than this, the courts have 
also stressed that in a multicultural secular country, like India, it is the duty of state to 
protect religious interests of all citizens. This argument has been extended to the 
protection of religious principles, religious texts, and even religious personage, from 
attack, as such act is deemed to be a direct attack on faith of the citizens. The courts also 
try to construct a distinction between criticizing religious practices or rituals, and 
insulting its principles or symbols, by putting the previous under the category of 
permissible speech. This distinction, however, as free speech scholars like Peter Jones 
and Eric Barendt have shown in another context, is very difficult to maintain and prone 
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to dissolve, which would mean that the authorities could act against any criticism of 
religion.
696
 At the least, it can be concluded that the position of courts in such cases 
reflects a sense of ambiguity vis-a-vis the use of statutory laws, and adds significantly 
to the scope of subjectivity in its interpretation.  
The above discussions reflect two prominent aspects about the courts position on the 
subject of religious offense produced by a publication. Firstly, the courts appear to be 
providing legal patronage to state actions through a very expansive interpretation of 
statutory laws and constitutional limitations
697
, and secondly, it practices legal 
paternalism, whereby it guides the citizens regarding what to say, how to say and how 
much to say.
698
 At the same time, the language of the statutory laws, along with the 
position of the courts in different cases, provides a sense of immunity to religions from 
criticism. All of this has a deep impact even on historical analysis and other scholarly 
work concerning religion. In a way, any critical publication on the subject of religion, or 
a literary piece like novel on the subject of religion, automatically becomes a subject of 
potential controversy, which restrains the scope for freedom of speech and expression.  
The position exhibited by the courts on the subject of religious offense adds to the 
already existing ambiguity vis-a-vis statutory laws. The impact on freedom to speech 
and expression is further compounded due to the procedural and functional limitations 
attached to the legal process in India. The procedural dimensions of legal process that I 
have discussed in this work, include the practise of “overcharging” and “spurious 
charging”, provision to file suits against the publication in any part of the country, and 
the time taken in the judicial process to complete leading to severe delays in delivering 
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judgment. These issues have a direct impact on the freedom of speech and expression of 
the author/publisher of the publication, which is claimed to be contentious due to its 
offensive content. The action by government officials create a sense that the publication 
has been held as problematic, and hence avoidable, even before any judicial trial. For 
the author/publisher, the legal process itself becomes a form of punishment – both in 
the form of financial loss as well as psychological harassment. The practise of 
“overcharging” and “spurious charging” is used by authorities to ensure that the 
publication is no longer available for consumption, primarily to avoid issues related to 
public order. The provision that allows cases to be filed anywhere in the country where 
the impact of the publication is expected, allows for harassment of the author/publisher 
as they have to appear as respondents, in the courts under whose jurisdiction the case is 
filed. Though both these issues act as impediments, the most serious harm is caused by 
the amount of time taken by the courts to deliver final judgment. As shown in chapter 5, 
the average time taken by the High Courts to deliver the final judgement in cases of 
contentious publications is 2.63 years and if the case travels to the Supreme Court the 
judgment takes 6.87 years. This severely jolts the hope for substantive justice from the 
judiciary. After all this delay, even if the courts orders in favour of the author/publisher, 
it amounts to severe loss of time and money, and also, the content of the publication 
might lose its relevance. Therefore the delay indirectly creates a state of indeterminacy 
and anxiety, and even a positive outcome may appear too costly. Along with this, the 
history of conflicting and confusing precedents set by courts, in its different judgments, 
has only made the law look more ambiguous and subjective. This inconsistency only 
adds to the fear and uncertainty for the author/publisher, about the approach the court 
would take in their case. As a result, considering all these issues related to law and legal 
process in India, the author/publisher, as in the case of Wendy Doniger’s The Hindus, 
might agree for an out-of-court settlement, thereby conforming to the demands of 
complaining groups.       
The aspects of law and legal process discussed above also contribute in strengthening 
the role of non-state actors in enforcing censorship. These non-state actors, which 
primarily claim to be representing the offended community, use the language of law to 
justify their grievances. It is also reflected in the way law and legal process is used by 
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the non-state actors, to express their grievances. This can, either be in the form of writ 
petitions (both civil as well as criminal) filed in the courts against the publication and its 
author/publisher
699
, or as a justificatory means to exert pressure on the government 
authorities to act against the publication and its author/publisher, or it is also used as a 
legitimate strategic tool to create public opinion in their favour
700
. The long legal 
process, that could be tiring and costly, and at the same time the ambiguity in legal 
interpretation, produce an environment where the author/publisher is forced to impose 
self-censorship – a phenomena that Cook and Heilmann call “public self-censorship.” 
This can either result in amendments to the original text including significant 
exclusions, or deletion of controversial portions, or even pulping or withdrawing the 
publication in controversy.   
4. The Legal Discourse on Censorship and the Role of Non-state 
Actors 
The non-state actors, prominently the socio-religious groups, played significant role in 
the process of censorship even before independence. But after independence their role 
took a more central stage as they mobilised against publications they considered 
offensive, and justified this practise in the name of constitutional provisions. They also 
claimed that it was the duty of the secular Indian state to protect their religious feelings 
from hurt. These protests and demonstration were seen by the Indian state as democratic 
rights of the citizens to display their grievances against the publications they felt were 
religiously offensive.
701
 However, there was an important caveat attached to this formal 
recognition of the democratic rights- that the protests and demonstrations should not be 
violent in any form. However, scholars on censorship in India have shown that the 
principle was violated at number of occasions, and in fact, violence became the 
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dominant form of expression, used by the aggrieved groups to exhibit their anguish 
against contentious publications.
702
 These ranged from threatening the 
author/publisher/seller of the publication, to attacking their houses, or vandalizing 
property to physical assaults. It has led some scholars to conclude that in India informal 
censorship
703
 is more threatening to freedom of speech and expression than any form of 
state censorship. Some scholars have tried to link the growth of informal censorship 
with the rise of Hindu nationalism in late 1980s
704
, and others have linked it to the 




, made possible due to changing 
nature of public sphere, due to diversification of media during this period. I have 
shown, through different case studies, that these arguments have deep evidential 
problems. Though the concern in these studies about the role of non-state actors and its 
threat on freedom of speech and expression are understandable, it is not a new 
phenomenon. The non-state actors have always been at the centre of enforcing 
censorship, either by launching formal complaints against publications in the local 
police station, or mobilizing and demonstrating against the publication to express their 
hurt sentiments in order to exert pressure on the officials to act. They have also taken 
the legal route by filing petitions against such publications, or taking part in the judicial 
process by filing affidavits in the court supporting government’s decision to seize or 
forfeiture contentious publications.  
I have argued in this thesis that, in order to understand the role of non-state actors in 
censorship, one needs to view their modes of participation in censorship in two 
different ways. One is their role in the legal process, whereby they organize 
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demonstrations and protests in order to attract the attention of state authorities towards 
their grievances, or they file petitions against such publications in the court, or they 
present their views against offensive publications in the court as an affected party. 
The other role is where their form of protests includes threatening the 
author/publisher/seller of the publication, or the use of violence including vandalizing 
property, or causing physical harm to author/publisher/seller. The problem with most 
existing studies on censorship in India is that they look at both of these aspects as part 
of the larger politics of these groups to impose their viewpoint, which is considered 
by these studies as antithetical to the spirit of freedom of speech and expression. I 
have maintained that, these studies use a teleological method, based on the 
assumptions about the intentions of the groups in question, and in the process, it is 
often overlooked or ignored, that the former mode of participation is well within the 
legal and democratic rights of the individuals who form these groups. To demonstrate 
or protest against a publication, or demanding the state to act against such 
publications, needs to be delineated from the other mode of participation- one that 
includes use of violence, which is legally prohibited in any democratic set up. Both 
these roles should be viewed differently, even if both have tendency to affect the 
scope of freedom of speech and expression. 
This distinction also helps us to understand the problem with the view of scholars who 
argue that, on account of the possibility of misuse and manipulation of laws by non-
state actors, all the statutory laws governing freedom of expression should be 
repealed.
707
 These scholars overlook the fact that if the statutory laws are completely 
revoked, it would close all doors to raise grievances, even if genuine, against religiously 
offensive publications. More importantly, it would further strengthen the role of state 
authorities, who could then act based on their discretion to use available laws, in the 
name of protecting public order. The absence of statutory laws would also reduce the 
available space for the court to decide the validity and legality of executive action in 
such cases.  
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The courts have also been vigilant about non-state actors’ use of threats and violence to 
impose censorship. For example, the courts have advised the authorities to judge the 
incumbent situation rationally, in case a complaint is received, without getting 
influenced by the pressure asserted by the socio-religious groups.
708
 It has even held 
that the threat of disruption of public order by such groups is in violation of the law, and 
should be strictly dealt by law enforcing agencies. Further, the court has also taken 
serious note that state authorities relent to the demands of such groups and act 
erroneously at times under pressure from the non-state actors.
709
 Recently in the case of 
Perumal Murugan, the Tamil Nadu High Court specified a preferred procedure to be 
followed, while dealing with the controversial publication, when the claims about it 
being offensive are raised by socio-religious groups. The courts have, therefore, 
exhibited a zero tolerance approach towards use of violence or threat to public order 
disruptions by these groups.  
5. In Lieu of Conclusion 
As the discussions above reflect, law and legal process in India (including the role of 
courts), as in other democracies, plays an extremely significant role in defining the 
scope of freedom of speech and expression. Most of the statutory laws used to restrict 
freedom of speech and expression are colonial in nature, but the lawmakers and the 
courts have continuously stressed its continuing relevance in contemporary India. The 
lawmakers reflected a paternalistic attitude which is reflective in the debates of the 
Constituent Assembly, and in the Parliamentary debates, when the amendments to the 
statutory laws were introduced. Their response to the emergent situation was to enlarge 
the scope for intervention by the executive in matters related to freedom of speech and 
expression, so that they could effectively curtail this right, as and when required. They 
were concerned about protecting the citizens from the misuse of freedom of speech and 
expression. In an attempt to realize this aim, and also to respond effectively to the 
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context which necessitated such laws, the lawmakers made laws which were vague in 
language and ambiguous in its scope. The responsibility to protect the fundamental 
rights of citizens was left for the courts, and was hailed as the sentinel of fundamental 
rights. 
However, an analysis of court’s judgments, particularly in cases which involved the 
claims of religious offense against a publication, reflect a sense of legal paternalism in 
guiding citizens about the form or manner and matter of speech, suggesting ways about 
how to express oneself harmlessly. At the same time, it seems to be extending legal 
patronage to state action by defining its scope widely, particularly for the maintenance of 
public order and protecting the pluralist and secular values of Indian society. I have 
argued that this approach of the court not only provides legal acceptance and validity to 
the category of “religious offense,” but also blurs the thin line between insult to religion 
and criticism of religion, making religion almost immune from any form of enquiry 
(either historical or sociological), or being subjected to satirical references, or any other 
form of innovative interpretations. Furthermore, the procedural and functional limitations 
of the legal process, which primarily includes the delay in reaching to conclusive 
judgments and high degree of subjective inconsistency in the use of different tests or 
doctrines in the interpretation of laws, create hurdles in free exercise of one’s right to free 
speech and expression. The paternalistic attitude of the lawmakers and the court along 
with the problems inherent in the legal process creates conditions where the role of non-
state actors (like socio-religious groups) is not only encouraged but also attains significant 
success in imposing censorship on publications claimed to be religiously offensive. In the 
process reasonability of restrictions, as required under article 19(2) of the constitution to 
regulate fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression, is barely defined and 
remains open to subjective interpretations. This poses the most serious threat to the scope 
of freedom of speech and expression in independent India.        
6. An Agenda for Future Research 
Considering the scope of current work, I limited my study to analyse the role law and 
legal process, particularly the courts, play in the censorship of publications against the 
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claims of religious offence. This by itself draws a set of limitations within which my 
project is structured. Firstly, in the process of censorship, courts are not the sole players. 
There are other stakeholders like non-state actors such as socio-religious groups, about 
which I have discussed briefly, but future research could focus more on their role as 
there are cases of censorship where their acts defy the sanctions of law.
710
 
Concentrating on law and legal process therefore sets its own limitations. Secondly, this 
being a study about censorship of publications, although I have briefly touched on case 
laws regarding censorship of other forms of expression or speech acts, they need further 
and more detailed analysis. Gautam Bhatia’s work explores a great deal of this. 
However, if a comparative study is done on the case laws involving different forms of 
speech acts, I believe the results could add to the popular understanding about freedom 
of speech and expression. For example, a study comparing whether the nature and 
scope of restrictions allowed by the courts on issues of religious defamation similar to 
that claimed under other cases related to expression, like, defamation of individuals, or 
press freedom, or election speeches. Other than this a comparative study of legal 
provisions and case laws within South Asia among countries like India, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, and Nepal, among others, could enrich our understanding about comparative 
constitutionalism and at the same time help to map the state of freedom of speech and 
expression among these third world nations, most of which are modern democracies.
711
 
Also this research primarily deals with the legal aspect of the debate over censorship in 
India. There are other aspects, like the role of economic considerations, or the role of 
“publicity” as highlighted by William Mazzarella and Raminder Kaur, in their work on 
censorship in India.
712
 This area is also highly under-researched and has potential for 
future research. Above all this, there is another area in which future research in the field 
of censorship could develop – the impact of digitization and internet, and how it is 
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transforming the discourse of freedom of speech and expression. This holds relevance 
even for a kind of study undertaken in this thesis, because these new forms of mediation 
have introduced significant changes in the landscape under which the debate on 
freedom of expression seems to be operating. Take for example, the case of Wendy 
Doniger’s book The Hindu. The publishers decided to withdraw the court case and 
reach a settlement outside the court, which included the pulping of the text. However, 
the digital version of the book was already available on the web and recorded a very 
high circulation. Reacting to this, Doniger said: “I am glad that, in the age of the 
Internet, it is no longer possible to suppress a book. The Hindus is available on Kindle; 
and if legal means of publication fail, the Internet has other ways of keeping books in 
circulation.”
713
 At the same time, the socio-religious groups have also become vigilant 
of this new development and have tried to counter it through the legal route. Take for 
example, the case of Yogesh Master, the author of Dhundi which was forfeited by the 
state officials, after complains from Sri Ram Sene, that the book had mocked the Hindu 
deity Ganesha, and hurt the religious sentiments of Hindus. While the case was still in 
the court, a fresh affidavit was filed by the leader of Sri Ram Sene, claiming that 
Yogesh Master was circulating the digitized version of the book on internet, and it was 
in violation of the court’s position.
714
 These controversies are new to the politics of 
censorship in India, but very relevant for future research. Legal mechanisms and the 
role of state in controlling the virtual world, and its impact on different forms of 
expression, is a very promising field where future research could be extended. 
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